Evidently, the 16km Expo Line to Langley is in trouble, so who else to defend this hugely expensive project but the folks at SkyTrain for Surrey, otherwise known as FOX Entertainment North.
The claims made by SFS are breathtaking and needs serious comment.
True to form, the deliberate misinformation by SkyTrain for Surrey is again creating many misconceptions about transit and transportation and our regional public transit system is in trouble with declining ridership. The taxpayer has spent around $30 billion on SkyTrain, yet ridership has been in an ever steepening decline.
Because of the efforts of SkyTrain for Surrey, the city of Surrey will suffer from poor transit for decades to come as there will be scant monies available to expand the light metro system to a point where it will become an alternative to the car. Thus the SkyTrain light metro system will continue to offer “lessons” that local politcans and bureacrats refuse to learn.
Following the “Pied Piper” of SkyTrain has created and will continue to create public transit chaos in the region.
Zwei will comment when needed and it is certainly needed here.
MAYOR’S $8 BILLION SKYTRAIN ESTIMATE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE
Zwei replies: Evidence, what evidence, unless one makes it up as one goes along.
Every few years, someone throws out a big, scary number about the cost of future SkyTrain expansion—and this year, that number was $8 billion. Mayor Locke’s statement reads like a warning, framing the idea of a future SkyTrain as unrealistic before the project has even been defined.
But here’s the reality: no one actually knows what a South Surrey SkyTrain extension would cost yet. Not because it’s unaffordable, but because it hasn’t been studied—whether by TransLink or the province. There is no finalized route, no design, and no engineering work to base a price on, so saying this future SkyTrain is “cost‑prohibitive” or claiming it would take “two decades” to build is not just premature—it’s irresponsible.
We’ve seen this pattern before.
Zwei replies: What is irresponsible is even talking about a SkyTrain south along the King George Hwy.
Queue up folks because any thought of a SkyTrain extension in Surrey must come after the now $8 billion completion of the Broadway subway to UBC and the now over $15 billion North Shore SkyTrain to Metro Town.
Sorry, any talk of SkyTrain expansion in Surrey in the near future is just plain daft.
In the early 2000s, the then-proposed Canada Line was subject to heavy scrutiny. Critics called the project “prohibitively expensive”; local leaders in other municipalities repeatedly voted to stall it; and some groups pushed for it to be converted to a surface LRT—including Richmond City Council, led by then mayor Malcom Brodie. It took the intervention of SkyTrain advocates, who called on the City of Richmond to hold a referendum, to keep an elevated line on the table—and on March 9, 2004, the finished public consultation drew a record response. Out of more than 13,000 respondents, the majority voted in favour of an elevated, grade-separated line over an at-grade LRT system.
Zwei replies: The Canada Line was a Gordon Campbell faux P-3 project, designed as a long term investment tool for Bombardier, SNC Lavalin and the Caisse du Depot. The problem was, the trains used on the Expo and Millennium Lines are proprietary and no other company cared to bid on the project.
In desperation, The Campbell BC Liberals allowed Siemens and Alstom to bid on the project but promptly tossed them from the bidding process because they used trams as vehicles. SNC Lavalin cut a deal with ROTEM from Korea to use EMU’s and won the bid because a conventional system is always cheaper than the proprietary LIM powered system used on the E&M Lines.
The result: The Canada Line is the only heavy rail metro in the world, built as a light metro that has less capacity than a modern streetcar costing a fraction to build. Any polling done were cleverly crafted push polls using deliberately misleading information.
Although Mayor Brodie and Richmond Council continued to stubbornly push for an at-grade system, TransLink and regional planners realized they had to respect the wishes of the people. So they sought a private partner who innovated to keep the elevated design, converted Mayor Brodie’s “no” vote into a “yes”, and eventually delivered the grade-separated Canada Line we know and love—on time and on budget.
Today, the Canada Line has become a national and international model for good public transit, inspiring projects like Montréal’s REM, which is opening a brand‑new 14‑kilometre extension to the West Island this weekend.
Zwei replies: Actually Richmond council was gung-ho for SkyTrain and not light rail for the Canada Line. Now buyer’s remorse has set in as the Canada Line has not done much to reduce traffic and there is zero chance of the Canada Line ever being extended in its present form. It is a ‘sort-of’ White Elephant’, with the only winner being YVR!
REM is a financial clone of the Canada Line as the Caisse du Depot is making a lot of money on the Canada Line P-3, as they will with REM.
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“Dismissing a future SkyTrain on the basis of costs, but in the absence of a feasibility study that actually looks at those costs, is completely irresponsible,” says Daryl Dela Cruz, Founder of SkyTrain for Surrey.
Zwei replies: Actually, what we call SkyTrain, especially the trains used on the Expo and Millennium lines were deemed unsalable since the very early 1980’s when a TTC commissioned study, “The Accelerated Rapid Transit Study (ARTS) found that ICTS (the first name that SkyTrain was marketed by) cost up to ten times more to install than light rail for about the same capacity”. Death sentence for ICTS, but reprieved under a new name Advanced Light Rail Transit (ALRT) for the sale to Vancouver.
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The Canada Line story shows how misleading early assumptions can be, and why it’s important to separate political messaging from actual project planning. Costs don’t come from speeches; they come from engineering, design choices, procurement models, and lessons learned from recent builds. And on all of those fronts, Surrey is in a far stronger position today than critics would have you believe.
To understand why the $8 billion figure doesn’t hold up, it helps to look at the fundamentals. Here are five key reasons a South Surrey SkyTrain extension is far more realistic—and far more affordable—than the mayor suggests:
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#1: If a South Surrey SkyTrain were being built at the cost of the SLS today, it would cost only about $7 billion.
Using the Surrey Langley SkyTrain cost of $375 million per kilometre as a benchmark puts the 19-kilometre project cost closer to $7 billion. That’s not small—but it’s also not $8 billion!
And even this estimate assumes the South Surrey line would mirror SLS’s most expensive requirements: Expo Line infrastructure, long 80-metre platforms, and full system integration. But a future line doesn’t have to be built this way.
SkyTrain was always more costly to build than LRT
Cost comparisons from the 1980’s
Zwei replies: Wishful thinking at best. The final cost for the Expo Line to Langley is not finalized and the best the government can do is give two year old estimates. Building small stations is not in the cards as any future extension would have to accommodate the five car Innovia 300 train-sets. The estimated full cost of the Langley extension may well exceed $7 billion and may even exceed $8 billion due to inflation.
Also remember if there is a future extension to the light metro system, the UBC extension to the Millennium Line will come first and that is 20 years in the future at minimum. Also factor in that the proprietary trains needed to extend both the Expo and Millennium Lines will be long out of production as no one is interested in building with the system, evidenced by no sales for the past quarter of a century!
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#2: The first phase to Newton would not require an OMC.
Although TransLink has not studied the full route to South Surrey, TransLink did study an Expo Line extension as far as Newton Centre in 2012 (with the cost estimates updated in 2019). This study noted that the short 5.5-kilometre extension would not require a new operations and maintenance centre (OMC)—dramatically reducing the costs by removing land acquisition requirements.
This was also long before we knew there would be OMC #4 in Coquitlam—and before we approved the SLS, which comes with OMC #5. Both of these OMC facilities should ensure that an OMC is not necessary for the first phase of King George Boulevard SkyTrain.
Zwei replies: Actually the OMC #5 is needed for the five car Innovia 300 train-sets replacing the Ml. 1 cars.
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#3: The line does not have to follow the Expo Line’s infrastructure requirements or platform lengths
Nobody said that the future line has to be an extension of the Expo Line. As we discussed in our previous post, Two Ways to Build SkyTrain on King George Boulevard, a separate line with different design standards could be built for far less. This includes shorter platforms, because the line wouldn’t need to handle 5-car-long Expo Line trains (and the trains can be made wider to compensate).
Zwei replies: Obviously the station platforms would have to accommodate the Innovia 300 five car train-sets that are in operation. This line of reasoning is pure nonsense.
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#4: The current BRT project will reduce the cost of the SkyTrain.
Every dollar spent on the King George BRT is a dollar that won’t need to be spent later on SkyTrain. That’s because BRT construction includes utility relocations, land acquisition, street reconstruction, and corridor widening. All of this work would otherwise be bundled into the SkyTrain budget—at a higher and inflated cost, and with greater disruption.
Surrey residents should be familiar with this: before Surrey Langley SkyTrain construction reached Green Timbers Forest, Fraser Highway was widened there from 2 to 4 lanes. Today, while the Surrey Sprinter launch gantry and work crews work on the guideway above, the two outer lanes below are kept open for traffic. The alternative would have been a full closure of Fraser Highway through Green Timbers for multiple years, sending transit buses and cars through local neighbourhood streets like 92 Avenue.
Zwei replies: I shake my head at this. BRT will not reduce the cost of SkyTrain light-metro construction. This is pure unsound reasoning by someone who is desperately trying to mislead the public.
Similarly, when the region’s first BRT (the 98 B-Line) was constructed on No. 3 Road in Richmond, the work done for it was critical for enabling the Canada Line. Before the BRT, No. 3 Road was a narrow 4-lane road with a centre turn lane, with malls and shops coming up to the sidewalk; there was no space to build a SkyTrain. Although the BRT was there for only 5 years before Canada Line construction began, the alternative would have been catastrophic: a fully closed road, shutting down businesses and severing the lifeline of the city.
Zwei replies: Nice try but again not true. Fact is, the Canada Line was a pure Gordon Campbell, BC Liberal project to promote P-3 construction and light metro was not planned for at least another 15 to 20 years. The notion that #3 Road was narrow comes from the 1950’s and 1960’s and by the time the B-98 was in operation. Actually #3 road and the Express Bus lanes were designed to accommodate LRT, not SkyTrain (which was actually built on the ‘gutter’ lane), but the NDP flip flop from LRT to light metro with the Broadway Lougheed Rapid Transit project made sure no LRT was to be built in Metro Vancouver.
Strange coincidence is that the NDP flip flopped again from LRT to light metro for Surrey, using the much more expensive proprietary MALM system.
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#5: Integration with a larger regional or intercity rail project could make the SkyTrain essentially free.
That’s right, free!
Zwei replies: This is pure nonsense and desperately shows both the ignorance of the author of this piece. Currently there are no regional or intercity rail being proposed.
Rail for the Valley’s $2 billion Marpole to Chilliwack proposal only integrates with the Canada Line at Cambie for service to Richmond and YVR.
Groups like Mountain Valley Institute and experts like Reece Martin have often pointed out that much larger projects could include urban rapid transit in Surrey, including proposed high-speed rail to Seattle and Portland, and regional rail connecting the Fraser Valley (Abbotsford-Chilliwack) and Sea-to-Sky (Whistler-Squamish) regions to Greater Vancouver.
Zwei replies: Excuse me but mountain Valley Institute are not experts, rather they have no actual experience building rail and are basically theorists more than anything. Reece Martin, is a You Tube presenter, who again is not an expert.
Rail for the Valley have engaged real experts, such as Leewood Projects (UK) who have a good working knowledge on rail projects, for the Leewood Study.
When one talks of High Speed Rail, one instantly should recognize that due to costs, will not happen in Metro Vancouver or the Fraser Valley and should be seen as comments by real amateurs!
Large‑scale nation-building rail projects often incorporate local rapid transit infrastructure as part of their corridor design. This is common worldwide—and it could happen here. If a future regional or high‑speed rail line uses the King George corridor, the incremental cost of building the local SkyTrain component could be minimal or effectively zero.
Zwei replies; Absolute nonsense.
The problem with extending the SkyTrain light Metro system is finance and the huge costs of light-metro, a transit mode grossly ill suited to operate as a regional railway.
The failure to recognize the expensive pitfalls of using proprietary trains on the Expo and millennium lines and the politcal interference with the Canada Line P-3, with the line being the only heavy-rail metro built in the world as a light-metro, having less capacity than a modern tram or streetcar coasting a fraction to build.
Need I remind the reader that of the seven such proprietary railways built, as used on the Expo and Millennium Lines, two were forced upon the operating authority (Vancouver and Toronto); two were involved in bribery scandals involving payments of “success fees” to senior bureacrats and politicians (Korea and Malaysia); one was financed by the Canadian Overseas Development Bank because a panel of experts found the system too expensive and poorly built (JFK Airtrain); and one was built to gain technical information (Beijing).
The proprietary system used on the Expo and Millennium Line were also marketed under at least six different names, Intermediate Capacity Transit System; Advanced Light Rail Transit; Advanced Light Metro; Advanced Rapid Transit ; Innovia Rapid Transit; and Movia Automatic Light Metro.
The proprietary railway has also had four owners; the UTDC; Lavalin; Bombardier; and now Alstom.
The SkyTrain light metro system has a sad history of corruption, professional misconduct and politcal, interference, which has left Vancouver as an outlier with public transit as not one city has copied Vancouver’s transit planning, nor its exclusive use of light metro.
Eglinton Further East: City Council Reboots Scarborough LRT Plans
Why Light Rail?
The answer is simple:
FLEXIBILITY
Despite a sort of “character assassination” by the media and metro crowd, LRT still remains the most built rail urban and suburban transit mode in the world.
The reason is simple as it provides the best bang for one’s transit buck. Inherently flexible in operation light rail or just the simple tram brings many benefits to a town and city.
Politicians favour hugely expensive prestige projects like elevated light-metro or subways, yet the modern tram can achieve the same results at a far cheaper cost.
The following is from 2016 and now with transit dollars in short supply, the plan is being rebooted.
This past week, Toronto City Council approved a motion from Mayor Chow to provide an additional $10 million in funding to move forward the “Scarborough East Rapid Transit” line, while designating it a top priority within the City’s transit expansion plans. Formerly known as the Eglinton East LRT, Chow has shown renewed interest in reviving long-stagnant plans to build a light rail line through Scarborough, following its initial proposal in 2007.A rendering depicting the SERT’s envisioned alignment along Military Trail within the UTSC campus, image courtesy of the City of TorontoThe Scarborough East Rapid Transit (SERT) line is planned to be a street-running LRT, akin to similar operations seen on the 510 Spadina streetcar and the Finch West LRT. It would run a total of 18.6 kilometres from Kennedy station on Danforth Line 2 to the University of Toronto’s Scarborough Campus, before crossing the 401 to run along Sheppard Avenue, branching at Neilson Road to reach both Malvern Town Centre and the McCowan-Sheppard subway station now under construction. The proposed alignment would form a rough crescent, connecting to Line 2 at either end while travelling primarily on Eglinton Avenue East, Kingston Road, Morningside Avenue, and Sheppard Avenue East.A map depicting the planned route of the SERT, image courtesy of the City of TorontoWhile recent documents from City Hall indicate that City staff will explore the potential for grade separations along the line, the SERT is currently planned to run primarily in a dedicated right-of-way in the median of the various suburban arterials along which it will travel. This at-grade alignment will necessitate frequent stops at signalised intersections and render transit service vulnerable to disruptions from on-street collisions — two issues which have plagued the Finch West LRT since its opening last December.A rendering looking over the intersection of Eglinton Avenue East and McCowan Road, image courtesy of the City of TorontoThe width of the various streets that the LRT is set to run down varies drastically along its route. On streets such as Sheppard and Eglinton Avenues, the City-owned vehicular right-of-way stretches over 25 metres wide, allowing for the relatively simple insertion of light rail tracks and platforms while maintaining a similar number of general traffic lanes as currently exist.A typical right-of-way plan at a signalized intersection along the SERT, image courtesy of the City of TorontoOn narrower streets, such as Morningside Avenue and Neilson Road, a street section more similar to the dedicated streetcar alignments seen in downtown Toronto would be implemented. General vehicle lanes would be removed to make way for the dedicated tracks, while significant alterations to boulevards would facilitate the delivery of a “complete street” featuring wide sidewalks, cycle tracks, and planting boulevards.A typical cross-section of the planned alignment along Morningside Avenue between Kingston Road and Fairwood Crescent, image courtesy of the City of TorontoThe $10 million dollar sum recently approved for the project is intended to advance these preliminary designs to a state of 30% completion. This will allow City staff and consultants to determine in greater detail the requirements for implementing such a project, such as property expropriation and utility relocation. Additionally, the funding announcement comes at a time as the municipal government is attempting to garner provincial and federal support for the project. Those two governmental bodies have historically shown limited interest in the idea of a LRT for Scarborough, with provincially-run Metrolinx even failing to protect for a future integration of service on the SERT with the Eglinton Line 5 during the construction of the Crosstown. A Line 2 train arrives at Kennedy station, image courtesy of the TTCPart of the higher levels of government’s hesitancy to become involved politically or financially with the SERT may be that, by the City of Toronto’s own admission, the new line would run slower than the bus service it would replace. In the Eglinton East LRT: Initial Business Case, the actual projected speed of the LRT is heavily underemphasised; where it is addressed, the business case states “bus travel speeds [would be] higher than the LRT,” and that due to this failure to reduce travel times, “the project as currently defined [would have] a negative user impact.” Looking along Morningside Avenue as a 116 Morningside bus travels along the RapidTO bus lane, image courtesy of the City of TorontoIt is also worth noting that LRT business cases have a precedent for dramatically overestimating actual speeds during revenue service. The recently opened Finch West LRT was projected to complete its 10.3-kilometre route in 28 minutes, according to Metrolinx’s Sheppard-Finch Rapid Transit Benefits Case. On opening day, it actually travelled that same distance in 55 minutes—nearly half the projected speed on which the justification for the entire project was predicated. In the face of the ensuing embarrassment, City Hall enacted traffic signal changes to speed up LRV operations, a move which still saw the line running between 45% and 65% slower than its promised speed.Looking south-west over the intersection of Finch Avenue West and Islington Avenue at a Finch West LRT vehicle, image courtesy of AECONWith the City of Toronto unable to shoulder the multi-billion-dollar cost of building the SERT, and provincial transit interests shifting toward expanded commuter rail, the future of this nearly two-decade-old LRT concept remains uncertain. Nevertheless, with a mayoral election approaching and both incumbent Olivia Chow and likely contender Brad Bradford taking strong stances on the project, it will undoubtedly be a major campaign issue.An aerial photograph of the University of Toronto Scarborough campus, 2025, image courtesy of Wikimedia user CanmenwalkerUrbanToronto will continue to follow progress on this development.application.
The La Chaux-de-Fonds–Glovelier line is a 1,000 mm (3 ft 3+3⁄8 in) railway line in the cantons of Jura, Bern, and Neuchâtel in Switzerland.[2] The line was originally built by two companies, the Chemin de fer Saignelégier-La Chaux-de-Fonds and Régional Saignelégier–Glovelier, and has been owned and operated by the Chemins de fer du Jura since 1944.
Clermont-Ferrand -Nîmes: 303 kilometers, double track to Arvant, single track then to Alès then double track between Alès and Nîmes, diesel traction in total.
Another French regional railway which also accommodates several express passenger train routes.
Regional railways are far more important than one would think. Regional railways offer an alternative to road travel and help mitigate the issues of pollution and traffic congestion. Regional railways, unlike buses, do not create the demand for larger roads and highways, which is important in the current era of Global Warming and Climate Change. With affordable operating coasts and the ability to travel where road vehicles cannot, regional railways fills a public transport need that politcans in Canada choose to ignore.
The Tavannes–Noirmont railway line is a metre-gauge railway line in western Switzerland. The Tramelan-Tavannes Railway [fr] (French: Chemin de fer de Tramelan à Tavannes) opened the first section in 1884; the Tramelan – Breuleux – Noirmont Railway (French: Compagnie du chemin de fer Tramelan – Breuleux – Noirmont) completed the line between Tramelan and Le Noirmont in 1913. The line was electrified in 1913 and has belonged to the Chemins de fer du Jura (CJ) since 1944.
Interesting video and informative. Also the comment about the Hyperloop should also be taken note of.
One quibble, I would not call “monorail” a gadgetbahn, rather it is a “niche” transit mode, operating in environments that would be too expensive or awkward for a railway. True monorails are quite rare (Germany’s famous Schwebebahn is a true monorail) but stradlebeam monorails are not true monorails.
It is puzzling that TransLink would waste valuable money on an express bus to, transit wise, nowhere. It’s like the Broadway subway stopping at Arbutus and it just does not make sense.
The 99-B “Rapid” (Express Bus) is successful because it largely serves UBC and Metrotown is no UBC! Though the new “Rapid” bus will serve BCIT, one wonders if there is the actual ridership to warrant the hype and hoopla about the new service.
Is this TransLink’s answer to the shocking 3.2% drop in ridership in 2025 from 2024?
If it is, it is way too little way too late.
With now over $16 billion being spent to extend the Expo and Millennium Lines a mere 21.7 km, one must now understand that the huge costs needed for “SkyTrain” expansion is leaving crumbs for the rest of the network.
A tarted up express service, being marketed as “RapidBus” and vague promises of “SkyTrain” to the North Shore sometime in the future gives the answer.
Until TransLink plans for customer needs in 2026 and beyond and not follow a questionable transportation doctrine, based on density cobbled together in 1998 to sell the public on SkyTrain, ridership on Metro Vancouver’s extremely expensive regional transportation system will continue to see a decline. Rapid Bus is merely a Band Aid solution while the ridership hemorrhages.
R2 RapidBus extension to Metrotown ahead of schedule, ready in September
An R5 RapidBus is seen in Burnaby, B.C. on Monday November 18, 2024. (CityNews Image)
Taking transit between the North Shore and Metrotown will soon be much easier and faster.
TransLink announced on Wednesday that the extension of the R2 Marine Drive RapidBus will be completed ahead of schedule.
Commuters will be able to ride the bus from Park Royal in West Vancouver all the way to Metrotown in Burnaby in September this year.
Originally, the extension was scheduled to open in early 2027.
Currently, the R2 stops at Phibbs Exchange, just north of the Iron Workers Memorial Bridge.
This means transit passengers going to Metrotown must transfer to either the 130 or 222 bus line. After the extension’s completion, the 222 will be discontinued while the 130 will continue.
The extension will route along Hastings Street and Willingdon Avenue, connecting passengers with Burnaby Heights, Brentwood, and BCIT along its path.
The service will run all day, seven days a week.
According to TransLink, the R2 will decrease travel time between Phibbs Exchange and Metrotown by 20 to 30 per cent.
“This project will also increase capacity along the Willingdon corridor and on the North Shore,” TransLink said in a statement.
“While increase at peak periods is expected to be modest, off-peak capacity on Willingdon is expected to rise by at least 50 per cent.”
Investments funded by tax and fare increases
The transportation authority also adds that it will indirectly benefit Capilano University students travelling along the North Shore corridor.
The project was spearheaded by the District of West Vancouver, District of North Vancouver, City of North Vancouver, City of Vancouver, and the City of Burnaby and is part of TransLink’s 2025 Investment Plan.
The additional investments are funded by a 0.5 per cent property tax increase in 2025, generating a $44 million in revenue.
Additionally, a higher parking sales tax and transit fares carry the financial expenses of the extension.
……….. or cutting through the BS about Local Transit.
The following is a guide plus definitions.
ALM: Automatic Light metro, the fourth marketing name given for the SkyTrain family of light-metros, when Lavalin briefly owned SkyTrain before going bankrupt.
ALRT (1): Advanced Light Rail Transit, the second marketing name after ICTS for the trains used on the Expo Line. erroneously called SkyTrain.
ALRT (2): Advanced Light Rapid Transit, the third marketing name for SkyTrain, when Advanced Light Rail Transit failed to find a market.
ART: Advanced Rapid Transit, the fifth marketing name for SkyTrain, used by its then owners, Bombardier Inc.
Alstom: The forth owner of the proprietary SkyTrain light-metro system (MALM).
Automatic (Driverless) Operation: A signaling system that permits train operation without drivers. Contrary to popular myth, automatic operation does not reduce operating costs. Instead of no drivers, attendants must be hired instead to permit safe operation. Automatic signaling was designed to reduce signaling staff, not operation staff.
Bombardier: The third owner of the proprietary SkyTrain light metro system (ART & Innovia)
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): Generally means Express Buses, a true BRT needs a very expensive and land consuming busway or highway or be guided.
Bored tunnel: A tunnel boring machine also known as a “mole”, is a machine used to excavate tunnels with a circular cross section through a variety of soil and rock strata. They can bore through anything from hard rock to sand.
Busway: A route needed for BRT. Busways can be conventional HOV lanes or exclusive roads for buses. Busways can be equipped with raised curbs or rails for bus guidance.
Canada Line: Vancouver’s third light metro line which is a grade separated EMU operation and is not compatible with the rest of the SkyTrain light metro system in operation.
Capacity: A function of headway multiplied by vehicle capacity, which in turn is dependent on station station platform length measured in persons per hour per direction (pphpd).
Community Rail: a government strategy supported by the rail industry. It engages local people in the development and promotion of local and rural routes, services and stations. Community Rail routes remain connected to the national rail network, and train operating companies run the trains and stations.
Consultation: To sell a transit decision to the public after the decision has been made.
C-Train: The Calgary light rail system, modeled after German Stadtbahn.
Cut and cover: A method of building a tunnel by making a cutting, which is then lined and covered over. (Civil Engineering) designating a method of constructing a tunnel by excavating a cutting to the required depth and then backfilling the excavation over the tunnel roof
DMU: Diesel Multiple Unit – A diesel multiple unit or DMU is a multiple–unit train powered by on-board diesel engines. A DMU requires no separate locomotive, as the engines are incorporated into one or more of the carriages. Diesel-powered single-unit railcars are also generally classed as DMUs.
EMU: Electrical Multiple Unit – An electric multiple unit or EMU is a multiple–unit train consisting of self-propelled carriages using electricity as the motive power. An EMU requires no separate locomotive, as electric traction motors are incorporated within one or a number of the carriages.
Evergreen Line: The 11.4 km newly finished portion of the old Broadway/Lougheed Rapid Transit Project. When the NDP forced the SkyTrain Millennium Line onto TransLink, there was not the money left order to complete the line to the Tri-Cities. Now completed. The Evergreen Line is now known as the Millennium Line.
Expo Line: The first SkyTrain line built, completed in late 1985. The Expo Line was built in three sections. The Waterfront to New Westminster section (cost a much as LRT from Vancouver to Whalley, Lougheed Mall and Richmond Centre), the Skybridge, section across the Fraser river to Scott Road Station, and the final section to Whalley in Surrey. The Expo Line is now being extended 16 km to Langley at an estimated cost of $6 billion
Grade: The vertical rise of a railway track, normally given in a percentage (1% grade = a 1 metre rise in 100 metres). Industry standard grade for LRT is 8%; Sheffield’s( LRTA) operates on 10% grades; the maximum grade for a tramway is located in Lisbon, where the streetcars operate, unassisted, on 13.8% grades.
Flip-flop: Make an abrupt reversal of policy. Common with Light Rail/SkyTrain planning in Metro Vancouver.
Garage Sale: The Detroit ICTS People Mover operators went to the TTC Garage Sale to get cars and parts to keep their system in operation.
Goebbels Gambit: The fine art of repeating a lie often enough that it is perceived as the truth, TransLink is very good at!
Greenfield Construction: A greenfield site is undeveloped land with no previous construction on it, offering a blank canvas for building.
Guided Bus: A BRT that is physically guided by either a raised curb or a central rail. Some guided buses are considered monorails.
Headway: The time interval between trains on a transit route.
Hybrid: A transit system that is designed operated as a LRT/light metro mix. Generally very expensive as it uses the most expensive features of both modes.
Innovia: The sixth name SkyTrain was marketed by (no buyers).
ICTS: Intermediate Capacity Transit system, the first name of what was renamed ALRT, erroneously called SkyTrain was marketed by.
Interurban: An early streetcar which operated at speed on its own R-o-W connecting urban centres.
Lavalin: The second owner of the proprietary SkyTrain light metro system. Went bankrupt building a system in Bangkok. Later amalgamated with SNC to become SNC Lavalin.(ALRT, ALM) Siemens built a conventional metro system for Bangkok, also known as SkyTrain, but there is no relation.
Light Metro: A transit mode, generally a proprietary transit system, that has the same or less capacity than LRT, at the cost of a heavy-rail metro.
Light Rail Transit (LRT): A steel wheel on steel rail transit system that can operate economically on transit routes with traffic flows between 2,000 pphpd to over 20,000 pphpd, thus bridging the gap on what buses can carry and that which needs a metro. A streetcar is considered LRT when it operates on reserved rights-of-ways or R-o-Wa’s for the exclusive use of the streetcar/tram. Number of LRT/tramways in operation around the world over 500; light railways (many use LRV’s) and over 120; heritage lines over 60.
Light Rail Vehicle (LRV): A vehicle that operates on a LRT or streetcar line. Also called a streetcar, tram, TramTrain or interurban.
LRT(1): Light Rail Transit (see above).
LRT(2): Light Rapid Transit – Light Metro (see above) Light Rapid Transit (LRT) is used by politcans and bureaucracy to confuse the public, when selling them the virtues of light metro instead of light rail.
Lysenkoism: used metaphorically to describe the manipulation or distortion of the scientific process as a way to reach a predetermined conclusion as dictated by an ideological bias, often related to social or political objectives.
Mass Transit: A generic term for heavy-rail metro. See rapid transit.
MAX: The Portland Tri-Met LRT system.
Mayor’s Council on Transit: Metro Vancouver mayors pretending to be experts, rubber stamping provincial transportation decisions. Locally know as the “Ship of fools”.
Metro: An urban/suburban railway that operates on a segregated R-o-W, either in a subway or on a viaduct, due to long trains (5 cars+) and close headway’s. There are 174 heavy/light metros in operation around the world.
Millennium Line: The second SkyTrain Line built, using the new Bombardier ART cars.
Medical Emergency:TransLink Speak for a suicide.
Monorail: A transit mode that operates on one rail. There are two general types of monorail: 1) hanging monorail and 2) straddle beam monorail (not a true monorail). Some proprietary BRT systems are also classed as monorail.
Movia Automatic Light Metro: The seventh and last name that SkyTrain has been Marketed under, with Linear Induction Motors a customer add on.
Priority Signaling: A signaling system that gives priority to transit vehicles at intersections.
Proprietary Transit System: A transit system who rights are exclusively owned by one company. Transit operations who operate proprietary transit systems must deal with only one supplier.
Rapid Transit: A generic term for metro. See mass transit. Rapid Transit is not Light Rail Transit.
Reserved Rights of Way: An exclusive R-o-W for use of transit vehicles, can be as simple as a HOV lane (with rails for LRT) or as elaborate a a lawned boulevard or a linear park complete with shrubs.
SkyTrain: The name of metro Vancouver’s light metro system, chosen via a radio contest in 1985. The SkyTrain light metro system consists of two very different systems: 1) The proprietary ALRT/ART/MALM system which operates on the Expo and Millennium Lines and 2) The Canada line which operates standard conventional EMU’s and built as a light-metro. The two systems are not compatible in operation.
Streetcar: A steel wheel, on steel rail electric (also can be diesel powered) vehicle that operates in mixed traffic, with little or no priority at intersections. Also known as a tram in Europe. Streetcars become LRT when operating on reserved R-o-W’s.
Subway: An underground portion of a rapid transit line. Subways may either be bored or cut and cover or a combination of both construction methods.
TTC: The Toronto Transit Commission.
Tram: European term for streetcar, as the Europeans do not use the term LRT.
TramTrain: A streetcar that can operate on the mainline railways, operating as a passenger train.
TransLink Speak: The lexicon used by TransLink to mask problems.
The Urban Transportation Development corporation (UTDC): A former Ontario Crown corporation responsible for the development and sales of ICTS and ALRT, Sold to Lavalin.
Viaduct: A viaduct is a bridge composed of several small spans.
The West Lyon tram-train is a French light rail network, whose ticketing is integrated into the TER Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes service, connecting the center of the metropolis of Lyon to the west of the city The service was partially inaugurated from Lyon-Saint-Paul to Sain-Bel on September 22 and from Tassin to Brignais including the Tassin shunt, Saturday, December 8, 2012.
The network will eventually have three branches departing from Saint-Paul station and serving twenty-three stations in the direction of Brignais, Sain-Bel and Lozanne.
The operation is carried out by Alstom Citidis Dualis tram-trains. The Citidis Dualis tramtrains have a maximum speed of 100 kph and the service is signaled for 15 to 30 minutes headway’s, with frequent stops, most served by buses.
Like all modular tram, the Citidis Dualis tram can grow to accommodate increasing ridership by adding another module.
The continued misinformation from the usual sources about SkyTrain being cheap to operate, must be again, refuted. When compared to light rail, SkyTrain has cost much more to operate ad maintain. According to TransLink from information in 2020, the operational costs of both the Expo line extension to Langley and the Broadway subway would add at least $80 million to TransLink’s operating budget. Accounting for inflation, this cost has now risen past $96 .5 million annually!
This cost is based on 2020 figures.Adjusted for inflation the cost would be $4 million per km in operating costs and $4.7 million per km in capital costs every year; for a total of $8.7 billion per km.
If one took the ‘Way-back’ machine to the late 1980’s, the argument that SkyTrain was cheaper to operate than LRT, would show the massive propaganda campaign to give the public a positive view of the proprietary ALRT light-metro. This is because it was forced upon the region by the Social Credit government of the day.
There were no comparative studies done as the orders came directly from the Premiers Office.
The reality was, building the Expo line with ALRT was a horse-trade with the government of Ontario (the UTDC was their Crown corporation) to both sell an unsalable R/T system and to obtain the services of the then Ontario Conservative governments ‘Blue Machine’ to win the next BC election.
This is the base for Vancouver’s love affair with light-metro.
The SkyTrain light-metro system has been portrayed as a wonder system, which over time has built up to the current SkyTrain myth. Like Robin Hood or King Arthur, the SkyTrain myth is nothing more than cobbled together claims and cherry picked facts and a myth often repeated tends to become fact in the people’s minds.
It is all “repeat a lie enough times and the people will come to believe” shtick.
It also be remembered that both BC, Transit and TransLink were in partnership to sell Advanced Rapid Transit (ART) or SkyTrain, abroad. This meant that there would be no way for LRT to be built in metro Vancouver.
The Calgary C-Train has traditionally carried more customers than the Expo Line (both being about the same length) and costing less than half to build and much less to operate.
Today, many of the “old gang” at TransLink have retired and the new lot of bureaucrats (many earning six figured salaries”) repeat the old porkies actually believing they are true.
Sadly, it never was.
The print and electronic media also fell into this trap as those reporters who did investigative reporting have long retired, with the new crop of reporters,eager to please their corporate bosses, treat TransLink news releases as real news, instead of a well planned propaganda campaign.
Even in the 90’s, then huge subsidies for ALRT, made the mini-metro not cost effective in operation.
Vancouver’s SkyTrain light-metro system has had the transit eyes of the world on it for almost 40 years, yet no one has copied Vancouver and that is a question that the SkyTrain Lobby prefer not to deal with.
In an era of unprecedented investment in public transport, no one has copied the Vancouver model, the exclusive use of a light metro, including a proprietary light-metro system, for urban transport.
Why?
The per km cost of LRT and light-metro, 1981 to 1987.
A Comparrison Of Operating Costs – SkyTrain & Light Rail
The late Des Turner was meticulous with his research with the SkyTrain light metro system and in 1988, embarrassed the then Social Credit Government to release the real costs of the mini-metro.
What is more interesting is comparing the operating costs of the Calgary C-Train light rail and SkyTrain.
Thought the operating costs are a year in difference, it must be noted that the Calgary C-Train has historically carried more customers than the Expo Line, yet its operating costs are more than $12 million less than that of SkyTrain.
BC Transit knew this, but continued the myth that SkyTrain was cheaper to operate. This is called professional misconduct; others may call it more.
TransLink, which was mostly made up of BC Transit bureaucrats jumping ship, knew this, but continued the myth that SkyTrain was cheaper to operate.
COMPARISON OF OPERATING COSTS
The total 1988/89 budget for SkyTrain:
Operations………………… 5,483,863
Maintenance……………. 14,243,092
Administration………….. 7,931,834
Total: $27,658,789
(Rick Krowchuck, Executive V.P. Finance)
Calgary C-Train 1990 Operating Budget
Operators……………………… $2,332,000
Maintenance………………….$4,804,000
(Labour, parts, materials)
LRV Power……………………. $1,384,000
Fixed Operating …….Costs $6,815,000
(administration, cleaning facilities/buildings)
Total: $15,335,000
(Niel Mckendrick Coordinator of Transit Services, Calgary Transit)
There are those who are still taken with the SkyTrain myth and firmly believe that the proprietary railway is the best, yet evidence clearly shows, that once out of the SkyTrain bubble of Metro Vancouver, what we call SkyTrain is nothing more than a dead branch on the public transit tree of evolution.
Today, in BC, funding for hospitals, care homes for the aged and many more public services are being curtailed, mainly to source funding for the $16 billion plus, 21.7 km expansion of the Expo and Millennium Lines and will be legacy for a government’s refusal to admit, that building with SkyTrain was strictly a politcal decision and not a practical one.
A rendering depicting the SERT’s envisioned alignment along Military Trail within the UTSC campus, image courtesy of the City of TorontoThe Scarborough East Rapid Transit (SERT) line is planned to be a street-running LRT, akin to similar operations seen on the 510 Spadina streetcar and the Finch West LRT. It would run a total of 18.6 kilometres from Kennedy station on Danforth Line 2 to the University of Toronto’s Scarborough Campus, before crossing the 401 to run along Sheppard Avenue, branching at Neilson Road to reach both Malvern Town Centre and the McCowan-Sheppard subway station now under construction. The proposed alignment would form a rough crescent, connecting to Line 2 at either end while travelling primarily on Eglinton Avenue East, Kingston Road, Morningside Avenue, and Sheppard Avenue East.
A map depicting the planned route of the SERT, image courtesy of the City of TorontoWhile recent documents from City Hall indicate that City staff will explore the potential for grade separations along the line, the SERT is currently planned to run primarily in a dedicated right-of-way in the median of the various suburban arterials along which it will travel. This at-grade alignment will necessitate frequent stops at signalised intersections and render transit service vulnerable to disruptions from on-street collisions — two issues which have plagued the Finch West LRT since its opening last December.
A rendering looking over the intersection of Eglinton Avenue East and McCowan Road, image courtesy of the City of TorontoThe width of the various streets that the LRT is set to run down varies drastically along its route. On streets such as Sheppard and Eglinton Avenues, the City-owned vehicular right-of-way stretches over 25 metres wide, allowing for the relatively simple insertion of light rail tracks and platforms while maintaining a similar number of general traffic lanes as currently exist.
A typical right-of-way plan at a signalized intersection along the SERT, image courtesy of the City of TorontoOn narrower streets, such as Morningside Avenue and Neilson Road, a street section more similar to the dedicated streetcar alignments seen in downtown Toronto would be implemented. General vehicle lanes would be removed to make way for the dedicated tracks, while significant alterations to boulevards would facilitate the delivery of a “complete street” featuring wide sidewalks, cycle tracks, and planting boulevards.
A typical cross-section of the planned alignment along Morningside Avenue between Kingston Road and Fairwood Crescent, image courtesy of the City of TorontoThe $10 million dollar sum recently approved for the project is intended to advance these preliminary designs to a state of 30% completion. This will allow City staff and consultants to determine in greater detail the requirements for implementing such a project, such as property expropriation and utility relocation. Additionally, the funding announcement comes at a time as the municipal government is attempting to garner provincial and federal support for the project. Those two governmental bodies have historically shown limited interest in the idea of a LRT for Scarborough, with provincially-run Metrolinx even failing to protect for a future integration of service on the SERT with the Eglinton Line 5 during the construction of the Crosstown. 
A Line 2 train arrives at Kennedy station, image courtesy of the TTCPart of the higher levels of government’s hesitancy to become involved politically or financially with the SERT may be that, by the City of Toronto’s own admission, the new line would run slower than the bus service it would replace. In the Eglinton East LRT: Initial Business Case, the actual projected speed of the LRT is heavily underemphasised; where it is addressed, the business case states “bus travel speeds [would be] higher than the LRT,” and that due to this failure to reduce travel times, “the project as currently defined [would have] a negative user impact.” 
Looking along Morningside Avenue as a 116 Morningside bus travels along the RapidTO bus lane, image courtesy of the City of TorontoIt is also worth noting that LRT business cases have a precedent for dramatically overestimating actual speeds during revenue service. The recently opened Finch West LRT was projected to complete its 10.3-kilometre route in 28 minutes, according to Metrolinx’s Sheppard-Finch Rapid Transit Benefits Case. On opening day, it actually travelled that same distance in 55 minutes—nearly half the projected speed on which the justification for the entire project was predicated. In the face of the ensuing embarrassment, City Hall enacted traffic signal changes to speed up LRV operations, a move which still saw the line running between 45% and 65% slower than its promised speed.
Looking south-west over the intersection of Finch Avenue West and Islington Avenue at a Finch West LRT vehicle, image courtesy of AECONWith the City of Toronto unable to shoulder the multi-billion-dollar cost of building the SERT, and provincial transit interests shifting toward expanded commuter rail, the future of this nearly two-decade-old LRT concept remains uncertain. Nevertheless, with a mayoral election approaching and both incumbent Olivia Chow and likely contender Brad Bradford taking strong stances on the project, it will undoubtedly be a major campaign issue.
An aerial photograph of the University of Toronto Scarborough campus, 2025, image courtesy of Wikimedia user CanmenwalkerUrbanToronto will continue to follow progress on this development.application.
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