Montreal’s REM – The Canada Line’s Financial Clone


Like the Canada Line light-metro, REM’s funding comes from the the Caisse de dépot et placement du Québec (CDPQ) and being built by Canadian favourite, SNC Lavalin. Bombardier Inc., again got pipped at the post by a desperate Alstom/Hitachi conglomerate desperately trying to sell their light-metro system.

Like the Canada Line, is grossly under built for what it will do.

The Canada Line was a Gordon Campbell/BC Liberal P-3 sham, because no sane banker would invest in a light-metro P-3, but the Campbell government waived “risk” (which is the hall mark of a P-3) and guaranteed a return on investment to the winning bidder.

SNC Lavilin/Bombardier was bidding against SNC Lavalin ROTEM and no surprise, SNC Lavalin won.

Even though TransLink claims impossibly high ridership on the Canada line, TransLink pays $100 to $110 million annually to the SNC lead consortium (including Caisse de dépot) who operate the Canada Line.

The Canada line with truncated 40 metre station platforms can only operate 2-car, 41 metre long trains, shorter than many modern trams today.

Internationally the Canada line is considered a “white elephant”, which the majority of ridership comes from Richmond, South Delta & Surrey buses, compelled by agreement to forcibly transfer their passengers onto the the mini-metro.

The judge (Hon. judge Pittfield) overseeing the Susan Heyes lawsuit against TransLink over lost business with the Canada Line construction, called the bidding process a “charade”.

With the same businesses and organizations involved, I am afraid that transit customers in Montreal will be involved in the same sort of “charade” with REM in Montreal.


The Réseau Express Métropolitain: the multi-billion dollar light rail project Montreal never asked for

By Taylor Noakes

Montreal from the summit of Mont Royal. Image: Getty.

The Réseau Express Métropolitain (REM) is the 67-kilometre, C$6.3bn light rail project Montreal never asked for.

It is the single largest transit project in Montreal in half a century. Not since the construction of the Métro has there been as bold a proposal: an entirely new mass-transit system that would have the effect of radically altering the city’s urban landscape.

Conceived, planned and costed by the Province of Quebec’s institutional investor, the Caisse de dépot et placement du Québec (CDPQ), the REM is currently under construction and slated to become operational between 2021 and 2023.

Once completed, it is supposed to provide high-frequency, intermediate-volume light-rail service on a regional level: connecting suburbs with the city centre along three axes and linking Montreal’s central business district with its international airport.

The REM may even connect to an as-yet unbuilt baseball stadium, and politicians have even proposed extending it over hundreds of kilometres to provide inter-city service. Indeed, the REM has been strongly endorsed – by both the federal and provincial governments that back it – as a panacea for all of Greater Montreal’s transit and traffic congestion problems.

Since it was first proposed in 2015, the REM has been championed above all else as a guaranteed-to-succeed “public-public partnership”. A win-win, where various levels of government cooperate and coordinate with an arm’s-length government agency to produce much-needed new transit and transport infrastructure.

Unlike the more commonly known public-private partnership (of which there are some notable recent failures in Quebec), the obvious insinuation is that – this time – there’s no private interest or profit to worry about.

PR aside, the pension funds managed by the CDPQ are private, not public, wealth. The CDPQ’s entire raison d’etre is to profit. It has even gone to the lengths of “mandating” the REM to provide it an annual profit of about 10 per cent, a cost to be assumed by the governments of Quebec and Canada in the event the REM isn’t profitable.

The law that has made the REM possible has other interesting components. The REM is legally distinct from and superior to other public transit agencies and the extant regional planning authority. It has exclusive access to publicly-funded transit infrastructure. There’s even a “non-compete” clause with the city’s existing mass transit services, as well as special surtax on all properties within a 1km radius of each of the 26 proposed stations.

This latter element takes on a new dimension when you consider the CDPQ’s real-estate arm, Ivanhoé-Cambridge, has a near total monopoly on the properties surrounding the future downtown nexus of the REM, and is invested in suburban shopping centres that will soon host REM stations.

It seems that Montreal isn’t so much getting a new mass transit system as a pension fund is using a new transport system to stimulate growth in a faltering if not moribund commercial and residential property sector.

Quebec’s public pensions have historically invested in suburban sprawl. As this market becomes increasingly untenable, and populations shift back towards the city centre, the REM is supposed to stimulate growth in “transit-oriented developments” centred on its future stations. The new surtaxes are likely intended to force sales of land for immediate redevelopment, so that new homes are ready to move into as soon as the system becomes operational.

It’s important here to remember that the city of Montreal wasn’t given several billion dollars by the government with which to spend developing its mass transit system. Rather, Quebec’s former premier asked the CDPQ to come up with a way to integrate several long-standing yet unrealized transit proposals. These included a light-rail system over Montreal’s new Champlain Bridge, an express train to Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, and a dedicated commuter rail line for the Western suburbs. It was the CDPQ that proposed a fully-automated light-rail system that would use existing technology as well as some of Montreal’s extant railway infrastructure as an inexpensive way of uniting several different projects into an assumedly more efficient one.

So far so good. Cities need more mass transit, especially in the era of climate change, and Montreal contends with regular congestion both on its roadways and various mass transit systems. Moreover, access to the city’s already generally-high quality public transit systems is an important driver of property values and new residential development.

Considering the evident need for more transit, the REM theoretically provides an opportunity to kill several birds with one stone. Better still, the REM will in all likelihood stimulate the transit-oriented developments and re-urbanisation necessary for a more sustainable future city.

A map of the proposed network, with metro lines in colour and commuter rail in grey. Click to expand. Image: Calvin411/Wikimedia Commons.

The REM is the business “test case” on which two new government entities are based; the CDPQ’s infrastructure development arm, and the Canadian government’s infrastructure development bank.

The REM is also intended to stimulate economic activity in important economic sectors – such as engineering, construction and technology – that could soon be in high-demand internationally. Both the governments of Quebec and Canada see tremendous value in the economic potential of infrastructure mega projects at home and abroad.

This aside, the actual development of the REM has been complicated by what appears to be a bad case of over-promising and under-delivering, at least in terms of how seamlessly it could be integrated into the city’s extant transit and transport systems.

Though the train as originally conceived was intended to use an existing electrified railway line as the backbone of the network, it now appears that the REM cannot in fact be adapted to the line’s current voltage. The entire line, and the tunnel it passes through, requires a thorough overhaul, something that had last been completed in the mid-1990s. The new electrification, as well as the reconstruction of the tunnel, will cut it off from the regional commuter rail network. Rather than have different types of rail systems share existing infrastructure, the REM will force the premature (and unnecessary) retirement of a fleet of high-volume electric trains.

Consider that while the REM will connect the city with its international airport, it’s not planned to go just one kilometre farther to connect the airport with a major multi-modal transit station. Dorval Station integrates a sizeable suburban bus terminus with a train station that serves both regional commuter rail as well as the national railways network.

It’s difficult to understand how and why such an obvious and useful connection wasn’t considered. Given long-standing interest in high-speed and/or high-frequency rail service in Canada, La Presse columnist François Cardinal has noted that a REM connection between airport and a likely future rail hub would extend access to international air travel far further than just downtown Montreal.

The REM was also supposed to integrate seamlessly into the Montreal’s built environment, its promoters insisting construction could be completed with minimal inconvenience to current transit users. By the end of this year, REM-related construction will force a two-year closure of Montreal’s most-used commuter rail line, and sever the most recently-built rail line off from the transit hubs in the centre of the city. Tens of thousands of commuters throughout the Montreal region will be forced to make do with already over-saturated bus and métro service.

Though public consultations revealed these and other flaws, concerns raised by the public, by professionals and even some politicians were largely ignored. The REM also failed its environmental assessment. The provincial agency responsible for such evaluations, the BAPE, stated baldly that the project wasn’t ready for primetime and lambasted the CDPQ’s lack of transparency. In turn, the BAPE was accused of exceeding its mandate. The REM made a similarly poor impression, with transit users groups, architects and urban planners criticizing the project in whole and in part.

The main points of contention are that the REM won’t do much in the short term to alleviate congestion across the city’s existing – and comparatively expansive – mass-transit network. Quite the opposite: it is already beginning to exacerbate the problem.

Because the REM was conceived without the involvement of either the city’s main transit agency or the regional transit planning authority, its progress is hampered by a wide-variety of problems that would otherwise likely have been planned for. And because it’s a mass-transit solution to what is primarily a political consideration, the REM will provide higher-frequency service of dubious necessity to the city’s low-density suburban hinterland, much of which already has ample commuter-focused transit service. The high-density urban-core, which is most in need of transit expansion, will benefit perhaps least of all.

While it’s unlikely the REM will fail outright, it’s also unlikely to stimulate much new interest in using mass-transit services: it will first have to win back those who may abandon mass-transit while the REM is being built. Providing higher-frequency service to suburbia is the kind of thing that sounds good in theory, but doesn’t respond to commuters’ actual needs. Arguably the REM’s best feature – its real-estate development potential – has been somewhat obscured from public view because of obvious conflicts of interest. The REM’s limitations – and there are many – will for the most part only become known once the system is operational, at which point it will be too late.

The REM provides interesting theoretical avenues worthy of exploration – particularly the potential relationships between new transit development and how it may stimulate new growth in the housing sector. But building a new transit system – especially one this large and complex – ultimately requires the fullest possible degree of cooperation; with transit users, extant transit agencies and regional planning bodies.

Ignoring the recommendations of experts, the public and government assessment agencies for the sake of expediency is never a wise idea. When it comes to designing and implementing the mass-transit systems of the future, the needs, wants and opinions of users must be paramount. In Montreal, it appears as though they were an afterthought and an inconvenience.

Whether Montrealers will be able to vote with their wallets remains to be seen. Under the specific conditions set with which to integrate the REM into Montreal’s overal mass transit scheme, other types of transit have either been replaced by the REM or will have their routes and schedules modified to better serve it. The REM removes operational redundancy between different systems in an effort to be more efficient, but this will likely have the effect of forcing many Montreal transit users to use a one-size-fits-all solution that doesn’t suit anyone’s needs

It’s difficult to imagine how forcing people to use a transit system they never asked for will encourage greater use.


19 Responses to “Montreal’s REM – The Canada Line’s Financial Clone”
  1. Haveacow says:

    One correction, it was Alstom not Ansaldo-Hitachi (now named Hitachi Italy) that won the REM Rail Vehicle contract. The winning vehicle is a much shorter version of the Metro trainsets used for Sydney Australia’s new Heavy Metro Line.

    Zwei replies: Thanks and updated.

  2. Haveacow says:

    Now on the subject of being desperate, enter Alstom. They have promised that the many teething issues and problems Ottawa’s Citadis Spirit LRV’s are facing like, the problem control system, the over abundance of basic preparation and technical issues as well as the door issues, would not effect the REM trains because they were different vehicles. Thus confirming to the people who were against the REM Network from the beginning that, this isn’t an LRT system but a light metro category of train network.

    The thing that has surprised me about this REM project is that, it’s a semi-private takeover of many public assets (like the Mount Royal Tunnel) at fire sale prices. Until recently, very few even complained about it.

    This is a Rail Rapid Transit Network that in one stroke:

    1. Wiped out the best rail right of way for high speed and the planned lower speed but higher frequency inter-city rail network between Montreal and Quebec City by VIA Rail.
    2. Took out the busiest Montreal Area Commuter Rail Line and one of the few in Montreal that was publicly owned for its entire length (currently the only electrically powered one in Canada) and sold it to semi-private interests.
    3. Cut off the newest commuter rail line from downtown, built at great public expense and will now force riders to transfer to another train, needlessly. I’m not against transferring but when it is done needlessly, that’s just a waste.
    4. Replaced an easily expandable commuter rail line operation with a Light Metro operation that, has lower capacity than the commuter rail line it replaced. (See Anton Dubrau’s excellent analysis from his Catbus Blog about this issue)
    5. Took the least direct route to the Trudeau International Airport but stoped a few hundred metres away from the existing Dorval Commuter Rail/VIA Rail station, which was obviously done so that they wouldn’t loose passengers to VIA Rail and Commuter Rail trains that, have a much more direct connection (shorter trip) to downtown Montreal coming from the direction of Montreal’s airport, than the REM Network does.
    6. Created no competition area clauses that forces all future local and rapid transit to either connect to or to not service areas controlled by REM. This essentially creates 2 transit operations areas one public and the other semi-private, thus guaranteeing inefficiencies in the borderlands between the two areas. This becomes problematic if you live on the far west side of the REM area, the far west end of greater Montreal but not currently in the REM service area. This has the effect of cutting your public transit buses off from downtown Montreal, unless your buses force you to travel to REM stations first.
    7. The $3 Billion+ the province of Quebec and the Federal Government are contributing to the project, about 49%, could have built amazing add-ons to the existing Commuter Rail Network that would have easily addressed the many capacity choke points in the system and established new service to areas currently not served by the commuter rail network or by REM for that matter.
    8. The REM has many poor and or no connection to the existing communities it wants to service, locating stations that will only be useful to car commuters or transit commuters with connection to commuter bus routes making pedestrian and cycling connection difficult if not outright impossible. This means a network which is designed to handle daytime work commuter trips and not the “all week” based trips for shorter range shopping and useful “life connection trips” that build ridership outside of traditional working hours or on weekends.This is a disastrous service model because most new fulltime and partime jobs don’t or only partiality include the traditional Monday to Friday, 9 to 5 commuter time periods.

    All this was done with a rail network design that failed its Environmental Assessment process, in many areas.

  3. zweisystem says:

    This is what I have been told by the transit folks in Montreal. The Caisse saw how much they were “clever clogs” financing the Canada Line, they went after bigger game in Montreal.

  4. fredinno says:

    A ‘Financial Clone’ of the Canada is a compliment. Buses are generally forced to transfer to Canada for much of the ridership- you’ve literally described all RT systems. Generally transit lines prefer to be anchored by hubs at their ends to maximize ridership:

    There’s no reason to go on Granville St. to Downtown when the Canada Line is faster anyways.

    Funny how you ignore TransLink’s own numbers? Can you provide your own *real* ones? You don’t even have to source ho gave you them. Just a report and explanation on how those numbers were calculated. It could be a major breakthrough.

    Zwei replies: Your gross ignorance of the issues compells me to not answer. The Canada line was nothing more than a money laundering scandal, which the taxpayer got a substandard transit system. The Canada line has increased comutes by at least 10 to 20 minutes.

  5. Rico says:

    Patience Fredinno, he spent years saying Skytrain boardings were exaggerated by Translink and now that compass is out it turns out they were under counting. He is still trying to figure it out to match his world view. A similar bit of mental mathematics is working through his mind with the ‘Expo line can’t go over 15,000pphpd,’ shtick now the published numbers show the average daily pphpd peak is 14,800….before all the new trains are in service..ooops. It just takes a while eventually he just forgets about inconvenient things like saying the RAV line will only get 40,000 boardings.

    Zwei replies: Rico, it is well known that you are a Translink Troll, spreading misinformation and fake news. Unlike myself, who consult with real experts, you live in a Translink fantasy world.

    Professionals do read my posts, in fact more in Europe than Canada and they certainly let me know if I have wondered from the track.

    You misconstrue anything I say and actual ridership on RAV is slightly over 40,000 persons a day (as everyone makes two boarding’s a day that number is over 80,000 and with the U-Pass many make more than 2 boarding’s a day). Translink only gives raw boarding’s numbers not actual ridership numbers and the vast majority of RAV’s ridership comes from forced transfers.

    But for a troll this does not matter,

  6. Bill Burgess says:

    Translink usually reports ridership in terms of boardings (and it is not uncommon to do so), but it also provides some data for journeys. Transfer during a journey count as an additional boarding.

    I doubt the ratio of boardings to journeys on the Canada Line is very different than for the rest of the transit system. According to total annual boardings in 2018 were 435.9 million and total annual journeys were 261.3 million, so there are about 1.67 boardings for every journey (these numbers exclude HandiDart).

    Canada Line boardings in Sept 2019 were 145,000/day (from same source above). Using the 1.67 ratio that is about 86,800 journeys/day. If everyone took two journeys per day the Canada Line would service more than 43 thousand individuals per day. The per week day number would be higher.

    The most recent Trip Diary Survey show that the auto driver share of all trips by Richmond residents declined by more than the auto drive share of all trips in Metro Vancouver between 2011 and 2017.

    Over this period, the auto driver share of all trips by Richmond residents declined by 6 percentage points, from 60.7% to 54.7%. This is more than the decline in the auto driver share for all Metro Vancouver of 3.5 percentage points, from 58.8% to 53.3% (see!/vizhome/Trip_Diary_2017/TripDiary2017).

    And while the transit share of all trips in Metro Vancouver declined from 12.4% to 11.6%, the transit share for Richmond residents increased slightly from 12.2% to 12.5% (same source).

    While hardly a great success story, these figures indicate that the Canada Line has done better than – a la Zwei – replace bus ridership with inferior service.

    Zwei replies: Quote from Zwei from previous post; “You misconstrue anything I say and actual ridership on RAV is slightly over 40,000 persons a day (as everyone makes two boarding’s a day that number is over 80,000 and with the U-Pass many make more than 2 boarding’s a day).

    Quote from B.B.; “the Canada Line would service more than 43 thousand individuals per day.

    So, what’s your point. The taxpayer, to date, has now paid well over $3 billion to move slightly over 40,000 persons a day; money spent wisely? This what international experts look at and there are much cheaper, just as efficient means to move that number of people. Certainly answers why no one has copied Vancouver!

    Sadly, you are too busy inventing criticisms instead of accepting reality and dealing with it.

  7. Rico says:

    Actually the point was Zwei said the RAV line would be lucky to get the 40,000 BOARDINGS the previous Express bus had. So he is only off by a factor of 3.5. Actually closer than his cost estimates.
    Separately Zwei asks if spending 2.1 (not 3) billion to move those people was a wise use of funds. To which I ask compared to what? New roads and bridges? A LRT line? Nothing? Clearly it is better and cheaper than new roads and bridges. What about LRT? We don’t know for sure how expensive or successful a LRT route would have been…but we do know the Canada Line beats Portland Max on every metric (including cost per boarding, or rider or operation and maintenance cost per boarding or rider) and Zwei considers Max a good use of funds so….

  8. Kevin says:

    Bombardier should have built the Canada line with the same 80 metre platforms as the expo line. Even 80metres is too short as the expo line is now over crowded. Platforms should be 200 metres long. The Canada line has made travel faster from South richmond. It currently takes 35-40 minutes to go from 3 road and williams to downtown with 1 transfer. It used to take more than 1 hour before 2009 with no transfers. That is some improvement. The Canada line does recreate part of the former interurban line that went to steveston. City of Richmond should bring back trams from Richmond centre to Steveston. The former tram line is now a bike path.

  9. zweisystem says:

    Bombardier lost the bidding war because the now called MALM light metro was too expensive for Gordon Campbell’s faux P-3.

    I have been told by a transportation planner (not Mr. Cow, who may disagree) that it would be cheaper to get rid of the ROTEM EMU’s and replace them with modern trams and gut the ATC and install local signalling and operate line of sight to both affordably increase capacity and to extend the line further into Richmond. To increase capacity further, use the Arbutus corridor. This can be done for the cost of the Canada Line rehab to increase capacity.

  10. Haveacow says:

    Considering the longest subway/heavy rail metro station platforms in North America (some New York Stations and BART Stations in the San Franciso Bay Area) are almost 200 metres long, it’s doubtful that Translink has in its P3 contract with the operators of the Canada Line, a section that would allow for major expansion of station platforms, most likely it just involves operations and maintenance.

  11. Bill Burgess says:

    My apologies for citing misleading numbers.

    I should have said that if individual riders board twice per day (to get to and then from where they are going) then 72,500 individuals per day (half of 145,000) were serviced by the Canada Line in September 2019, not 43,000.

    It was remarkably stupid of me to have first deflated boardings into journeys – that is relevant to a different issue.

    Zwei replies: But you were right the first time and here is the problem as told to me by a former TransLink planner. The preponderance of post secondary education locations (Langgara, SFU/UBC downtown, etc) along the Canada line, means a far greater proportion of customers have the U-Pass means the students are boarding many times a day and much to the horror of TransLink some of the students were boarding as much as 8 times a day, as the U-pass gives unlimited travel. Thus there are a lot of boarding’s on the Canada Line, it does not translate to more actual customers.

    All this is hidden with Translink’s high annual payments to the SNC lavalin lead consortium operating the Canada Line which amount to $110 million or more annually!

  12. Haveacow says:

    Unfortunately, you guys are one of the few operations outside of Korea that actually operate the Hundai/Rotem trainsets, so your guys would probably know more about the vehicles operational shortcomings, other than their length anyway, than most other people. Since they use 3rd rail power collection and any LRV would have to be adjusted to handle that (which isn’t overly expensive) but that would end any possibility of surface street operations forever. So if you wanted any extension to have surface operations in a road median, on or near any section of standard Canadian mainline railway R.O.W or any non-fenced surface right of way at any point, conversion to overhead wire or OCS power delivery becomes legally necessary.

    That being said, if the ATC cabling is still good, replacing or simply swapping out with new line of sight signaling equipment would be very cheap. Not having to operate and maintain all the systems and technology that any Automated Train Control System (or ATC) needs, the complex communications rooms (at each node station) and their expensive electrical and network communication connections, would save a mountain of cash. Leaving only basic vehicle operator communication and vehicle monitoring systems behind would be relatively simple.

    I think a study could be done to look at that question but the difference between operating the current Canada Line technology and a simple non ATC system would probably favor the non ATC system in terms of operating costs. However, and this is A BIG HOWEVER, the devil is in the details! If the conversion isn’t done right that conversion could become a hugely expensive nightmare for everyone involved, causing problems for years and no money would be saved then.

    You really need a reason to do all this, simply saying this way of doing things is cheaper than the existing way you do things, isn’t enough. There has to be a reason to begin the process, does switching make operations easier, for example, is the current operating system holding back or making expansion of the network overly complex? Does the current system lack adaptability or scalability in a meaningful way that, holds back development of the network?

    One of the major reasons the TTC wants to desperately get rid of the Scarborough RT isn’t just the age of the system but the RT’s costly and overly complex maintenance requirements, even on the newer trains that you guys have (plus the nonstandard railway tools and maintenance equipment, especially when compared to the simple and considerably cheaper equipment and standard railway tools of the LRV’s and their Heavy Rail Subway Trains.

  13. zweisystem says:

    Ah yes the 3rd rail pick up. A was assured some years ago that a retractable 3rd rail shoe was available and is being used on some tram routes.

    With a retractable shoe, the problem with surface operation becomes a non issue.

  14. zweisystem says:

    From STEMMANN-TECHNIK We are specialized in customized innovative solutions in the field of third rail shoegears for suburban rail, metros and rapid transit rail.Thanks to its large cross-section, the third rail can transmit high current densities. It is always used when an overhead wire for roof-mounted pantographs cannot or should not be installed.The maximum vehicle speed with third rail shoegears is approximately 120 km/h. Deploy-ment and retraction can take place manually or by remote control, i.e. through mechanical or pneumatic systems.The contact to the conductor rail can be made from the top or the bottom or even from the side.Our third rail shoegears are in everyday use in local rail networks of the big cities regions and metropolitan areas.

  15. Haveacow says:

    Oh I agree, a retractable shoe is more than possible, I have seen them used, they are just not that cheap and take up extra space in the vehicle, which means other things have to be moved somewhere else. That means non-standard trains which depending on the nonstandard parts and operations, adds more cost. A cost politicians and taxpayers may or may not be willing to bear.

    One advantage the current LRV’s from Alstom, Bombardier, Siemens, Hitachi-Italy, Skoda, Stadler and a few other manufacturers have over than something like the Skytrain is that, a great percentage (95%+) of the parts and components on each vehicleorder are common, regardless which individual sub-model each city or transit property orders. Each sub-model of LRV might have a few differences but never enough to seriously raise the cost of each individual LRV by a considerable amount. If the vehicle is too expensive, the whole line can get killed.

  16. fredinno says:

    “Zwei replies: Rico, it is well known that you are a Translink Troll, spreading misinformation and fake news. Unlike myself, who consult with real experts, you live in a Translink fantasy world.
    Professionals do read my posts, in fact more in Europe than Canada and they certainly let me know if I have wondered from the track.
    You misconstrue anything I say and actual ridership on RAV is slightly over 40,000 persons a day (as everyone makes two boarding’s a day that number is over 80,000 and with the U-Pass many make more than 2 boarding’s a day). Translink only gives raw boarding’s numbers not actual ridership numbers and the vast majority of RAV’s ridership comes from forced transfers.
    But for a troll this does not matter.”

    I’d argue that boardings are perfectly fine for the viability of a system, since in most cases that means people are paying that amount of times anyways.

    Capacity is in pphpd anyways.

    I wonder, could you name some professionals who you know are a fan of your works? Surely, since they seem to be a point of pride for you, you should be able to identify them as well…just curious.

  17. zweisystem says:

    Professional who reside outside the toxic political sphere of the lower mainland. This thing has been rejected by the professionals around the world, the only support it comes from local politicians and imported executives as those who do not support SkyTrain expansion are terminated. No one buys this anymore.

  18. fredinno says:

    Cool. Can you name them and their credentials? Can you please prove you aren’t just pulling bollocks out of thin air? Otherwise you really can’t be taken as seriously- I mean, you’re part of an advocacy group!

  19. zweisystem says:

    Who has copied Vancouver and Vancouver’s exclusive use of light metro? No one, well that explains things. Gerald fox, John Schuman and a hell of a lot more to start.

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