The case for Diesel LRT for the metro Vancouver region.
Diesel light-rail is a light-rail vehicle which is powered by a diesel engine, rather than electricity, conforming to the operational parameters of modern LRT. ThisAi??Ai??meansAi??Ai??Diesel LRTAi??Ai??can be installed very cheaply on routes that would otherwise not be considered for ‘rail’ transit, as itAi??Ai??forgoes the expense of the ‘overhead’ for electric transmission,Ai??Ai??giving large cost savings on longer routes. Being light-rail, Diesel LRT can also operate on tram tracks in city centres, on ‘reserved rights-of-ways, and track share on mainline railways. The following is a U-Tube feature, showing the New Jersey Diesel LRT line.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TizfWStIy-M
Being powered by a diesel engine, the light-rail vehicle can operate on existing railway tracks, track-sharing with regular freight and passenger trains, with safe operation ensured by modern signaling methods. There areAi??Ai??five routes in the metro Vancouver region thatAi??Ai??could be consideredAi??Ai??for Diesel LRT operation.
- The Vancouver to Chilliwack interurban.
- Vancouver to Whiterock.
- Coquitlam/Port Moody to Vancouver viaAi??Ai??New Westminster, Marpole and the Arbutus Corridor.
- New Westminster to Queensborough and Annacis Island.
- New Westminster to Richmond.
Five Diesel LRT routes, using existing railway infrastructureAi??Ai??and a new Fraser River Rail bridge with a 3-track lift span, could be had for the cost of one new SkyTrain line. What is needed is the political will to provide affordableAi??Ai??LRT solutions and Federal legislation to compel mainline railway operators to accept Diesel LRT operation on lightly used rail lines in urban areas. With ‘peak oil’ and a severeAi??Ai??economic downturn, precious transit money should not be spent on prestigious ‘metro’ projects that will achieve very little, but on ‘workhorse’ solutions, bringingAi??Ai??LRT to as many people as possible at the cheapest cost.
It isAi??Ai??time that our provincial and federal politicians andAi??Ai??regional transportationAi??Ai??authorities end their fixation with hugely expensive light-metros like SkyTrain and RAV/Canada LineAi??Ai??and start planning for affordableAi??Ai??LRT projects, including diesel LRT,Ai??Ai??thatAi??Ai??would provide the all important seamless journey from residence to destination that has proven time after time, to attract the all important motorist from the car.
The seamless (no transfer) journey – Transit’s Holy Grail!
It has been long known that the seamless or no transfer journey is the ‘ticket’ to attract customersAi??Ai??to public transit asAi??Ai??itAi??Ai??is well understoodAi??Ai??that oneAi??Ai??could lose upwards of 70% of ridership per transfer, even inter modal. On older tramways and streetcar systems, many lines offered more than one service, providingAi??Ai??the all importantAi??Ai??seamless journey toAi??Ai??many destinations. Cities that abandoned there streetcar/tramway’s in favour of subways,Ai??Ai??forcedAi??Ai??many customers to first take a bus to the metro and then for many, transfer again. Many former transit customers found that the car provided the seamless journey and with the added advantage beingAi??Ai??easier and less time consuming to use.
Though transit officials were aware of the problem of loss of ridership due to transfer, little was done to improve the situation until a very dramatic event happened in 1993, in Karlsruhe Germany. When Karlsruhe’s first two-system or tram train line opened, replacing one major transfer point (commuter train to tram) at the main train station, ridership surged way beyond expectations! Weekday ridership on the tram train increased 423%Ai??Ai??in just a few weeks.
Before LRT
Commuter trainAi??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??After LRTAi??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??% increase
Weekdays – 488,400Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??2,064,378Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai?? Ai??Ai?? 423%
SaturdayAi??Ai??Ai??Ai?? – 39,000Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??263,120Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??675%
SundayAi??Ai?? -Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??6,200Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??227,478Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??3,669%
TotalAi??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai?? -Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??533,600Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??2,554,976Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??479%
(Albtal-Verkengesllschaft Karlsruhe & ABB Henchel)
Since Karlsruhe’s dramatic increase in patronage on their tram train system, European planners have put great emphases on the all important seamless (no-transfer) journey and designed new transit lines, not as feeders to subways or regional railways but as stand alone transit lines servicing major destinations, even in competition with other transit modes.
The lesson of Karlsruhe should not be lostAi??Ai??on theAi??Ai??advocates for the return of the Valley interurban service, who want the new service to terminate at Scott Road SkyTrain Station andAi??Ai??compel those who want to go to Vancouver to transfer to SkyTrain. The all important seamless journey from Vancouver to Langley, Abbotsford and Chilliwack may just provide the ridership to make the new service successful!
Can TransLink’s business cases be trusted?
Since last spring, the Light Rail Committee has circulated an E-Mail sent by American transit and transportation expert, Gerald Fox to a Victoria transit group that wants to promote LRT and diesel LRT into the Capital Region. Mr. Fox easily shreds TransLink’s business case for the Evergreen Line which shouldAi??Ai??forewarn transit groups in the Fraser Valley that TransLink easily manipulates statistics to favour SkyTrain to the detriment of light-rail and is not to be trusted with any transit study. The following is the text of the E-Mail and for those lobbying for the return of the Interurban, just substitute the Fraser Valley for Victoria.
From: A North-American Rail Expert
Subject: Comments on the Evergreen Line “Business Case”
Date: February 6, 2008 12:15:22 PM PST (CA)
Ai??Ai??
Greetings:
Ai??Ai??
The Evergreen Line Report made me curious as to how TransLink could justify continuing to expand SkyTrain, when the rest of the world is building LRT. So I went back and read the alleged “Business Case” (BC) report in a little more detail. I found several instances where the analysis had made assumptions that were inaccurate, or had been manipulated to make the case for SkyTrain. If the underlying assumptions are inaccurate, the conclusions may be so too. Specifically:
Ai??Ai??
Capacity. A combination of train size and headway. For instance, TriMet’s new “Type 4” Low floor LRVs, arriving later this year, have a rated capacity of 232 per car, or 464 for a 2- car train. (Of course one must also be sure to use the same standee density when comparing car capacity. I don’t know if that was done here). In Portland we operate a frequency of 3 minutes downtown in the peak hour, giving a one way peak hour capacity of 9,280. By next year we will have two routes through downtown, which will eventually load both ways, giving a theoretical peak hour rail capacity of 37,000 into or out of downtown. Of course we also run a lot of buses.
Ai??Ai??
The new Seattle LRT system which opens next year, is designed for 4-car trains, and thus have a peak hour capacity of 18,560. (but doesn’t need this yet, and so shares the tunnel with buses). The Business Case analysis assumes a capacity of 4,080 for LRT, on the Evergreen Line which it states is not enough, and compares it to SkyTrain capacity of 10400.!
Ai??Ai??
Speed. The analysis states the maximum LRT speed is 60 kph. (which would be correct for the street sections) But most LRVs are actually designed for 90 kph. On the Evergreen Line, LRT could operate at up to 90 where conditions permit, such as in the tunnels, and on protected ROW. Most LRT systems pre-empt most intersections, and so experience little delay at grade crossings. (Our policy is that the trains stop only at stations, and seldom experience traffic delays. It seems to work fine, and has little effect on traffic.) There is another element of speed, which is station access time. At-grade stations have less access time. This was overlooked in the analysis.
Ai??Ai??
Also, on the NW alignment, the SkyTrain proposal uses a different, faster, less-costly alignment to LRT proposal. And has 8 rather than 12 stations. If LRT was compared on the alignment now proposed for SkyTrain, it would go faster, and cost less than the Business Case report states!
Ai??Ai??
Cost. Here again, there seems to be some hidden biases. As mentioned above, on the NW Corridor, LRT is costed on a different alignment, with more stations. The cost difference between LRT and SkyTrain presented in the Business Case report is therefore misleading. If they were compared on identical alignments, with the same number of stations, and designed to optimize each mode, the cost advantage of LRT would be far greater. I also suspect that the basic LRT design has been rendered more costly by requirements for tunnels and general design that would not be found on more cost-sensitive LRT projects.
Ai??Ai??
Then there are the car costs. Last time I looked, the cost per unit of capacity was far higher for SkyTrain. Also,it takes about 2 SkyTrain cars to match the capacity of one LRV. And the grade-separated SkyTrain stations are far most costly and complex than LRT stations. Comparing 8 SkyTrain stations with 12 LRT stations also helps blur the distinction.
Ai??Ai??
Ridership. Is a function of many factors. The Business Case report would have you believe that type of rail mode alone, makes a difference (It does in the bus vs rail comparison, according to the latest US federal guidelines). But, on the Evergreen Line, I doubt it. What makes a difference is speed, frequency (but not so much when headways get to 5 minutes), station spacing and amenity etc. Since the speed, frequency and capacity assumptions used in the Business Case are clearly inaccurate, the ridership estimates cannot be correct either. There would be some advantage if SkyTrain could avoid a transfer. If the connecting system has capacity for the extra trains. But the case is way overstated.
Ai??Ai??
And nowhere is it addressed whether the Evergreen Line, at the extremity of the system, has the demand for so much capacity and, if it does, what that would mean on the rest of the system if feeds into?
Ai??Ai??
Innuedos about safety, and traffic impacts, seem to be a big issue for SkyTrain proponents, but are solved by the numerous systems that operate new LRT systems (i.e., they can’t be as bad as the SkyTrain folk would like you to believe).
Ai??Ai??
I’ve no desire to get drawn into the Vancouver transit wars, and, anyway, most of the rest of the world has moved on. To be fair, there are clear advantages in keeping with one kind of rail technology, and in through-routing service at Lougheed. But, eventually, Vancouver will need to adopt lower-cost LRT in its lesser corridors, or else limit the extent of its rail system. And that seems to make some TransLink people very nervous.
Ai??Ai??
It is interesting how TransLink has used this cunning method of manipulating analysis to justify SkyTrain in corridor after corridor, and has thus succeeded in keeping its proprietary rail system expanding. In the US, all new transit projects that seek federal support are now subjected to scrutiny by a panel of transit peers, selected and monitored by the federal government, to ensure that projects are analysed honestly, and the taxpayers’ interests are protected. No SkyTrain project has ever passed this scrutiny in the US.
Ai??Ai??
Victoria
Ai??Ai??
But the BIG DEAL for Victoria is: If the Business Case analysis were corrected to fix at least some of the errors outlined above, the COST INCREASE from using SkyTrain on the Evergreen Line will be comparable to the TOTAL COST of a modest starter line in Victoria. This needs to come to the attention of the Province. Victoria really does deserve better. Please share these thoughts as you feel appropriate.
Diesel light-rail to Chilliwack – What will it cost?
One Canadian transit line, seldom mentioned by TransLink or the Minister for Transportation is Ottawa’s 8 km. diesel LRT line, called the O-Train. The five-station route connects to Ottawa’s existing east-west bus Transitway system with simple stations at its north and south ends. Because it uses an existing rail line, it cost only about $4 million per kilometer to set up this 8km line, including the cost of track upgrades, signaling, simple stations, and three Bombardier Talent diesel light rail vehicles. The current cost of Ottawa’s lack lustre busways is about $15 million per km. to build, which is about $10 million per km. more than tramway construction in Helsinki. Please see Trams on the cheap – Part 2.
Using the figure of $4 million per km. to install, a 90 km. a basic Vancouver to Chilliwack diesel LRT service could cost in the neighbourhood of about $450 million (90Ai??Ai??km. x $4 million + 25% contingency), including about 30 diesel light rail vehicles.
The same $450 million would buyAi??Ai??just a little more thanAi??Ai??4 km. of SkyTrain on the proposed Surrey or Evergreen line SkyTrain extensions. This LRT/light-metro cost comparison makes the SkyTrain lobby within the provincial Transportation Ministry and TransLink very nervous, for it exposes the SkyTrain/light-metro planning only policy for regional ‘rail’ transportation policy a sham, being supported by inaccurate assumptions and manipulated analysis.
The return of the interurban is a viable proposition for the Fraser Valley and its budget could easily fit in the provincial Liberal Party’s $14 billion regional transportation plans.
Trams on the cheap – Part 2
Another news item from the Light Rail Transit Association (www.lrta.org), dispels the myth that light-rail or streetcars are very expensive to build. Here we have 5 km. of double track, including overhead, costing EUR 15 million or EUR 3 million per km. to build. In Canadian funds, EUR 15 million = CAD $27.75 million or $5.55 million per km. to build. Compare this with the proposed Surrey SkyTrain extension which is expected to cost well over $100 million per km. to build!
Helsinki grows : Sunday 10 August saw the opening of Helsinki’s first new tramline for 17 years. The new route 9 includes five km of new double track which cost EUR 15 million to build, and links Kaartinkaupunki in the city centre with the northern suburb of Pasila via Kallio and Alppila. It means the HKL tram network has reached its largest length since 1959. More new tracks are under construction in the Kamppi area, where route 3 will serve a new alignment in 2009.
13 August 2008
Trams on the cheap!
The following newsAi??Ai??item from the Light Rail Transit Association, in October 2006, should dispel any notion that modern light rail is too expensive to build, with construction costs approaching that of SkyTrain.Ai??Ai?? The equivalent cost of the VA?Ai??lA?Ai??z Malaga tramway today in Canadian fundsAi??Ai??is $30.5 Ai??Ai??million or about $6.6 million per km. to build, including three articulated vehicles. By comparison $30.5 million would by about 300 metres of Kevin Falcon’s proposed SkyTrain extension in Surrey.Ai??Ai??If TransLink can’t plan for inexpensive LRT, then we should hire some Spanish transit planners who can!
VA?Ai??lA?Ai??z Malaga opens : The Spanish town of VA?Ai??lA?Ai??z Malaga finally opened its tramway for public service on 11 October. Over 15000 passengers were carried on the first two days, but the service was free until 16 October. The 4.6-km line links the town (20 km east of Malaga) with its beach resort of Torre del Mar and cost EUR 18 million. The fare then became EUR 1. The infrastructure was completed more than a year ago, but in order to provide the three trams necessary to work the initial service CAF had to take them from the production line of a batch ordered by Sevilla (which is running late with its infrastructure). When cars were delivered and tested it was found that power supply to the Torre del Mar end of the line was weak, and additional electrical infrastructure had to be provided. An extension at the northern end of the line is under construction
16 October 2006
Streetcars – light-rail, what’s the difference?
With the ongoing transit debate, there is some confusion between streetcars and LRT, so what’s the difference?
Streetcars are just that, a rail guided transit mode that has the legal right to operate on the public highway. Streetcars in Europe are known collectively as trams, a term dating back over two hundred years, where ‘trams’ mostly coal carrying rail cars, traveled on a ‘tramway’ on the public highway. Back then, the public highway was merely a muddy track.
The term streetcar is strictly North American and with a few exceptions (Diesel LRT), describes a steel wheel on steel rail, electrically powered passenger vehicle, that operates strictly on public streets.
During the heyday of streetcars, many operators ran on routes that had few stops between urban centres and operated on an exclusive rights-of-ways, giving a much faster service. This was known as the ‘interurban’ or a streetcar that ran between urban centres. The interurban could operate on streetcar tracks in city centres and then network on to its own rights-of-ways, giving much faster journey times to its various destinations.
In the 1930’s several transit operators in Europe and the USA took the interurban concept and applied it to cities by givingAi??Ai?? streetcar lines exclusive or ‘reserved’ Ai??Ai??rights-of-ways in city centres, giving much higher commercial speeds and faster journey times for customers. The depression, World War 2, and the auto revolution, started a chain of wholesale streetcar abandonments in many cities in North America and Europe and the lessons of the ‘reserved’ rights-of-ways were lost.
By theAi??Ai??late 1960’s, streetcars had all but disappeared in North America and in Europe abandonments increased, with the old tramway’s being replaced by metro systems. A few cities in Europe upgraded their tramway systems to smaller pre-metros with large sections of grade-separated rights-of-ways, operating articulated cars. This was very expensive and the results were not all that encouraging. Overall transit ridership in cities with new metro or subway systems declined as the customer perceived that metro and buses (which replaced trams to take the customer the metro station) were not user friendly and it was just easier to take the car instead. As auto congestion increased in urban centres, more subways and metro were planned, with the thought at the time thatAi??Ai??the transit customer wanted fast subways. The customer, as it turned out wanted his or her the tram back.
A crisis of transit philosophy evolved, the transit customer wanted faster trams, but did not want subways (nor did the taxpayer) and one universal and unpleasant fact emerged, the customer did not want to take a bus! In the early 1970’s, the idea of the reserved rights-of-way reemerged and the results were encouraging. By giving a tram line even sort sections of reserved rights-of-ways, greatly increased commercial speed, which both increased ridership and increased productivity. The success of the reserved rights-of-way was instant and combined with the articulated rail car, the concept of priority signaling, and operating on a reserved rights-of-way gave the tram or streetcar almost the same commercial speeds of a metro at a fraction of the cost. A new name was coined to market the old tram/streetcar/interurban – Light Rail Transit or LRT.
Today a tram or streetcar system which operated at least 30% of its route on reserved rights-of-ways is considered LRT. In the USA and Canada, transit planners have tried to reinvent light rail as a light-metro(Vancouver & Seattle)Ai??Ai??and the streetcarAi??Ai??as small trams, operating on marginal routes. It should be noted that Hong Kong’s 1067 mm, gauge tramway, operating small double-deck tram cars, carry over 80 million passengers a year andAi??Ai??in France, Strasbourg’s tramway’s largest cars, called Jumbo’s, have a capacity of 350 persons. Any streetcar or LRT system can carry over 20,000 persons per hour per direction, the only difference being, LRT is able to obtain much higher commercial speeds.
AAi??Ai??streetcar is considered a rail operated transit vehicle, operating on-street, in mixed traffic, with little or no signal priority at intersections, while Light Rail or LRT is a streetcar that operates on aAi??Ai??reserved rights-of-way, which can be as simple as a High Occupancy Vehicle LaneAi??Ai??(HOV lane) or on a park like boulevard like the Arbutus Corridor,Ai??Ai??with priority signaling at intersections, giving it commercial speeds equal to that of a metro.
LRT operatingAi??Ai??on segregated rights-of-ways such as in aAi??Ai??subway or on viaduct is considered a light-metro.
It is not the vehicle that dictates whether a transit line is a streetcar or tram, rather it is the quality of rights-of-way.
Transportation improvements not fast enough
Another column in the Province newspaper today: Transportation improvements not fast enough (Jon Ferry)
…And so far the story of Fraser Valley light rail hasn’t been made to sound too compelling, at least to folks in Victoria. The platform hasn’t collapsed, but the train’s still stuck in the station. That’s a pity because, while governments play politics over transportation for one of our fastest-growing regions, its residents spend a lot of their time choking on traffic.
There seems to be plenty of eagerness in the Ministry of Transportation to expand highways, twin the Port Mann bridge etc., but when it comes down to actually doing anything to diminish valley traffic, to decrease the number of cars on the road by providing an alternative way for people to get around, so far nothing.
Any ideas how to make the story of Fraser Valley light rail more “compelling to Victoria?”
One idea involves May 17.
Hey, Mr. Falcon, why do you love SkyTrain?
BC politicians have had a long love affair with SkyTrain and one wonders why?
British Columbia’sAi??Ai??politicians love spending billions of dollars on the prestigiousAi??Ai??SkyTrain light-metroAi??Ai??and the mind set is the more you spend on SkyTrain, the better it must be. Friends of the government love SkyTrain/light-metroAi??Ai??(oh yes they are theAi??Ai??same types that balk at raisingAi??Ai??or installing new taxes) because a lot more money is spread around toAi??Ai??friends of the government, includingAi??Ai??cement manufacturers, the trucking industry, engineering firms, consulting firms and the media. It should come as no surprise that to date, not a penny has been given to the bankrupted merchants along Cambie St. due to the cut-and-cover subway construction, yet millions were spent on media relations and advertising for RAV/Canada Line. Finally, the big winner in the SkyTrain stakes are land developers and property owners who own lands near a SkyTrain line or are lucky enough to own land adjacent to a SkyTrain station.Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Ai??Property values, near a SkyTrain lineAi??Ai??skyrocket because of the density mantra of all levels of governments, with the call: Ai??Ai??”Can’t have SkyTrain without more density” or “There is not enough density for rapid transit“!
That nobody knows what density is needed for rapid transit is another story.
The result of course is a small, very expensive metro system, that despite all the increased density alongAi??Ai??the line, still gets 80% of its riders from buses, which should give one pause for thought.Ai??Ai?? Are the people in the newly higher density areas using SkyTrain or hasAi??Ai??TransLink cascaded as many bus riders as they canAi??Ai??onto the metro, toAi??Ai??inflate ridership to give the appearance of people living near the SkyTrain Line are using the metro?
With light rail, being much cheaper to build, up to 10% the cost per km.Ai??Ai??than SkyTrain, there is lot less money to “shovel off the back of a truck” to politicalAi??Ai??supporters and cronies; SkyTrain has now become a vehicle for a provincial corporate welfare scheme, where the provincial government diverts taxpayers money to ‘friends of the government’, legally by building the most expensive rapid transit scheme possible.
Despite claims by the SkyTrain lobby that SkyTrain has a higher capacity, faster, or safer than LRT, the opposite is true; to date SkyTrain has yet to out perform LRT in revenue service and is probably why very few people build it.
So it seems Mr. Falcon’s and Mr. Campbell’sAi??Ai??love affair with SkyTrain or light-metro is to keep theirAi??Ai??political friends in business andAi??Ai??that is maybeAi??Ai??why the Board of Trade supported RAV.
ButAi??Ai??for the taxpayer, who has to pony up the money in higher taxes and user feesAi??Ai??to pay for exotic metro schemes – a lump of coal.
Surrey Leader Editorial: Keep the pressure on
Frank Bucholz’s Surrey Leader editorial offers strong encouragement to us who are pushing hard for passenger rail service, and holding our government’s feet to the fire.
Excerpts:
TransLink is starting to get the message, thanks to relentless pressure from South Fraser mayors and community leaders…
…There has been a smattering of interest in the idea of passenger rail on the corridor over the past 15 years. Now there is more backing for this idea than ever.
Every Fraser Valley mayor is in favour of taking a look at the idea. Surrey has shown strong leadership, both under former mayor Doug McCallum and current Mayor Dianne Watts. In Surrey and Langley it makes particular sense to use the Interurban corridor A?ai??i??ai??? to get from one point to another, and to connect with SkyTrain at the Scott Road station.
Take just one example A?ai??i??ai??? post-secondary institutions. Kwantlen Polytechnic University campuses in Newton and Cloverdale could both be easily serviced by trains along this corridor, as could Kwantlen and Trinity Western in Langley.
TransLink is facing some big financial challenges. It would cost far less to upgrade the Interurban tracks, still in use for freight trains, than it would to build an extension of SkyTrain to Fleetwood, as proposed by the provincial government.
Those who favour a more intense study of the Interurban corridor in Surrey and Langley need to put pressure on Liberal MLAs and candidates in the run-up to the provincial election in May. Surrey will be a very important battleground in that election.
All I can say is, it’s going to be one interesting election.
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