Being a member of the Light rail transit Association for 45 years, one has just more than a passing knowledge of transit.
I find that Canadian politcans must be dragged kicking and screaming to provide a modern and user-friendly (oh that damned phrase again) public transit service for the public. Yes, Vancouver’s SkyTrain seems modern, but also is a dated proprietary light-metro system, based largely on 1960’s transit philosophy and trends – News Flash: It’s 2026 and travel tastes and demands have changed, yet the transit that has been provided, has not and cannot due to the massive investments made for the guideways and subways.
Result: Ridership is in decline as the transit system is deemed user unfriendly by potential customers.
The following is an excerpt from a North American transit group I belong to, regarding transit priority.
One comment: The Light Rail Transit Association’s 1990 video, Light Rail, Today’s Way Forward, shows several examples of signal priority in action, simple and effective, yet in Canada one would think it was like designing a moon rocket!
TTC has no Priority for all bus routes. TTC does have Priority for St Clair, Spadina streetcars routes and a few other locations close to 2 decades, but the City, mainly Transportation and Works (TW) has refused to turn them on until the Finch mess. The mayor has order TW to deal with all transit priority issues and report back to council by 2027 how to improve service. The only change so far, TW has move left turn singles from first to last.
As far I know and seen, there are no systems in NA and Europe using a true transit priority signal system all the time. It is only use when vehicles are behind schedule.
Finch Ave was a 5 lane road before construction started to 7 lanes now that require major rebuilt of everything including bridges and new retraining walls. I never knew this until construction took place that the Islington/Finch intersection is a bridge on a 45 degree angle that was widen for better water flow.
Finch like a number of Toronto roads that could easily support an elevated line but it had an CPKC bridge to go over as well a 12 lane Hwy 400.
Since Finch, Eglinton and Hurontario lines are own by Metrolinx, they call the shot how the line was to be built and the technology under the P3 process to reduce the cost to build the lines. Operations was to be under the control of the P3 group and awarded that way. Near the completion of the Eglinton Line, TTC and the City started to call for TTC to operate the line. The Province decided to change the operation contract to allow TTC to operate both Eglinton and Finch lines under a 5 year contract will a renewal 5 year extension and this is where the lines went off the rails.
TTC demanded various changes to the lines as well bring in out dated operation policy that down graded operations. They require speed reduction for all intersections that can handle full speed in the first place for both lines, but chose to reduced the speed like they have done for all the streetcar lines. The original operators of all Metrolinx lines were to be outside sources who operate systems worldwide.
Sadly, I do not see any appetite for change and doing the same thing over and over again, ever hoping for different results, is the Canadian way forward.
If one took the ‘Way-back’ machine to the late 1980’s, the argument that SkyTrain was cheaper to operate than LRT would show the massive propaganda campaign to give the public a positive view of the proprietary ALRT light-metro. This is because it was forced upon the region by the Social Credit government of the day.
It was all fake news.
From an article, written by a Canadian author for the Light Rail Transit Association’s periodical, in 1983……………
This was written before the name ICTS was changed to ALRT.
For the Expo Line, there were no comparative studies done as the orders came directly from the Premiers Office and the same was true for what is now called the Millennium Line.
The reality was, building the Expo line with ALRT was a horse-trade with the government of Ontario (the UTDC was their Crown corporation) to both sell a very unsalable R/T system and to obtain the services of the then Ontario Conservative governments ‘Blue Machine’ to win the next BC election.
This is the base for Vancouver’s love affair with light-metro.
Ever since, the SkyTrain light-metro system has been portrayed as a wonder system, which over time has built up to the current SkyTrain myth. Like Robin Hood or King Arthur, the SkyTrain myth is nothing more than cobbled together claims and cherry picked facts and a myth often repeated tends to become fact in the people’s minds.
It is all “repeat a lie enough times and the people will come to believe” shtick.
It also be remembered that both BC, Transit and TransLink were in partnership to sell Advanced Rapid Transit (ART) or SkyTrain, abroad. This meant that there would be no way for LRT to be built in metro Vancouver.
The Calgary C-Train has traditionally carried more customers than the Expo Line (both being about the same length) and costing less than half to build and much less to operate.
Today, many of the “old gang” at TransLink have retired and the new lot of bureaucrats (many earning six figured salaries”)repeat the old porkies actually believing they are true.
Sadly, never was.
The print and electronic media also fell into this trap as those reporters who did investigative reporting have long retired, with the new crop of reporters,eager to please their corporate bosses, treat TransLink news releases as real news, instead of a well planned propaganda campaign.
Even in the 90’s, then huge subsidies for ALRT, made the mini-metro not cost effective in operation.
Vancouver’s SkyTrain light-metro system has had the transit eyes of the world on it for almost 40 years, yet no one has copied Vancouver and that is a question that the SkyTrain Lobby prefer not to deal with.
In an era of unprecedented investment in public transport, no one has copied the Vancouver model, the exclusive use of a light metro, including a proprietary light-metro system, for urban transport.
Why?
The per km cost of LRT and light-metro, 1981 to 1987.
A Comparrison Of Operating Costs – SkyTrain & Light Rail
The late Des Turner was meticulous with his research with the SkyTrain light metro system and in 1988, embarrassed the then Social Credit Government to release the real costs of the mini-metro.
What is more interesting is comparing the operating costs of the Calgary C-Train light rail and SkyTrain.
Thought the operating costs are a year in difference, it must be noted that the Calgary C-Train has historically carried more customers than the Expo Line, yet its operating costs are more than $12 million less than that of SkyTrain.
BC Transit knew this, but continued the myth that SkyTrain was cheaper to operate. This is called professional misconduct; others may call it more.
TransLink, which was mostly made up of BC Transit bureaucrats jumping ship, knew this, but continued the myth that SkyTrain was cheaper to operate.
COMPARISON OF OPERATING COSTS
The total 1988/89 budget for SkyTrain:
Operations………………… 5,483,863
Maintenance……………. 14,243,092
Administration………….. 7,931,834
Total: $27,658,789 (Adjusting for inflation, $62,407,681 in 2026)
(Rick Krowchuck, Executive V.P. Finance)
Calgary C-Train 1990 Operating Budget
Operators……………………… $2,332,000
Maintenance………………….$4,804,000
(Labour, parts, materials)
LRV Power……………………. $1,384,000
Fixed Operating …….Costs $6,815,000
(administration, cleaning facilities/buildings)
Total: $15,335,000 (Adjusting for inflation, $33,140,856 in 2026)
(Niel Mckendrick Coordinator of Transit Services, Calgary Transit)
I will say it again, at a time (1989-1990) when the Expo Line was brand new and Calgary’s LRT network was just starting to show its age, not to mention that Calgary’s network was 4km longer as well as moving more passengers at that time. That maintenance total for Expo Line is interesting. I would suggest that Calgary’s total is missing something. However, now that I know and have seen the difference in both systems maintenance practices, it does graphically show one of the problems of Vancouver’s chosen transit operating technology. I can say with great confidence that, a very large percentage of the difference between the two system’s maintenance costs has a lot to do with the Skytrain’s linear induction propulsion motors and the need to support them (the LIM motors) and its extra track infrastructure.
It’s a very cumbersome, intrusive and expensive way to move a train from point A to point B, compared to just using standard electric motors. The LIM units may have been better than traditional electric motors from the mid 1970’s to very early 1980’s (the LIM propulsion unit’s main design era) but when you add in the need for a 4th rail to just function, wow. Unfortunately in nearly all but a few rare cases, they offer no advantage compared to today’s electric railway motors. Just their physical location alone, at the bottom of the centreline of the trucks/bogie frame, a place they have to be to make them work efficiently, adds maintenance costs compared to standard electric railway motors.
In Germany, the average cost to construct a new at-grade, 2-track (double) street tramway typically ranges from €10 million to €20 million per kilometer (CAD $16 million to $32 million)
This includes the physical track installation, embedding in the road, overhead electrification, and basic stop infrastructure.
However, total project costs fluctuate heavily based on localized urban conditions:
Average European Baseline: While Germany generally enjoys some of the most cost-effective at-grade tram delivery in Europe (often averaging around million per mile nationwide), heavy utility relocation, land acquisition, or intersection redesign can easily spike the price.
Total System Build vs. Track Only: For a comprehensive urban light rail or street tramway—which also requires rolling stock (trams), maintenance depots, and signaling systems—costs can range anywhere from €25 million to over €45 million per kilometer (CAD $41M – $97M/km) when factoring in all necessary capital outlays.
International Context: When compared to other developed nations, German urban rail infrastructure delivery is considered highly cost-efficient, costing significantly less per mile than similar projects in the UK, USA, or Australia.
This is important, the initial tram line, complete with Operations and Maintenance Centre, will always cost more than future extensions.
The previously planned for Surrey LRT’s initial line was said to cost $1.65 billion, but that included cars, OMC and all the other items for a start-up line.
Extensions to the line, depending on quality of Right of Way, would have cost $16/mil/km to $32 mil/km. Thus a 16 km extension to to Langley would have cost anywhere from $512 million to $1.03 billion.
The total cost of both the initial light rail line and the 16 km extension would range from CAD $2.2 billion to $2.68 billion.
Compare this to the current SkyTrain extension to Langley:
The guideway’s latest cost from 2025, $6 billion, but does not include signalling (part of the Thales $1.47 re-signalling contract of the Expo and Millennium Lines), extra cars needed and the the $1 billion Operations and Maintenance Centre #5, needed for the new MK.5 Innovia 300 cars.
The total cost for the $16 km SkyTrain extension to Langley is costing over $7 billion and possible over $8 billion!
Thus the total cost for the 16km extension works out to $437 million/km to $500 million/km to build!
Both civic and provincial politicians are spending over $5 billion more for a light metro line, which, according to TransLink, move less customers than the Broadway B-Line bus!
One must remember that the Mayor’s Council on Transit, Metro Vancouver and the provincial NDP, abetted by the corporate media, fully approved of this massive $5 billion fiscal mismanagement.
The ION’s capital cost was about $818 million in 2017 (1.06 billion in 2026 dollars) for 19 km of greenfields construction or $43 million/km to build ($56 million/km in 2026 dollars), complete.
Compare this with the Expo Line extension now costing over $400 million/km to build not including signalling, cars and much more.
For four decades, the lessons building ‘rai’ transit has not been learned. Politicians in BC refuse the learn the lessons of others and continue to blunder on making the same higely expensive mistakes, over and over again. It is sheer negligence on the part of TransLink, the Mayor’s Council on Transit, the Premier’s Office, and the Ministry of Transportation, that they remain ignorant of what was commonly known elsewhere.
Ignorance of the truth, is not a defense.
Lesson #1
In the very early 1980’s, the Ontario Conservative Party (the William Davis Government) tried to force the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) to build with the new Intermediate Capacity Transit System or ICTS, now known as SkyTrain; produced by the Urban Transit Development Corporation (UTDC) an Ontario crown corporation. The TTC commissioned a comprehensive study comparing streetcars/LRT and metro with ICTS. The results were not encouraging to those wishing to sell ICTS and even gave the City of Hamilton enough ammunition to reject the Ontario provincial government lead, construction of ICTS in the city. The TTC transit study, the Accelerated Rapid Transit Study or ‘ARTS’ found that:
“ICTS costs anything up to ten times as much as a conventional light-rail line to install, for about the same capacity; or put another way, ICTS costs more than a heavy-rail subway, with four times its capacity.”
ICTS was dead in the water as a product, so UTDC did what every other manufacturer does when faced with this dilemma, they changed the name from ICTS to ALRT or Advanced Light Rail Transit and sold the unsalable ICTS to some political rubes out West, namely Bill Bennett and Grace McCarthy, the leader and deputy leader of the British Columbia Social Credit Party and the rest, as they say, is history.
Toronto’s ICTS system, one of two built, and now closed.
Lesson #2
In the 1980’s there was much debate between modern light-rail and many proprietary transit systems being offered for sale, which included the SkyTrain ICTS/ALRT automatic light-metro. Many claims were made by the owners of various proprietary transit systems being offered for sale, about the effectiveness of their transit systems. In 1991, Gerald Fox a noted American transit specialist, produced a study comparing light-rail and automatic guided transit (AGT) systems including SkyTrain and the French VAL light-metro system. The study concluded that despite the hype and hoopla of the promoters of AGT systems, there was no benefit in building with more expensive AGT. These conclusions were not lost on American and European transit planners, who wanted ‘the best bang for the buck’ and the desire to build prestigious and expensive light-metro systems waned from the mid 90’s until the present day.
Conclusions from Gerald Fox’s A Comparison Between Light Rail And Automated Transit Systems. (1991)
Requiring fully grade separated R-O-W and stations and higher car and equipment costs, total construction costs is higher for AGT than LRT. A city selecting AGT will tend to have a smaller rapid transit network than a city selecting LRT.
There is no evidence that automatic operation saves operating and maintenance costs compared to modern LRT operating on a comparable quality of alignment.
The rigidity imposed on operations by a centralized control system and lack of localized response options have resulted in poor levels of reliability on AGT compared to the more versatile LRT systems.
LRT and AGT have similar capacities capabilities if used on the same quality of alignment. LRT also has the option to branch out on less costly R-O-W.
Being a product of contemporary technology, AGT systems carry with them the seeds of obsolescence.
Transit agencies that buy into proprietary systems should consider their future procurement options, particularly if the original equipment manufacturer were to cease operations.
Conclusion #4: “LRT and AGT have similar capacities capabilities if used on the same quality of alignment. LRT also has the option to branch out on less costly R-O-W.“is affecting future light metro growth very badly. The cost of the Expo Line extension to Langley has now surpassed $400 million/km to build, yet, according to TransLink, will carry around 40 thousand passengers a day, less than the Broadway B-Line bus carries today!
The taxpayer the province) can only afford one light metro line built every decade, thus the next line built, if it is indeed a MALM SkyTrain will not start construction until 2040 at the earliest. But will there be cars available to operate on it, when Alstom ceases production?
Today TransLink and the provincial government still make unfounded claims of superior operation for SkyTrain (if it doesn’t snow) and denounces LRT as a poor-man’s rapid transit system. Nothing could be further than the truth and it still seems TransLink and the SkyTrain lobby have failed to read and understand transit lessons, taught decades ago!
France’s VAL system, a comparable system to today’s Movia Automatic Light Metro, a.k.a. SkyTrain.
Those who do not read history are doomed to repeat it ……………..
……… and the BC government and Metro politicians are ignorant about history and have saddled the region with an unaffordable transit system that is now almost too expensive to extend.
In 2026, ridership on TransLink is tanking (a 4.5% drop from April 2026 from April 2025), yet our provincial and regional politcans blunder on, selling “snake-oil” tarted up as transit solutions. BC’s economy is on the rocks, yet the NDP preserver on planning for hugely expensive light metro, which in today’s world, is an operating museum piece.
BC desperately needs cheaper transit options, but 40 years of lies, deceit, and corrupt politics has doomed the lower mainland to massive traffic congestion and gridlock, simply because those in charge, refuse to learn lessons from the past.
What the (expletive deleted) is TransLink trying to say?
I will take an educated guess that Translink is either replacing the reaction fourth rail or replacing the third rail for electrical pick up.
The strange thing is, the same trains operate on the Expo and Millennium Lines already.
Or, are they replacing the switches to higher speed switches used on the Millennium Line which was designed for second generation Innovia 100 ART Trains?
Our utterly inept media has been duped again by Translink’s flim-flam.
SkyTrain’s Expo Line undergoes maintenance until the fall
Zwei often hears the tired old saw that “we don’t have the population for light rail or the alternative, light rail does not have the capacity to deal with traffic flows that SkyTrain can.
The “Good Burghers” in Bath England are countering this debate by actually listing 40 cities that have populations of 100,000 (with a 10% margin for error) that operate stand alone tram systems.
The below list is by no means exhaustive – as in the Belgian Coastal Tram example above, many outlying towns are connected to trams but are not listed here as it is mainly the central city listed.
Ranked by population:
Town/City
Country
Length of system, or to nearest large tram town, km
TramTrain, which is a tram, reminiscent of the interurban, so designed that it can operate on the mainline line railway, in mixed traffic, can also servcie small town on the mainline railway portion of its route very cheaply.
It is important to consider that the Vancouver metro region cannot afford to expand the SkyTrain light-metro system which base cost has now surpassed $400 million per km to build (over $700 million per km for subway construction). TramTrain and light rail can be expanded much more cheaply from costs ranging from $10 million/km to $50 million/km, depending on the quality of Right-of-Way used from track sharing with the mainline railway to operating on a dedicated R-o-W.
As a reminder, extensive viaduct or subway construction, drives up the cost and takes the “light” (light in cost) out of light rail!
Those who support continued SkyTrain expansion, must also accept a limited light metro network, ill equipped to deal with future expansion needs.
First published in 2022, this post remains extremity relevant today.
Four years have gone by and the cost today of the Expo Line extension to Surrey is now estimated at $7 billion and that is just for the guideway, which the federal government is paying 40%of the cost.
Zwei has been told privately that the full cost of the extension, including the operations and Maintenance Centre #5 may exceed $10 billion! By comparison, the Massey Tunnel replacement has now soared past $8.3 billion.
Yet, ridership is dropping on the regional transit system and has been in an ever steepening decline for the past decade.
The sense I get from TransLink, Metro Vancouver, the provincial NDP, and regional mayors and politcans, that the now, $17 billion, full program to extend the Expo and Millennium Lines (Broadway Subway), mere 21.7 km, will reverse this trend in declining ridership.
I think not, as the problems with TransLink including financial issues, coupled with a declining ridership, point to major structural issues that the provincial government, Metro Vancouver, TransLink and the mayor’s Council on Transit, refuse to address.
The problem with declining ridership may be in part, SkyTrain itself, where a very expensive1970’s light metro system was developed to cope with 1960’s, 9 to 5 traffic issues, where commuters took a bus to a transit hub, transfer to SkyTrain to complete the trip downtown.
Today, downtown Vancouver is no longer the main destination for commuters and taking the bus is both slow, even slower on the return journey and taking the car in most cases, is far faster and far more convenient.
Building more SkyTrain will only exacerbate the problem.
The echo of American engineer, Gerald Fox, reverberates:
But, eventually, Vancouver will need to adopt lower-cost LRT in its lesser corridors, or else limit the extent of its rail system. And that seems to make some TransLink people very nervous.
What Zwie has tried to convey for decades, that the driverless light-metro is a money hog and building more, will only see more tax money sucked into this heavily subsidized black hole.
Part of the problem is that the mainstream media and TransLink’s lil darlin, the Hive do not report on costs, just the hype and hoopla of building more SkyTrain.
The financial debate is purposely not reported as not to dampen local SkyTrain hue and cry by the local SkyTrain lobby.
The following comment by Haveacow, a Canadian transportation Engineer is a must read for all those armchair SkyTrain enthusiast and then wonder about this:
At the same time that billions of dollars are being lavished on two very expensive, yet completely unnecessary light metro extension, Emergency Care is collapsing in the province.
One can almost draw a straight line from SkyTrain expansion to eroding healthcare in the province.
The Skytrain really isn’t a regional distance based, rapid transit system. It is a inner suburb to downtown or a inner suburb to inner suburb rail rapid transit system.
The line extension fron Surrey to Langley (SLS) is and will be showing just how expensive the technology is to build and how expensive it will be to operate. Even 22 years after opening it will still be only moving around 5000 passengers per km per day or about 75% of the current passengers per km/per day average of the existing system. This means that this portion of the Expo line from Surrey to Langley will require more subsidy to operate than the already existing Skytrain system does simply due to geographic distance and attract fewer passengers at the same time.
Nothing illustrates the geographic limitation of the technology more than current SLS extension does. Each new significant segment of Skytrain, anything more than 8 to 10 km that is built further and further out from existing Skytrain yards seems to require, an entirely new yard or a major expansion of an existing one, just so servicing and train-set redeployment can be done efficiently and in a timely manner. Train storage and actual maintenance capacity is a whole separate issue. That means each extension becomes even more expensive due to the fact that, a new yard and servicing site must be constructed each time the system grows outward horizontally. Ottawa’s LRT system desperate to keep costs down, make the new yards, light maintenance centres instead of full ones, saving hundreds of millions of dollars without seriously impacting maintenance. Each new Skytrain Yard or OMC (operations and maintenance centres) is and must be because of the automation, a full service yard.
Yes, as a rail network grows in length and number of train-sets, more storage and servicing capacity is needed. However this driverless railway system requires very large, heavily protected and computerized yards, instead of just a simple set of ladder track (multiple sets of track sidings used for storage) connected to and parallel to the main line running track itself, no large storage buildings required, just a protected operations caban and maybe extra fencing.
This is how GO Transit builds new Train Storage facilities. Actually maintenance is done at 2 very large maintenance centres on a specific schedule. Keep in mind, this is a system with over 500 km of main line track and over 850 engines and passenger coaches with very little automation. The new GO Transit Region Rail Network (formerly GO RER) won’t change this situation too dramatically until, a lot of the planned Bi-Level EMU’s are purchased because the EMU’s will require an entirely new separated or a severely altered existing maintenance centre.
The following should be Emailed to every politicians, federal, provincial and civic in BC.
Here is something else to think about. This line extension, according to TransLink and the provincial government of BC, is going to move 56000 passengers a day upon opening in 2028. That’s roughly 53% of the daily passengers per line-km average for the rest of the SkyTrain system (3500 passengers per km per day vs 6613 passengers per km per day).
They both admits that this is the equivalent to what the 99 B express bus line moved per day in 2019. They are spending billions to move the same number of passengers you already move on Broadway with buses. They are currently spending $2.83 Billion (updated to July 8 2026 dollars $4 billion) to move passengers in a 5.7 km SkyTrain tunnel under Broadway, the busiest corridor in the city. Yet it’s good to spend somewhere between $1.67 billion and $2.17 billion (updated to July 8 2026 dollars $3 billion+ dollars) more, to move the same number of passengers per day between Surrey and Langley.
Our South-East Bus Transitway moved more people than that per day in 2019 and it sure wouldn’t cost that much to build.
Toronto spent only $2.3 million on King Street in downtown Toronto to improve passenger service on a streetcar corridor which moved more people per day in 2019 than the SLS line extension will move on opening day (84000 vs 56000) at a cost of billions.
RftV cost for a Vancouver to Rosedale regional railway $5.4 billion cheaper than the 16 km Expo Line extension to Langley.
Re-posted and updated on Saturday, September 19, 2020
Re-released and update July 2, 2026
On September 20, 2010, Rail for the Valley unreleased the groundbreaking Leewood Study regarding the reinstatement of a passenger service using the former BC Electric, now Southern Railway of BC route.
Why Groundbreaking?
The Leewood Study was the first and only independent study done on passenger rail for the Fraser Valley, without political or bureaucratic bias.
The Leewood Study shows the way how passenger rail should be reinstated on the former passenger rail route.
Today, more passenger passenger rail services are being restored on previously abandoned passenger routes; more passenger rail services are being restored on routes long abandoned and now rebuilt. Today politicians and planners see both the wisdom and economy of using existing railway infrastructure as a means to affordably extend passenger services to areas otherwise unreachable due to cost.
The vision was there a decade ago and the vision remains for the Fraser Valley, the question is; “Do politicians and planners in Metro Vancouver have the vision beyond there own parochial politics?”
The following is the Leewood Study’s costs for reinstating passenger rail, adjusted to 2020 dollars.
Total capital costs in 2020 dollars:
Stage 1 Phase 1 (Diesel Light Rail) 98 km Scott Rd. – Chilliwack: $578 million ($720 million – 2026)
Stage 1 Phase 2 (Electrification) 98 km Scott Rd. – Chilliwack: $134 million ($667 million – 2026)
Stage 2 Proposal – 28 km Extension to Downtown Vancouver: $426 million ($531 million – 20026)
Stage 3 Proposal – 12 km Extension to Rosedale: $33 million ($41 million – 2026)
Total:$1.171 billion! ($1.46 billion – 2026)
$5.4 billion less than the estimated cost of the 16 km extensions to the Expo Line To Langley.
From 2010
Groundbreaking report on Interurban light rail – released TODAY
Surrey Leader Editorial: We should get on track (Frank Bucholtz)
North Shore News: Valley residents on track with light rail
Vancouver Province: Valley light rail all go, twin groups claim
News 1130: Commuter rail service to the Valley is affordable – study
Rail For The Valley is extremely excited to announce the release of a comprehensive independent analysis of the potential for light rail service on the existing and publicly owned Interurban Rail Corridor, connecting communities from Chilliwack to Vancouver with an affordable, sustainable public transportation system. The study, now complete, was performed by Leewood Projects.
About Leewood Projects:
Leewood Projects is a British-based company that has professional expertise in light rail solutions, providing comprehensive project management and planning services to the international railway industry. Leewood Projects has i the past had involvement in prestigious rail projects such as the Channel Tunnel.
Railway stations designed as community gathering points. 10 full stations and 8 Tram Stops.
A detailed Journey Time matrix for stops along the line.
Total journey time between Surrey Scott Rd. SkyTrain Station and downtown Chilliwack: 90.5 minutes.
Future proposed expansions of the line: Downtown Vancouver (Stage 2) and Rosedale (Stage 3).
A detailed capital cost breakdown for the entire project.
Total capital costs (2010):
Stage 1 Phase 1 (Diesel Light Rail) 98 km Scott Rd. – Chilliwack: $492 million ($720 million – 2026)
Stage 1 Phase 2 (Electrification) 98 km Scott Rd. – Chilliwack: $114 million ($667 million – 2026)
Stage 2 Proposal – 28 km Extension to Downtown Vancouver: $363 million ($531 million – 20026)
Stage 3 Proposal – 12 km Extension to Rosedale: $28 million ($41 million – 2026)
This is the most comprehensive light rail study ever undertaken in this province, performed by a company with professional expertise in light rail solutions. This report at long last provides us with an honest accounting of the potential for light rail service on the Interurban corridor.
The “gelb wand” (yellow wall) of trams in Karlsruhe Germany
With the the Province; the City of Vancouver and TransLink continued selling big porkies about LRT, the following will be enlightening!
The ongoing planning and construction charade currently being played out by the usual suspects including cities of Vancouver & Surrey, TransLink and the provincial Minister of Transportation that the SkyTrain Light Metro System has shorter headway than light rail!
According to Thales’s 2022 news release, the Millennium Line (Broadway Subway) will only be signaled to allow a maximum capacity of only 7,500 pphpd, instantly puts a lie to these claims. Strange then Toronto’s TTC were obtaining capacities in excess of 12,000 pphpd on select tram/streetcar routes in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s.
Couples sets of PCC cars, Toronto 1940’s
The following is an email from a transit engineer from Germany answering my questions regarding tram headway’s and capacity (Capacity is a function of headway). He is answering questions that were put to me by several local politicians claiming that LRT cannot obtain the same headway’s as SkyTrain. Remember the Millennium Line, after the $1.47 billion rehab by Thales, will only have a maximum capacity of 7,500 pphpd!
One should compare the maximum of 10 to 12 trains an hour on the Millennium Line after resignalling, with Leipzig’s 40 trains per hour or Prague’s 45 trains per hour in the peak hours!
Question: It is not possible to operate 36 trains per hour as traffic signals will hold them back.
Answer: That’s the whole point of traffic light pre-emption. Which does not *increase* the green phase for streetcars, but *shift* it in time. So automobile traffic does not wait longer, it’s just different drivers who wait, statistically.
If there’s no significant automobile traffic parallel to the streetcar/light rail tracks (as typically the case in those “transit malls”), you can even dynamically reduce the green phase for the trains to the strict minimum required to clear the crossing (less than ten seconds, even for a four-car set), which will actually *increase* the green phase for crossing automobile traffic.
Right here next door, Leipzig is easily running 40 trains per hour on sections shared by several routes. And the infrastructure is not nearly at capacity, neither concerning trainset length (platform length would allow 60m instead of 42m), nor concerning frequency. Other operators do as well or even better. Karlsruhe’s 80 trains per hour are running through a pedestrian street. Calgary’s transit mall preciselyseems to suffer from a lack of traffic light pre-emption, judging form the videos.
Another example, from Czechia, the streetcar at Prague. The sectio from Karlovo Namesti east to I.P.Pavolova carries the routes
4: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 6: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 10: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 16: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 22: 4 min 15 trains/h
That’s 45 trains per hour.
The tracks from Karlovo Namesti to the north carry the routes
3: 4 min 15 trains/h 6: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 14: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 18: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 22: 4 min 15 trains/h 24: 8 min 7.5 trains/h
That’s 60 trains per hour.
The tracks from Karlovo Namesti to the south carry the routes
3: 4 min 15 trains/h 4: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 10: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 14: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 16: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 18: 8 min 7.5 trains/h 24: 8 min 7.5 trains/h
That’s 45 trains per hour as well.
All figures given are for the morning peak. There are various other networks in Europe that have similarly dense operation on sections shared by several routes. 40 trains/h is not uncommon.
Question: with a subway, 31 trains are possible per hour with 14,640 passengers.
Answwer: Boston’s green line is running 40 trains per hour, 90 second frequency. Onsight in the tunnel, without ATC. Four branches, six minutes frequencyeach. They are running four-car trainsets for events so the platforms would be long enough.
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