A New Low For Reporting In The BC Media

Zwei gets a lot of Emails and this caught my attention.
Slow-pitched questions and the continued referring that the tunnel is a mistake, the entire show seemed like an infomercial for the BC Liberals.
Why all the angst for the tunnel and why do the Liberals still want a bridge?
The answer probably is that the Port Authority still wants to have Cape Max  natural gas & oil tankers and colliers ply the Fraser to Surrey Docks to load dirty Montana coal and volatile Braken oil, transported by the BN&SF Railway, saving wheelage charges paid, for using BC Rail’s Delta Supper Port line.

So much for BC being Green!

I also see that RftV has a fan as he/she quoted our blog.
Global warming; the heat dome; and last November’s destructive monsoon, sent a blunt message to our politicians that we must change and sadly the message has fallen on deaf ears, especially the BC Liberals.  The question that should be asked is why we are replacing a perfectly good tunnel with a larger tunnel or bridge that will only attract more cars and create even bigger congestion in Richmond?
Established choke points, reduce traffic and encourage people to take transit, which is a good thing and standard transit planning practice.
It seems the BC Liberals like the evangelical Republicans down south, reject climate change and want  to continue with the status quo and continue to build massive monuments like bridges, for photo-ops at election time.
Fake news
After a “puff” interview with Delta’s “pork pie” vendor and BC Liberal MLA for Delta, Ian Paton, on today’s Mike Smyth Show on CKNW radio, the following post from Rail for the Valley’s blog from 2018, hopefully will correct the propaganda spewed by the BC Liberals.
Mr. Paton deliberately used misleading information in a Fox News, Tucker Carlson type of interview, without any clear rebuttal from the chap on CKNW Radio, is more than shocking.
Is CKNW/Global now resorting to Trumpian or Q’anon fake news and alternative facts to pander to the BC Liberal’s?
Please read Mr George Massey’s letter, included with this post, a letter MLA Ian Paton would not like to again make public.
Orwell-Universal-Deceit-1024x512
Massey Tunnel Facts – Facts That No One Wanted The Public To Know
Rail for the Valley
January 17, 2018

The alternative facts and fake news spewed by the BC Liberals, especially sitting MLA and still Delta Councillor, Ian Paton, Delta Mayor, Lois Jackson and the hoi polloi of car and truck drivers wanting a new $3.5 billion to over $5 billion mega bridge to replace the perfectly good George Massey Tunnel, have been shown for what they are: falsehoods or grand economies of the truth.

The bridge was proposed for two reasons:

1) To allow Panama and Cape Max. colliers and tankers to travel up the Fraser River to load dirty Montana Coal; volatile Braken Oil; and LNG at Fraser Surrey Docks, with the coal and oil delivered directly by the BN&SF. By doing so, the BN&SF railway would not have to pay wheelage charges for unit trains to BC Rail, which owns and operated the rail line to the Delta Superport.

2) To divert billions of taxpayer’s monies to political friends via multi billion dollar mega projects. This is called “Pay to Play”.

The new American Trump administration doesn’t care for environmental concerns, thus the American coal and oil will be loaded in the USA and LNG and the BC’s new NDP Government, hopefully will stop “Pay to Play” mega projects.

The proposed Fraser River mega bridge was never about traffic and transportation, it was all about political deals, cut by the BC Liberals with big business.

George Massey Tunnel under construction – 1959

Meeting with ministry gave former Liberal government tunnel options

Delta Optimist January 10, 2018

Much has been said by the former Liberal government and its representatives about getting the facts for the replacement of the George Massey Tunnel.

Transportation and Tunnel Engineering Consultants (TEC) of the Netherlands to update the ministry on the state of the art of immersed tunneling.

The content of the 60-page presentation included introduction of TEC worldwide tunnel projects both recent and proposed, and cost effective options for the George Massey Tunnel. Special attention was given to tunnel safety, earthquake resistance design and comparison with bridge solutions.

The following are quotes taken from that presentation:

1.Tunnels are more suited for various and poor soil conditions.

2. Tunnels are shorter in length than a bridge and have a smaller footprint.

3.Tunnels can be built parallel and close to existing tunnels.

4.Tunnel construction is capable of dealing with severe seismic conditions.

5.Tunnel construction where 80 to 90 per cent of the work could be done by local contractors.

6.Tunnels can be built safer than an open highway.

The last 14 pages of the presentation dealt with TEC’s selection of appropriate options, possible cross sections, layouts and options for future use of the George Massey Tunnel.

TEC recommended the following:

1. To assess the structural integrity and durability of the present tunnel.

2. Increase river depth by replacing riprap with an asphalt mattress.

3.Introduction of longitudinal ventilation and use current ventilation ducts as escape cell and for passage of pedestrians and cyclists.

4.Move ballast concrete to ventilation ducts and increase internal height of the tunnel.

The entire report is available, on request, from me.

The report from TEC was not made available to the public and was not appropriately considered by the former Liberal government. A freedom of information request (FOI) to the Liberals yielded a response of no records. A recent FOI request has released the buried report which reveals viable, safe, cost effective options of upgrading the existing tunnel and adding a second tunnel beside it.

This report has now been made available, by the public, to new Transportation Minister Claire Trevena.

So, you see, the former Liberal government never revealed the true facts or alternatives to the public. Instead, it followed the demands of the Port of Vancouver and wrote fear mongering reports that suited its agenda of removing the George Massey Tunnel and deepening the lower Fraser River to suit present and future industrial interests.

This would destroy not only a perfectly good river crossing, but a bog land and a marshland, known the world over as vital component for a continued healthy ecosystem that supports a migratory food source for all marine and wildfowl life from the headwaters of the Fraser River along migratory routes of the Pacific Coast.

May the true facts be known.

Douglas George Massey

Trams To be Fitted With Head-up Displays

47590_continental_pp_railway_safety_612383

What is good for the car is also good for the tram!

The modern tram is one of the safest transit modes today and with active “heads-up” displays, makes the tram or streetcar much safer.

A head-up display, or heads-up display,also known as a HUD, is any transparent display that presents data without requiring users to look away from their usual viewpoints.

As the above illustration shows, with heads-up displays, the tram driver is made aware of activity around the tram and with automatic braking dangerous situations are made safe.

Trams to be fitted with head-up displays

EUROPE: Head-up display technology originally developed for cars has been adapted for light rail applications by Continental Engineering Services, which is planning a first deployment later this year.

The lesson is just not making public transit safer, it is that modern light rail is continually upgrading and changing to meet today’s challenges. Unlike our SkyTrain light-metro, being proprietary and is slowly being phased out, safety issues are not addressed as they should be, simply because they are not cost effective.

Not cost effective? Yes, as there is no market for the proprietary railway, no investment is being made to make the system safer.

Something to think about, when planning for the future.

ZF-tram-18thSept

Too Expensive – AirTrain (SkyTrain) Is Scrapped

What is now called Movia Automatic Light Metro is known as Airtrain in New York.

AirTrain JFK, is a 13 km elevated, ART system built by Bombardier serving John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK Airport) in New York City. The system consists of three lines and ten stations within the New York City borough of Queens. It connects the airport’s terminals with the New York City Subway in Howard Beach, Queens, and with the Long Island Rail Road and the subway in Jamaica, Queens. Bombardier Transportation operates AirTrain JFK under contract to the airport’s operator, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

The often rebranded Advanced Rapid Transit (ART) system was owned by Bombardier Inc. and was built with largely Canadian government funding. By doing so, AirTrain escaped scrutiny from the US Federal government.

The system opened on December 17, 2003 and is operated by Bombardier.

All passengers entering or exiting at either Jamaica or Howard Beach must pay a $8.00 (CAD $10.25) fare, while passengers traveling within the airport can ride for free. The system was originally projected to carry 4 million annual paying passengers and 8.4 million annual inter-terminal passengers every year. The AirTrain has consistently exceeded these projections since opening. In 2019, the system had over 8.7 million paying passengers and 12.2 million inter-terminal passengers.

The LaGuardia AirTrain, first touted by Governor Cuomo was to cost no more than $450 million (CAD$576 billion) the project soared to CAD $2.56 billion!

Sound familiar? Surrey’s mayor claimed he could build the Expo Line extension to Langley for $1.65 billion, yet the budgeted cost is now $3.95 billion and is expected to even reach $4.5 billion.

It seems fiscally responsible politicians put a stop to this, unfortunately our local politicians in Metro Vancouver and Victoria are not fiscally responsible and believes the taxpayer has deep pockets and willing to pay higher taxes to fund politically prestigious transit projects.

Like the folks in New York, maybe local folks should start looking at cheaper and just effective transit options, other than the extremely expensive SkyTrain light metro!

JFK AirTrain

JFK AirTrain

After scrapping Cuomo’s AirTrain, Port Authority releases 14 other options

Where Metro Vancouver Went Wrong

TramTrain Zwikau3

Zwei has belonged to the Light Rail Transit Association since 1983 and I first learned about the LRTA while I lived in Nottingham England in 1974/75. I attended a free lecture in Nottingham about bringing trams back to the city, while I was waiting for my girlfriend who was attending night school at Nottingham University.

I was very much interested in public transport and the information from the lecture was such, it was easy to become a supporter of modern tram.

Said girl freind’s father thought I was a daft idiot (well don’t all fathers think that of their daughter’s boyfriend, especially one from the colonies) because trams were old school and no one would use the service.

I thought otherwise.

Today, Nottingham has a Tramway and has recently opened an extension.

Despite the anti-tram/Streetcar/LRT bias in Metro Vancouver and in BC, due to the huge costs of current light metro projects, the region must once again plan for cheaper  light rail, including tramways, and tramtrain or do without rail transit altogether and just build more highways and bridges.

American transportation expert, Gerald Fox predicted this back in 2008, with his scathing review of the Evergreen Line business case.

But, eventually, Vancouver will need to adopt lower-cost LRT in its lesser corridors, or else limit the extent of its rail system. And that seems to make some TransLink people very nervous.

The government is now getting very nervous, post Covid inflation and massive rise in energy costs due to the ongoing war in the Ukraine, will make current cost estimates a mere scrap of paper. The $2.8 billion, 5.8 km Broadway subway is now expected to cost over $3.5 billion and the $3.95 billion, 16 km Expo Line extension to Langley is now expected to cost over $4.5 billion!

TransLink is broadly hinting that they do not have the funding and another big financial surprise maybe soon to come.

Alstom is now the owner of the proprietary Movia Automatic Light Metro system, used on the Expo and Millennium Lines. Only seven such systems have been built in the past 42 years, with only three (soon to be two) seriously used for urban transit. One of these two systems, in Malaysia has embroiled Bombardier Inc. and SNC Lavalin is a criminal corruption case, leaving only TransLink as the the last customer for the proprietary railway.

Question:

Will Alstom mothball the MALM production line after the paid for orders of MALM cars are completed, sometime in 2025?

If Alstom does, this would leave TransLink with even higher costs for future procurement for spare parts and vehicles.

As the provincial government, TransLink and regional mayors blunder on, planning for more expensive SkyTrain, while at the same time increasing taxes on a tax weary electorate, many will wonder:

Where did Metro Vancouver go wrong?

The following article from the LRTA may give some insight into our transit woes.

BC Transit Rail

Where the UK went wrong

The first Metrolink study tour in 1983 ended in Zürich, where trams, trolleybuses and buses formed a fully-integrated network. Councillors from Manchester were impressed, asking ‘when can we have one?’ Image courtesy of Tony Young

The revival of the tramway in the later decades of the last century is well-documented, not least in the pages of TAUT and its predecessors. The movement began in the USA and Canada, closely followed by the Netherlands and France and eventually even in the UK. Now it is a worldwide phenomenon with new systems appearing in countries that never had first-generation tramways.

Those working in the tramway field have always been well aware of the wide benefits of this unique form of urban transport, the only mode that is equally at home on railway tracks, along the street, through pedestrian zones or on its own private right-of-way through parks – and even in tunnels. It is by far the least damaging mode to the environment, at the same time supporting and enhancing the local economy.

These obvious benefits should make it the number one choice to meet urban travel needs in this environmentally-challenged era. Most countries have recognised this and are taking action, but Britain is sadly missing out. Why?

In the 1970s and ’80s, planners and engineers were beginning to look at the tramway afresh. Memories of previous systems still haunted politicians and professionals so the new movement had to be clandestine, mainly in the backrooms of the newly-created Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs). The word ‘tram’ was taboo, so the term ‘light rail’ was adopted.

The Tyneside Metro (later Tyne and Wear Metro) was the first to break through in 1980, but it took another 12 years before Manchester crossed the street-running divide in 1992. That sparked a deluge of schemes across the country – everybody saw the benefits and wanted a system of their own. The big cities of Sheffield, Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool and Bristol were next in the queue, with the London Borough of Croydon not far behind. Sheffield, Birmingham and Croydon eventually got their trams… but Liverpool, Leeds and Bristol are still waiting.

There was a long list of smaller towns and cities where the tram was seen as a valuable part of the transport mix. Many were the subject of feasibility studies during the 1990s, but only two more projects were successful: Nottingham and Edinburgh. Most of the successful schemes were promoted by PTEs, with Nottingham the only one in England to be promoted by a city and county without such a body. Interestingly, Nottingham and Edinburgh are amongst the handful of authorities that still feature municipally-owned bus operators, making integration a practical proposition.

What lessons can we take from failure?

The success of Greater Manchester Metrolink, South Yorkshire Supertram, West Midlands Metro, Croydon (now London) Tramlink, and Nottingham Express Transit is well-known. But why are Leeds, Liverpool, Bristol and several more not up there with them? And what can we learn from their failure?

The reasons are many and complex. There can be little doubt that the actions of then-Secretary of State for Transport Alistair Darling in cancelling the plans for Leeds, Liverpool and South Hampshire in 2005 – and all the Manchester Metrolink extensions – had a devasting effect on all the other potential tramway promoters. His strings may well have been pulled by Her Majesty’s Treasury (as has always been the case in Britain), but the result damaged urban public transport in major cities for generations.

If popular, well-developed tramway projects – which had been approved by the Government at every stage, and were ready to go out to tender – were to be scrapped, then there was no chance for any other scheme. Many millions had been spent by promoting authorities and bidding contractors on design and approvals, including obtaining the necessary Parliamentary Powers – all money down the drain. The pain was felt deeply in both public and private sector pockets.

While Leeds, Liverpool and South Hampshire begrudgingly accepted Darling’s ruling, Great Manchester fought back. Metrolink was already running and proving popular with passengers and the public at large. A massive campaign was led by the media and local authorities demanding that the planned expansion of Metrolink be given approval. Eventually the Government had to give in. All the extensions are now carrying passengers, while Leeds and South Hampshire are left to rely on buses.

At least Liverpool has its Merseyrail network, but the proposed tram routes would have served parts of the conurbation which the trains don’t reach. Leeds is now renowned as the largest conurbation in Europe without a metro, underground, light rail or tramway. Acres of former Ministry of Defence land in the Gosport peninsular could have been profitably developed with improved access from a tramway; the ‘replacement’ busway can only offer a fraction of the service and does not provide the much-needed link
into Portsmouth.

Increased costs were undoubtedly a major cause of the failure of these light rail projects. In reality, however, while the costs of all the cancelled schemes had indeed increased, they were no more than many highway projects – in fact far less than some. Yet no highway schemes were cancelled. It is an inescapable fact that capital costs of major infrastructure schemes increase with time, as evidenced by the Thameslink, Crossrail and HS2 heavy rail projects. But such situations give politicians a cast iron excuse to get rid of projects they don’t like.

Is there an in-built bias?

There is still an innate dislike of tramways in Britain that goes back to the Royal Commission on Transport in 1929. This encouraged their abandonment and replacement with buses, noting that trams ‘if not an obsolete form of transport, are at all events in a state of obsolescence and cause much unnecessary congestion and considerable danger to the public’.

Ambitious plans to upgrade the tramways in Liverpool, Leeds and Glasgow to light rail standards in the post-war years were all thrown out. Even the serious plans of English Electric to build a British PCC car came to nought. That would have been a real game-changer.

Promoters of second-generation schemes in Britain had a hard time getting them accepted by the Department of Transport, who could only see them as far too expensive and unnecessary when you can have buses. The enormous potential benefits of trams over buses were never understood in Marsham Street. It is only when they started carrying passengers that attitudes did a rapid about-turn, as residents of Manchester, Nottingham and Edinburgh can verify.

Why are we afraid to learn from our neighbours?

When Manchester’s Metrolink was in its early planning stages, the Transportation Committee Chair realised that getting approval from the County Council for such an innovative plan would require changes of approach. Many councillors did not understand what a modern tramway looked like. To this end, he initiated a series of study tours to European tramways to see first-hand what could be achieved. Political representatives included key committee chairs, officers came from County and City, and there were engineers and planners with representatives from Greater Manchester’s PTE and British Rail.

The last city visited was Zürich. In the 1960s, it too faced similar pressures to its counterparts in Britain, namely increasing car use and congestion. We had the Buchanan Report which advocated full car ownership and residual public transport. A plan to build urban motorways and underground railways to replace the trams in Zürich was defeated by referendum, the legal process required in Switzerland. It was sold by the authorities as a ‘balanced approach’ but the people of Zürich saw it differently. Transport planning was in limbo for a decade. A new plan for a more extensive metro network was also defeated in 1973. Zürchers love their trams.

A radical plan prepared by a grass-roots ‘peoples initiative’ to upgrade the tramway and trolleybus networks and give them priority over car traffic was approved in 1977. The City Engineer still wanted a car-based plan, but that was defeated. The results were spectacular. Public transport patronage skyrocketed while car commuting declined. Annual trips per capita in Zürich are now more than three times the figure for major British cities.

The aim of the study tour was to show Manchester councillors and officers what a tram system looked like. The reaction on returning to England was an almost unanimous, ‘when can we have one?’. Such initiatives are what we need to convince our Government ministers.

Any radical infrastructure plan needs both a political and a technical champion. Both must be fully committed to a politically achievable project with sound engineering and planning credentials. Maintaining both cross-party and cross-district support is essential, as is robust consultation with a wide group of interests, public and private. Perhaps most of all, close links with the relevant government departments must be maintained throughout the planning process, although, as we have seen, that is no guarantee of success…

We have the expertise and experience

There is no shortage of expertise, experience or enthusiasm in the light rail industry in this country. This is repeatedly demonstrated at the annual UK Light Rail Conference, the copious documents produced by UKTram and its Centre of Excellence, the resources of the Urban Transport Group and the new Light Rail Safety and Standards Board, and the mass of light rail documents produced by the All-Party Parliamentary Light Rail Group.

Many other documents have been produced, for example TramForward’s contribution to COP26. Yet tramways hardly got a mention in Glasgow, even given their close fit with environmental objectives.

Despite the seemingly impossible task of getting tram schemes approved by our Government, there are several promising projects in embryo. Perhaps best-known is the Very Light Rail (VLR) scheme for Coventry which envisages a four-line loop network to link all parts of the city with the centre, rail station, university and hospitals. Although not conventional light rail, this is an attempt to produce a much cheaper rail-based system with a lighter trackform and a lightweight shuttle. A prototype vehicle has been constructed and a research centre is being completed in Dudley.

Another imaginative project is the KenEx Tramway to connect the counties of Kent and Essex from Bluewater to Lakeside with a tube tunnel under the River Thames. This makes much greater environmental sense than the planned Lower Thames Crossing and yet has not been given much prominence. The road tunnel is bound to increase car traffic, and hence pollution and congestion. The tram alternative would attract car users to public transport, a key objective of transport policy.

The conurbations around Bristol and Leeds are still unlikely to achieve their light rail ambitions for at least a decade. Neither have firm plans or any Transport and Work Act powers. The shame is that both had powers in the 1990s. Bristol has suffered over the years from disagreements between its various local government bodies, not helped by the abandonment of Avon County Council which was developing sound light rail plans. An early private sector proposal was ill thought-out and had no chance of being realised.

A local pressure group in Bath which sees trams as the saviour of that historic city has turned its attention to Bristol and appears to be having some success in persuading the regional authority to at least consider the possible role of light rail. Until recently the car and bus lobbies have won the arguments, but perhaps things are changing.

Leeds is the city most in need of a light rail network, and has nearly realised those plans on a number of occasions since the far-sighted tram subway plans of 1945. After a number of failed attempts, it finally received Royal Assent for a tramway in 1993. Another decade later and it was all scrapped. Government response has been: ‘trams are too expensive, get some better buses’. Yet despite investment in new buses, and even some bits of guided busway, patronage has continued its downward trend and current expectations to dramatically increase bus use seem doomed to failure.

The Government’s recent publication of its Integrated Rail Plan, scrapping HS2 to Leeds and abandoning the Northern Powerhouse Rail plan, has caused anger and disbelief across the North and Midlands.

As a consolation prize, current Prime Minister Boris Johnson has said that Leeds can have its mass transit system. It should be noted, however, that the word ‘tram’ is conspicuously absent from any official statement and what has actually been offered is GBP200m (EUR238.6m) for a feasibility study. The Government expects the first phase of this GBP2bn (EUR2.4bn) project ‘to be in service by the second half of this decade’.

There must be drawers full of approved tram plans for Leeds, so why yet another study is needed beggars belief. What West Yorkshire desperately needs is the funds to build a first phase tramway, probably along York Road to Seacroft, or south to Stourton and Middleton.

Why can’t we be like the French?

Five years after the Tyne and Wear Metro brought light rail technology to the UK, Nantes became the first French city to bring trams back to its streets. Seven years later, Manchester followed. In the next 25 years, tramways were built in more than 20 cities in France. In Britain, the figure for the same period was five.

While all these cities in France have been reaping the wide benefits of new tramways, many UK cities which could have seen similar success are instead suffering ever-increasing congestion and pollution, and declining bus patronage. Paris now has no fewer than nine tram and tram-train lines. London, by comparison, still has only one. It could have had more, but they were killed off by Boris Johnson when he was Mayor.

One major difference between the UK and France is devolution. French cities and their mayors have a high degree of control over their own affairs and funding through the ‘Versement Transport’ (now Versement Mobilité) hypothecated taxation system. Dating back to 1972, this has been a consistent policy for half a century. In Britain, policy has ricocheted between extremes but always with steely control from the capital. West Yorkshire’s Mayor, Tracy Brabin, has supported plans for a mass transit system for her region – it remains to be seen if she will succeed.

Tramway extensions are being built in the West Midlands, Edinburgh and Blackpool. More new routes are in the early planning stages. New tram-trains are to be delivered to Cardiff, which is a great step forward, although how they are to be used is still rather uncertain. But there are no shovel-ready new schemes anywhere. It will probably be another ten years at least before any other city sees the benefits of a tramway.

It is good to see investment going into existing systems – including Government packages to support systems as they rebound from the pandemic – but we need massive investment in new schemes to combat climate change and tackle pollution and urban congestion. We have the solutions, some are outlined in this article; there are many more.

But we can’t achieve anything without the backing of the Government. If a fraction of the GBP27bn (EUR2.2bn) to be spent on highways could be diverted to urban tram schemes, the benefits would be enormous.

OK…….Is It Now Time for TramTrain?

What is TramTrain?

A TramTrain is a type of light rail vehicle that meets the standards of a light rail system (usually an urban street running tramway), but which also meets national mainline standards permitting operation alongside mainline trains.

Straight forward isn’t it, or is it?

Then, was the interurban an early form of TramTrain?

Yes and no. Interurban operated both on their own dedicated rights-of-ways and on city tram/streetcar tracks. Interurban s seldom if ever, track shared with mainline railways. The one exception I can think of were the Electroliners of the Chicago Nouth Shore and Milwaukee Railway which operated from 1941 to 1978, ending their days with SEPT.

Electroliner on the main line

Electroliner on the main line

 

The Electroliners could operate on the main line railways at speeds of 130 kph; on-street in mixed traffic and on Chicago’s famous “EL” with rapid transit .

 

Electroliner in mixed traffic.

Electroliner in mixed traffic.

Sadly, interurban’s went the way of the streetcar as the car became the main source of commuting, until, of course congestion, pollution, and now climate change has made commuting by car, expensive and environmentally insensitive.

Fast forward to 1990, Karlsrhue, Germany where the transit authority was investigating how to get trams to service areas otherwise too expensive for classic tram operation. In 1992 a new tram service was inaugurated using modified tram, able to track-share on the mainline railways, reaching customers as far away as Bade Baden, to travel to Karlsruhe’s city center without inconvenient transfers.

The new service was a massive instant success.

TramTrain RidershipIn just seven moths ridership increased 479% from the previous commuter trains that were in service. Ridership went from 533,600 a week to an astounding 2,554,976 customers a week!

Success saw a rapid expansion of TramTrain service in Karlsruhre was instant and today there are seventeen Stadtbahn TramTrain routes, serving hundreds of stations and stops.

The key to TramTrain’s success was the simple formula of “user friendliness” where transit customers can be conveyed from where they live to where they want to go without transfer.

In the transit world, success is infectious and today there are 29 cities which transportation authorities operate TramTrain and another 27 cities are proposing or planning to build TramTrain.

With the cost of our SkyTrain light metro system ever unceasing (the 16 km Expo Line extension to Surrey will easily surpass $3.95 billion) a 130 km  Leewood Study TramTrain, from Vancouver to Chilliwack costing less than $1.5 billion, our regional planners at all levels of government must rethink urban transportation.

This rethink must include TramTrain, because only a TramTrain like service  connecting Fraser Valley communities, colleges, universities and other major destinations will be affordable.

TramTrain in the country

A Slow Train to The Future

Something that is badly needed in BC and Canada, regional railways.

Local pundits have called for faster and faster rail transit, with some even advocating for high speed rail (HST) for the Fraser Valley as the only way to get people out of their cars.

Today, with gas topping $2.00 a litre is another way I guess, but I digress!

What is needed is a network of user-friendly rail line to entice customers to rail and those willing to try a modern DMU or EMU for a somewhat longer but far more comfortable trip may find a slower train far more enticing.

Rail for the Valley’s, Leewood Study sees a 90 minute trip time from Chilliwack to Scott road Station, about 30 minutes slower than taking the car, in perfect conditions.

For many, the extra 30 minutes travel time will be well worth not dealing with gridlock and congestion and just enjoying the journey itself.

A slow train to Chilliwack, just maybe, will be the fast train to success!

Screenshot 2022-03-04 at 10-16-47 chilliwacktosurreyinterurbanfinalreportr pdf

OPINION: France’s ‘slow train’ revolution may just be the future for travel

Famous for its high-speed TGV trains, France is now seeing the launch of a new rail revolution – slow trains. John Lichfield looks at the ambitious plan to reconnect some of France’s forgotten areas through a rail co-operative and a new philosophy of rail travel.

News Alert – Expo Line Kaput

Just on the radio, the Expo Line is kaput, but what is interesting is that TransLink has indicated the problem will not be fixed until this evening!

chinatownskytrain

SkyTrain: Expo Line

In Effect03-Mar-2022 05:53 AM — Until further notice

Expo Line delays due to a track issue at Columbia Station. No train service between Columbia and Sapperton. Bus Bridge between Braid Station and New West Station in both directions.

Trains from Production Way will turn around at Sapperton Station.

Bus Bridge locations:

New West Stn: Bay 3 stop 61650 on Columbia St outside bus loop.

Columbia Stn to New West: 52331 westbound on Columbia at Fourth St.

Columbia to Production: Stop 52317 eastbound on Columbia at Fourth St.

Sapperton to New West: Stop 53218 E. Columbia St at Keary St

Sapperton to Braid: Stop 53111 E. Columbia St at Keary St

Braid Stn: HandyDART stop 58709 (in front of Bay 6)

Millennium Line and Canada Line are unaffected

And Over To You Mr. Cow – TransLink’s fiscal Realities

logodec0831.jpg

One of the RftV’s many friends, Haveacow is a Canadian transportation specialist. He uses the Avatar Haveacow because in the arcane world of Canadian and American public transportation, speaking the truth may find you out of a job.

An American transportation Engineer who has helped Zwei in the past, found this out when the long arms of SNC Lavalin and Bombardier caused him much worry due to a not to pleasant factoid about our locally venerated SkyTrain light-metro system.

TransLink is seldom honest with the public, but with the TransLink’s new CEO taking to the stump, drumming up support for new taxes for TransLink one can believe that TransLink is in dangerous economic peril.

This, of course , is not new and has been long predicted by experts outside the metro Vancouver/TransLink bubble.

Gerald fox had a terse comment about financial ills in his 2008 critique of the Evergreen Line and stated:

But, eventually, Vancouver will need to adopt lower-cost LRT in its lesser corridors, or else limit the extent of its rail system. And that seems to make some TransLink people very nervous.

TransLink is nervous and Mr. Cow gives detailed insight at TransLink’s financial ills in a comment in the previous post. Insight that the Hive or the mainstream media do not give, nor care to give.

 

A subsidy of $157.7 in 1992, translates to $275 million in today's money.

A subsidy of $157.6 million in 1992, translates to $275 million in today’s money.

When you have a regional transit agency like Translink it’s very difficult to not use taxation as a form of operating funding. When I refer to taxation, I mean taxes the transit agency itself can levy against taxpayers. I knew a long time ago that agencies that use this revenue or somewhat dubious private investment funds filled with taxpayer funding to fund not just operating budgets but a portion of future capital budgets as well, are headed for great troubles unless, they are very, very careful. North America is full of regional transit agencies that have done this since the 1960’s and been burned financially, some are still paying for it (SEPTA, MBTA, TriMet, MPAT and PATCO come to mind).

When I saw that a not to small amount of funding from Translink itself was required to fund Stage 1, 2 and 3 of their 10 year capital works funding plan (2018-2028), I started to worry for Translink. This is the current 10 year plan that has several high order projects like, the phase 1 of the Millennium Line extension to Arbutus, the original SNG LRT Line, which were all part of stage 2 of the plan. Projects like phase 2 of the Millennium Line extension to UBC and the LRT extension from Surrey to Langley (which was actually affordable), which were funded in stage 3 of the 10 year plan.

However the most important parts were the hundreds of smaller, state of good repair and operational improvements in all 3 stages of the plan. Many of those were highly dependant on Translink’s funding. Many of these desperately needed items can’t happen without the portion of funding from Translink’s coffers. As early as the implementation of stage 1 of the 10 year plan, Translink’s own financial documents questioned if the planned funding from Translink for stages 1-3 would be enough (about $725 million). These comments were usually in the “financial risk portions” of the documents, at the end of the financial documents. The parts after they would show how great their financing ability was and how “on track” they were going towards their financing goals. These comments are essentially, under the category of “look guys and gals we’re just covering our buts here”. The public and many politicians have been conditioned over the years to ignore these sections but they all said the same thing essentially, “we really need a lot more funding in the future than we currently have but we are ok for now. However, one catastrophe and everything changes, forever”. Without a lot of these little projects being completed many of the big ones become impossible.

The Catastrophe Begins

First, a fool (the current Mayor of Surrey), believed he could fund a 16km long Skytrain line with the same amount of funding for 11 km of surface LRT, a yard and its LRV’s. He didn’t understand that just the concete alone for a 16km long, above grade Skytrain line was going to cost almost as much as the entire LRT Line over the original 11 km distance in phase 1 of the LRT plan. The new Skytrain extension price didn’t include new trains where as the LRT price did. This cost was added into a Skytrain vehicle order which was now costing around $727 million. The final cost of that contract has gone up, believed to be now around $800 million simply due to the length of the contract being extended multiple times let alone inflationary costs and not immediately nailing the cost down at the time of it’s announcement. This is a common error made by agencies. Other cost increases have and will occur because Bombardier was bought out by Alstom

This mayor didn’t realize that, if this line became a Skytrain line a massive new operations and maintenance yard (OMC#5) would be needed, this alone will add $350 – $600 million in cost to the line, depending on the yard’s capacity and capabilities.

He also didn’t know that surface LRT along the highway median through certain portions of the Surrey to Langley LRT line (phase 2) was cheaper because an above grade Skytrain line running at the north side of the highway alignment would mean, building a concrete viaduct through 3 to 4 km’s of wet unstable soil as well as bog and swamp.

There’s a few more cost surprises coming and it all depends on the choices made by Translink in the extension’s final design. So 2 LRT lines costing a combined $3.4-$3.5 Billion covered by 2 different stages of the 10 year plan as well as everything 27 km’s of LRT operations would need is replaced with, 16 km of Skytrain, costing $3.95 Billion and rising, not including the trains or financial risk costs, with the final price rising because none of these costs have been finalised yet.

This forced the Province to take over the project because Translink could no longer afford its portion of the costs. The original LRT money now doesn’t even cover the 7 km long first stage, in the originally 2 stage funding plan. Then the plan became a single stage plan, all 16 km to be built at once, all having to be covered by the provincial government. This maneuver alone will raise the cost of the line not to mention, the extra time costs Translink is now forcing on the project to modify its entire 10 year funding plan. Remember Covid 19 hadn’t hit yet and a reworking of the 10 year funding plan was already needed by late 2019. This means costs for materials that were to be ordered, based in 2021-2023 costs now have to be all budgeted at costs based in 2024 and later, adding at the least, 2 years of increasing inflationary cost to this project, let alone any other inflationary costs. That’s why I know the line cost will continue to go up. The entire $3.95 Billion cost for the Surrey to Langley extension is based in ordering construction materials based on prices for 2021, 2022 and 2023 levels. The line’s new cost benefit analysis being done by the provincial government won’t be complete until late 2022 at the earliest. Then they have to finalize cost estimates. Which aren’t truly, actually known until the tendering process is complete.

Then Covid 19 hit!

Yes the Fed’s bailed out Translink on its operating funding from 2020 through part of 2022 but that doesn’t cover capital costs. Funding that was supposed to go into the existing 10 year plan from their own taxation was extremely degraded because of Covid 19 costing not only the total missing amount of funding for capital project costs versus pre Covid levels but the future potential interest, that holding some of that cash would have provided towards Translink’s portion for stage 3, 10 year plan funding. The federal government is spending $750 Million this year in operating funding relief (operating funding only) to bail out transit agencies but that’s for all Canada not just Vancouver. This continues to put a bigger and bigger hole in capital funding until Translink’s tax levies return to pre Covid levels, sometime between 2024-2028. This may never happen if electric vehicles take hold in a big way because they (Translink) rely on a lot of gas taxes for their funding. Hence the call for new funding sources from Translink’s CEO.

Rail For The Valley Knew

logodec0831.jpg

Well, Rail for the Valley has been sounding alarm bells on this issue for at least seven years, but we were mocked and then ignored by the powers that be.

 From January 28,2022:

The Mayor’s Council’s Delusions Of Grandeur in 2050 – Where Is The money?

January 12, 2022:

Troubles At TransLink?

December 10, 2021:

A Repost From 2019 – Here We go Again……

TransLink does not have an income problem, it has a spending problem. The two big transit projects, the $3 billion Broadway subway and the $4 billion Expo Line extension to Langley, both projects are politically driven and ignores much cheaper and more effective transit solutions.

Here we come to the crux of the matter, TransLink is a politcal animal designed to masquerade very questionable politcal transportation decisions made in Victoria, further camouflaged by squabbling regional mayors, who haven’t a clue about regional transit.

In 2015, the taxpayer voted against TransLink profligate spending, but TransLink, metro Vancouver and Victoria chose not to listen, but instead tarted up the previous mega projects to sell to the public and with rising inflation, increasing taxes, the public will have none of it!

July 2, 2015

Vancouver Metro Region Votes NO.

This message has been ignored by TransLink, provincial and municipal politicians, at their peril.

 

746280-cartoonjuly8.jpg;w=960;h=640;bgcolor=000000

TransLink CEO says absence of long-term funding ‘solutions’ puts capital projects at risk

‘We may need to consider difficult decisions in the future,’ Kevin Quinn told the Mayors Council on Regional Transportation on Thursday

TransLink needs to develop long-term funding solutions to stave off reduction of service levels and delaying or cancelling capital projects, its CEO Kevin Quinn told the Mayors Council on Regional Transportation on Thursday.

“We may need to consider difficult decisions in the future,” Quinn said. “This could result in a range of impacts – reduction of service levels, delaying or outright cancellation of capital projects or stalling expansion of much-needed service that we know this region needs.”

“Quite frankly, we simply can’t deliver this without a long-term secure and stable funding source.”

In September 2020 TransLink received a “one-time” funding of $644 million under the provincial and federal government’s safe restart agreement, which helped it keep service levels up through the pandemic, Quinn noted, “but also helped to keep fares affordable.”

TransLink’s revenues are sitting at 17 per cent below budget for January, translating to roughly $7 million. “We fully expect these numbers to improve in the coming months as the economy opens up and we see those health restrictions start to ease and loosen up a bit.”

Six operators award joint contract for up to 504 tram-trains

Salzburg Lokalbahn

Salzburg Lokalbahn will soon see Karlsruhe style TramTrains

Salzburg Lokalbahn

Salzburg Lokalbahn is participating in the 6-city TramTrain order.

A consortium of six German and Austrian transport bodies has jointly awarded Stadler a framework contract for the supply and maintenance of up 504 tram-trains

EUROPE: A consortium of six German and Austrian transport bodies has awarded Stadler a framework contract for the supply and maintenance of up 504 tram-trains worth €4bn, the largest contract in the Swiss company’s history.

From the Light Rail Transit Association

The long-awaited announcement of the award of a contract for up to 504 tram-trains by the VDV tram-train consortium came on 17 January when Stadler Rail was announced as the supplier for 246 Citylink cars, with an option for up to 258 more.

This is the largest order placed for a single vehicle type this decade (and the largest in Stadler’s history). It includes 16 (and up to 32 years) of maintenance and is worth up to EUR4bn (CAD $7.58billion), with the initial tranche valued at EUR1.7bn (CAD $2,46 billion) (EUR6.91m per car { CAD $9.85 million}).

The selected design is a three-section high-floor base car, fully air-conditioned, but configured for each customer – for instance those for AVG in Karlsruhe will be fitted with toilets to cater for long interurban workings, while those for Schiene Oberösterreich will have a larger luggage-carrying area. Deliveries will run over 12 years from July 2024, with main production taking place in Valencia, Spain.

Although procured under the auspices of the VDV association of public transport undertakings, VBK Karlsruhe has acted as technical lead for the project. End-user customers are Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe (VBK), Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft (AVG) Karlsruhe, Saarbahn Netz Saarbrücken, Regional-Stadtbahn Neckar-Alb Tübingen, Landesanstalt Schienenfahrzeuge Baden-Württemburg, Land Salzburg (Salzburger Lokalbahn) and Schiene Oberösterreich (Upper Austria local railways).

Dr Alexander Pischon, CEO of VBK/AVG said: “We are very happy that in Stadler we were able to find a reliable and experienced manufacturer for this extraordinary project. A procurement concept like the one we have implemented here is unique in the world to date. Not only do we all benefit economically from scale, we also share our know-how… On average we have saved 20% of the cost per vehicle by ordering together.”

Peter Spuhler, CEO of Stadler, said: “We are proud to have won this international tender with our proven vehicle concept. The Citylink is a product that we have already delivered in numbers reaching 650 for operation in six countries.’