What was turning out to be a breathe of fresh air in BC politics, Premier Horgan and his puppet master, former Vision(less) Vancouver Councillor and now Horgan’s chief advisor, Geoff Meggs, have killed the idea for LRT on the E&N and you can damn well betAi?? the same is true about the Rail for the Valley project.
Horgan was desperate before the election for a transportation solution for the Fraser Valley, but once elected all that has vanished.
Horgan’s Chief of Staff, Geoff Meggs is anti LRT and as a former Vision(less) Vancouver Councilor, he learned the fine art of intimidating people wanting light rail; with the premier, it is just Meggs whispering sweet nothings in Horgan’s ear and LRT is dead.
What Meggs is afraid of is that modern LRT could provide a better servcie than the proposed $3 billion subway under Broadway and that proprietary SkyTrain subway is very important as it is the use rapid transit that is causing land speculators and land developers great delight in assembling lands adjacent to rapid transit stations and having Vancouver council up-zone the properties to allow high rise condos for off shore sales.
And why is that?
Simple, it is part of the money laundering process which has enriched local governments,Ai?? via casinos and land developments. AndAi?? not forgetting of course the criminals that launder the money.
With light rail there is no impetus to build high rise condos and freshly laundered money goes elsewhere to further cleanse it of criminal activity.
SkyTrain is indeed the money train.
Light rail operating in BC would give an “apples to apples” comparison with the now obsolete and expensive SkyTrain proprietary light-metro and a tram-train version, with costs around $10 million/km, would certainly look good when compared to a $500 million/km plus subway under Broadway.
This is why Surrey’s LRT is so heavily gold-plated, as it is being built to fail!
Meggs could not stand for successful LRT and told Horgan not to stand for it either.
Sadly, the NDP have very short memories, as almost the same thing happened with former Premier Glenn Clark and Joy McPhail, with the former Broadway-Lougheed light rail project, which after inducements from Bombardier and SNC Lavalin, flip-flopped from LRT to SkyTrain. To many people were burned by this and sat out the next election, leaving the NDP with a two seat rump in 2001.
History is again repeating itself.
A Tram Train solution would be a perfect solution for the E&N, a real winner. Sadly the NDP back losers.
Premier John Horgan not only dashed the hopes of light-rail transit fans in the capital region on Tuesday, he got a nice round of applause for doing so.
Addressing the 400-member massed forces of all the local chambers of commerce, Horgan parked the light-rail dream in short order.
ai???The business case doesnai??i??t seem to be there.ai???
He signalled his government is vastly more interested in bus lanes. Watch for plans to extend them much farther than the construction thatai??i??s already underway.
Itai??i??s a bit of an about-face. The NDP in opposition made some polite remarks over the years about the potential for rapid transit on the abandoned E&N Railway line. It came with the job of nagging government to do more of everything when it came to transportation. But dithering over that potential has occupied dreamers for years.
Now that theyai??i??re in power, Horgan said, he has been talking to leaders about using the corridor for its purpose, ai???which is not necessarily a train, but moving people from the west into the city and back again.ai???
Referring to the never-ending talk of light rail, he said: ai???Iai??i??m not prepared to wait any longer. We shouldnai??i??t have a corridor like that designated for just growing Scotch broom.ai???
The ramshackle Dayliner passenger service that formerly used the line was mothballed seven years ago, and the rail line has been rotting ever since, while a bustling bike path occupies part of the right-of-way.
Horgan wasnai??i??t specific, but insisted the corridor should be used to move people. ai???Iai??i??m committed to doing that, and that will happen.ai???
People are wasting time in congestion, and Horgan said his government is keen to build a transportation plan for the south Island.
Bus lanes are an ai???immediate and efficientai??? solution to gridlock.
It went over well with the crowd packed into Crystal Garden.
But the elephant in the room was the employer health tax. Business leaders have concentrated attention on the downside of eliminating Medical Services Plan premiums ever since the move was made in the February budget.
Its partial replacement is a phased-in payroll tax that imposes new costs on employers, particularly those that didnai??i??t cover employeesai??i?? MSP premiums.
And those who do will sustain a double hit next year, paying one more year of their workersai??i?? premiums in addition to the new tax.
Horgan reminded them that he campaigned against the MSP, although the replacement came to light only in the budget. ai???We said were going to do it and we are doing it.ai???
He said he knows the replacement is a significant concern. ai???We understand. We feel your pain.ai???
He pointed to upcoming cuts to the sales tax on electricity bills as a partial offset.
But the first question after his speech was a plea to reassess the impact of the tax, given how it hits municipal employers, as well, and that impact compounds on business property taxes.
To paraphrase, the answer was: No.
The Finance Ministry is scrambling to soften the impact on some sectors, such as non-profits and school districts. But municipalities and businesses arenai??i??t on the list and wonai??i??t be any time soon.
Horgan said the property-tax impact of municipalities passing their tax costs on to property owners is ai???infinitesimalai??? compared to the savings for individuals (assuming their premiums werenai??i??t covered by their employers).
Horgan said the NDPai??i??s payroll tax will be the lowest in the country, is being phased in, and makes B.C. the last place in Canada to abandon the flat-rate premiums.
ai???This is what rest of the country is doing. This is catching up to the rest of the country.ai???
It wasnai??i??t what they wanted to hear, but Horgan held his own, overall.
The antipathy over the tax is partly offset by the sheer novelty of having a premier from the capital, with a select handful of cabinet misters from the ai??i??hood as well.
The crowd is counting on a bump in provincial spending locally as an offshoot of that representation.
If Horgan can hold the employer health tax anger to a simmer, rather than a boil, he can count that as a win.
Huge costs for what is basically an on-street/at-grade tram is staggering and it seems TransLink has pulled out the stops to gold-plate this project, which has now become a road project, rather than a LRT project.
That no one with real experience in building with LRT has been involved, tells the tale; TransLink has designed Surrey’s LRT as a poor man’s SkyTrain, costing huge sums to build, but with little befits from the investment.
No wonder TransLink has an American CEO, as I think a Canadian CEO would be asking important questions and not pander to the SkyTrain crowd, as the present chap is doing.
Always with TransLink, zero steps forward and two steps back!
Rendering of a planned Surrey light rail train. (Photo: surrey.ca)
New federal agreement unlocks $2.2B in TransLink cash to help pay for projects like Surrey light rail
SURREY ai??i?? Mayor Linda Hepner says a $4.1-billion funding deal between Ottawa and B.C. is ai???the step we were hoping for.ai???
The 10-year agreement, announced Monday, unlocked the $2.2 billion in federal money that TransLink needs to complete the next phase of its vision to improve transportation in the region ai??i?? including 27 kilometres of light rail transit in Surrey.
Ottawa had previously promised to cover 40 per cent of project costs for phase two of the 10-year vision, which includes Surrey light rail.
B.C. had pledged to cover another 40 per cent, while TransLink and the regionai??i??s mayors would come up with 20 per cent.
Good old Zwei has been blogging on local transit issues for the past 10 years, I can say that both recently announced “rail” transit projects are both hugely expensive, will not ease congestion and will fail to achieve their objective, except giving the excuse for land development adjacent to the routes.
As advised by real transportation professionals, there are North America and Europe, there are many serious problems affecting our local transit.
First of all, what we call SkyTrain is really three different railways.
The Expo Line is the original proprietary ICTS/ALRT system marketed by the former Ontario Crown corporation UTDC.
The Millennium and Evergreen Lines are a completely re-engineered ICTS/ALRT proprietary railway, now called ART which patents are owned by Bombardier (technical) and SNC Lavalin (Engineering). Though ART and ICTS/ALRT can operate on each other’s rights-of-way, the cars cannot be operated in a single train. The E&ME Lines maximum capacity is 15,000 as per Transport Canada’s operating certificate.
The Canada Line which is a conventional heavy rail metro, built as a light metro, but because of cost constraints, was built with very small stations with 40 metre long station platforms, allowing only 2 car trains, which constricts capacity to a maximum of 9,000 pphpd and internationally, is considered a “White Elephant”.
The Canada Line needs a minimum of $1.5 billion spent to increase capacity beyond 9,000 pphpd.
The E&M/E or Innovia Lines need about $3 billion spent to both renovate the aging Expo Line. Over $1 billion is being spent from the $7.3 billion budget for infrastructure upgrades, but a further $2 billion must be spent to increase capacity beyond 15,000 pphpd.
This $3 billion must be spent on the Innovia lines before any extension to Langley (cost around $3 billion).
To date only seven LIM powered Innovia SkyTrain systems have been built in the past 40 years, with only 3 seriously used for regional transit and not one new system has been built in the past decade.
By comparison over 200 new build LRT systems have been built, and many of the 350 existing or heritage tram/streetcar lines have been upgraded to LRT standard.
The North American standard for a subway is a transit route having customer flows in excess of 15,000 pphpd and in Europe, because of the success of light rail over 20,000 pphpd.
Customer flows along Broadway are less than 4,000 pphpd, much less than would demand of a subway (the same is true of the Canada Line and its annual operating costs of around $110 million is more than twice the amount than comparable LRT systems).
Please note: TransLink schedule for peak hour service on the 99B Express bus is 20 trips per hour, giving a maximum capacity of 2,200 pphpd.
The problem is that we are grossly over building transit to suit political needs and not transit customer needs.
We are going to spend over $6 billion on about 20 km of rail transit and this is pure madness.
As a reminder light rail is not rapid transit and in fact rapid transit is used to describe heavy rail metro and want we call SkyTrain is a light-metro, which was made obsolete by LRT in the 1980’s!
What is not being calculated are the huge operating costs of the Broadway subway, which will be around $40 million annually and this on a route most used by those holding the $1 a day U-pass, which means more subsidies to a very heavily subsidized rail service.
Again, no one builds with Innovia SkyTrain anymore as it is deemed dated 1960’s tech, akin to the Edsel.
What needs to be done is put an end to the mayor’s 10 year plan and get an outside agency of transportation professional, specifically from Europe, to plan and install the proper transit meeting transit customer needs.
In 10 years time we will be over $7 billion poorer with no real improvement to regional transit.
Congestion will be endemic, forcing the government to impose road pricing on the region, to pay for more “madness”.
LOWER MAINLANDA (NEWS 1130)Ai?? A local blogger and former journalist says its time for people in Surrey to be the focus of transit improvements.
UBC has offered to pay for a portion of the SkyTrain line extension from its intended terminus at Arbutus to the Point Grey campus.
TransLink says the Broadway SkyTrain and Surrey LRT projects will move ahead simultaneously. It notes the Surrey-Newton-Guildford LRT is slated to be completed in 2024, a year before the Millennium Line Broadway Extension.
The next phase of transit improvements across Metro Vancouver, totaling $7.3 billion, makes way for 108 new SkyTrain cars, and 95 replacement cars.
Still, Frank Bucholtz, a former local journalist, writes that people living south of the Fraser have been punished for decades.
There is lot of parts of the region that need better service but Surrey has grown dramatically in almost 30 years since the SkyTrain last stopped here and nothing has been added since that time despite a tremendous amount of talk, he tells NEWS 1130.
That talk mostly comes from politicians who, as Bucholtz argues, can do little more than slightly improve bus service.
One can draw a straight line from BC’s current money laundering scandal and the Broadway SkyTrain subway.
It is the only conclusion one can make with the proposed Broadway subway, as customer flows on Broadway just do not warrant a subway.
Building a subway, will enable developers and land speculators to assemble properties along the subway route and then fund civic politician’s election runs so they will look favorably in up-zoning the assembled properties for high-rise condos for off-shore investment for money laundered at BC casinos.
The costs are rising dramatically for the subway and as the cost for cement and steel rebar increase, so will the subway costs and by the time of its expected completion, the Broadway subway will cost in excess of $3.3 billion.
The Broadway subway is now the NDP’s updated version of the FastFerry fiasco, which has haunted the political party for the past two decades.
The NDP, it seems, will not learn or cannot learn from past mistakes.
Like the Canada Line, the only heavy-rail metro in the world, built as a light-metro and has less capacity than a simple tram, costing a fraction to build, the Broadway subway will be a future monument of blinkered thinking, political corruption, and just plain bad and incompetent planning.
Like the site-C dam fiasco, the Broadway subway will become the FastFerry headache of future governments, most likely not the NDP, but the smell of corruption and incompetence will cling to the present government, like the odor of a skunk.
The Broadway SkyTrain subway smells of scandal and corruption and will put regional transit planning in jeopardy, in effect, the Broadway SkyTrain subway will be the financial straw that broke TransLink’s back and will demand the implementation of road pricing and or congestion charging.
Is this a fate waiting for the Broadway "Fast-Ferry" subway?
TransLink’s CEO explains rising costs for major projects
VANCOUVER (NEWS 1130) ai??i?? By the time a new Broadway SkyTrain extension opens, the cost could top $3 billion. And thatai??i??s not the only project in TransLinkai??i??s phase-two plans with a price tag thatai??i??s gone up more than 20 per cent since 2015.
TransLink CEO Kevin Desmond admits the $2.83-billion Millennium Line extension and the $1.65-billion Surrey Newton-Guildford light rail transit line are hundreds of millions higher than they were when Metro Vancouver voters said no to a sales tax hike three years ago.
ai???By the time we go through the procurement process, the numbers could change again, as well,ai??? says Desmond.
ai???We are expecting very competitive bids for these two projects ai??i?? the Surrey project and the Millennium Line extention ai??i?? and the projects are costed out fairly conservatively at this point in time to ensure that through the bid process, weai??i??re in a very good place within our budget.ai???
As for construction, Desmond says the Broadway line could be completed in 2025, with Surrey light rail ready in 2024.
The next phase of transit improvements across Metro Vancouver, totaling $7.3 billion, makes wayAi??for 108 new SkyTrain cars, and 95 replacement cars.
Riders can also expect an increase in service on the Expo and Millennium Lines during the morning and afternoon rush hours, evenings, and weekends starting in 2019. TransLink expects same boost in service will take effect for the Canada Line the following year.
Here is a big problem. City of Vancouver types have been claiming that 100,000 people use transit on Broadway each work day.
From the following statistics, the claim is pure hokum.
From the following table there are a total of 73,328 trips in and out of UBC from all transit routes with Broadway accounting for a mere 7.4% of the trips.
41st Ave accounts for 10% of the trips to UBC.
It is clear, that those advocating for the Broadway subway are greatly inflating ridership numbers, in order to make the case for a Broadway subway.
More and more the Broadway subway is becoming this decades great FastFerry fiasco.
Is it not time to put a halt to the Mayor’s Council on Transit’s Ten Year Plan, until a public and independent inquiry is ordered to see if the project is viable or not.
From the UBC Vancouver Transportation Status Report Fall 2016
Table 3.3:Ai?? Average Weekday Transit Trips to / from UBC by Route, 2016
Route
AM
Midday
PM Peak
Evening
Night
Totals
6am to 9am
9am to 3pm
3pm to 6pm
6pm to Midnight
Midnight to 4:30am
4
4th Avenue
347
934
593
982
21
2,877
3.9%
9
Broadway
352
250
723
124
–
1,449
2.0%
14/N17
Broadway
440
1,317
881
1,167
153
3,958
5.4%
25
King Edward
1,136
2,985
1,644
1,410
32
7,207
9.8%
33
16th Avenue
787
1,625
970
755
–
4,137
5.6%
41
41st Avenue
1,237
3,383
1,566
1,565
5
7,756
10.6%
43
41st Ave Express
1,695
1,233
1,410
766
–
5,104
7.0%
44
4th Ave. Express
1,177
2,564
1,477
594
–
5,812
7.9%
49
49th Avenue
893
2,863
1,861
961
–
6,578
9.0%
84
4th Ave. Express
872
2,396
1,620
811
–
5,699
7.8%
99
Broadway B-Line
2,241
6,540
4,093
4,745
152
17,771
24.2%
258
North Shore
210
86
70
–
–
366
0.5%
480
Richmond Express
721
2,040
1,352
501
–
4,614
6.3%
NIS
Not In Service
–
–
–
–
–
–
0.0%
Totals
12,108
28,216
18,260
14,381
363
73,328
100%
14.7%
40.3%
26.3%
16.6%
2.1%
Table 3.4:Ai?? Average Peak Hour Weekday Transit Trips to / from UBC by Route, 2016
In Toronto, metro madness is the order of the day, but the overlooked story is the Scarborough R/T, SkyTrain’s first cousin, being torn down because it will be soon “life expired”.
The current debate is whether to build a hugely expensive one stop subway to replace the SRT or a cheaper LRT that will carry more people.
This echo’s our SkyTrain’s dubious history.
The Expo Line was going to be light rail, until the then Social Credit Premier, Bill Bennett, made a private deal with Ontario Premier, “Bill Davis”, to purchase the unsalable ICTS light-metro, recently renamed ALRT.
The Millennium Line was going to be light rail as well, because of the poorly performing and expensive ALRT SkyTrain light metro, but then NDP Premier Glen Clark made a private deal with Bombardier which acquired ALRT’s technical patents and renamed ALM (then owned by Lavalin, which went bankrupt) system and rebranded it as ART.
Supposed to be able to carry 30,000 pphpd, the present SkyTrain can only manage 15,000 pphpd, as the stations are too small and a lack of electrical supply constricts capacity and about $3 billion needs to be spent to increase capacity.
American Engineer and transportation expert, Gerald Fox, easily shredded the Evergreen Lines business case.
The Evergreen Line Report made me curious as to how TransLink could justify continuing to expand SkyTrain, when the rest of the world is building LRT. So I went back and read the alleged Business Case (BC) report in a little more detail. I found several instances where the analysis had made assumptions that were inaccurate, or had been manipulated to make the case for SkyTrain. If the underlying assumptions are inaccurate, the conclusions may be so too.
And his summation devastating.
It is interesting how TransLink has used this cunning method of manipulating analysis to justify SkyTrain in corridor after corridor, and has thus succeeded in keeping its proprietary rail system expanding. In the US, all new transit projects that seek federal support are now subjected to scrutiny by a panel of transit peers, selected and monitored by the federal government, to ensure that projects are analyzed honestly, and the taxpayers interests are protected. No SkyTrain project has ever passed this scrutiny in the US.
Yet, in Vancouver it is business as usual, SkyTrain is planned and built in a vacuum, where unpleasant and invented facts keep SkyTrain planning going. Myopic bureaucrats, doing the bidding of dishonest politicians, keep SkyTrain going; and equally dishonest academics, afraid of being found out being the charlatans they are, keep SkyTrain going.
This is the sad legacy of those who refused to study transit history and have doomed Metro Vancouver in repeating the same expensive transit mistakes.
Four decades after the TTC, its riders and Toronto ratepayers got stuck with Bill Davisai??i??s RT white elephant ai??i?? the Scarborough RT ai??i?? professional transit planning advice is again ignored in favour of pandering to the Scarborough electorate.
The Scarborough RT pulls into the McCowan Station in 2017.Ai??Ai??(Rene Johnston Toronto Star / Toronto Star)
By R. Michael WarrenOpinion
Wed., April 18, 2018
In 1981, as TTC chief general manager, I recommended the Kennedy subway station be connected to the Scarborough Town Centre by a streetcar line on a separate right-of-way. It was the best value-for-money option.
It would easily handle the 30 year projected ridership and provide excellent rider access. It cost a quarter of the other option: a Rapid Transit (RT) line using unproven ai???Intermediate Capacity Transit Systemai??? (ICTS) technology.
As is happening today, pure, parochial politics interfered.
It provided 20,000 riders per hour capacity. Today the RT line has only reached 5,000. It was supposed to be driverless. But drivers had to be added.
Four decades later, the TTC, its riders and Toronto ratepayers are stuck with Bill Davisai??i??s RT white elephant. Professional transit planning advice was ignored in favour of pandering to the Scarborough electorate.
Sound familiar?
There are many well known reasons why Mayor Toryai??i??s expensive, stubborn support for a one stop ai???vanityai??? subway connection will produce another transit white elephant.
A city-created Expert Panel found a modern LRT was superior to a subway extension on all counts: cost, transit service, economic development, sustainability and social impact.
Non partisan, Pembina Institute, concluded the LRT offered the best value for the taxpayer dollar. They forecast the original three stop subway would cost twice as much as a seven stop LRT ai??i?? and attract eight million less riders a year.
Metrolinx recommended replacing the aging Scarborough RT with a modern LRT. A subway is ai???not a worthwhile use of money.ai??? The province is willing to pay the $1.8 billion cost of an LRT.
The cost of Mayor Toryai??i??s one-stop subway extension could easily balloon from the approved $3.35 billion to beyond $4 billion. This will exceed the total government approved funding envelope of $3.56 billion. And thatai??i??s up from $2 billion only three years ago.
Just before the July 2016 vote a misleading TTC memo to council falsely escalated the cost of the LRT to $2.7 billion from $1.8 billion by pushing the completion date forward by an incorrect six years.
The subway option places a $910 million tax burden on the shoulders of Toronto ratepayers ai??i?? $745 million of this has to come from a property tax surcharge for the next 30 years.
TTC staff will have updated cost and ridership estimates by September. City staff says they canai??i??t release the estimates until January 2019 ai??i?? well after the November election. How convenient for the mayor and council.
Last week, Star reporter, Jennifer Pagliaro, uncovered further reasons to question the subway decision.
The July 2016 decision in favour of the one stop subway over an LRT was based on exaggerated design information by city staff, rushed input from consultants and on ai???hand-drawnai??? sketches.
City staff also ai???significantly down played the progress of the seven stop LRT alternative ai??i??ai??? The LRT was actually 30 per cent design complete at the time of the vote. Council was told it was only 5 to 10 per cent. Staff claimed the subway design was 5 per cent complete when it was closer to 2 per cent.
Tory has said, ai???There is no doubt the original decision to cancel a planned LRT in Scarborough and extend the subway instead was made without enough information or process ai??i??ai??? Tory is repeating the flawed process heai??i??s says heai??i??s against by ignoring the overwhelming case against a subway and refusing to initiate a value-for-money analysis of the two options,
When Tory talks about his SmartTrack plan heai??i??s committed to a cost-benefit analysis on each station. ai???The express purpose of what we are doing here is to move forward with a fact-based, transparent process.ai??? So why not on the Scarborough subway?
If Tory is really committed to transparent transit decision making he should demonstrate that obligation. If he has nothing to hide with respect to the Scarborough subwayai??i??s costs and ridership, he should direct city staff to report the latest cost estimates before the November election.
And he should call for a value-for-money analysis of the two options before further council action. Mr. Mayor, if you stand for transparency, act like it.
R. Michael Warren is a former corporate director, Ontario deputy minister, TTC chief general manager and Canada Post CEO. r.michael.warren@gmail.com
And here I thought universities were filled with intelligent people; people who crave education and research.
At UBC, evidently not!
The ignorance and displayed by the UBC types is nothing more than appalling.
Lysenkoism and jingoism has now become transit planning doctrine.
The current cost of the proposed UBC subway is in excess of $3 billion, based on costs of subway construction in Toronto and a subway to UBC will cost $5.5 billion to $6 billion, easily.
Then there are the added operational costs of over $40 million annually, which begs the question: “Would the customer flows on the Broadway route to UBC sustain a subway?”
That answer is no.
The Broadway B-Line bus, operatesAi?? three minute, peak hour service, or 20 buses an hour, which translates to a capacity of about 2,200 pphpd. Add the other bus services using Broadway and peak hour customer flows are less than 4,000 pphpd.
Subways in North America are not considered unless traffic flows exceed 15,000 pphpd on a transit route, thus if a subway is built, the huge operational subsidies will bankrupt TransLink.
As land development is also included with UBC’s offer to shell out money, (which would be better spent on creating a faculty of urban transport) one can only but feel if the current money laundering, casino, real estate, land development scandal is now pervading in UBC. A subway would inflate property values all along Broadway, allowing land speculators to assemble properties and gaining approval by Vancouver City Council to up-zone to greater density, flip the properties to land developers to tear down affordable housing to build non affordable shoe-box sized condos for the overseas market, all done with laundered money.
It is an Idiot’s Delight At UBC, where transit planning has devolved from a science to the criminal activity of money laundering.
UBC is willing to consider paying for a portion of the Broadway subway, according to a release
The University of British Columbia says contributions could take different forms, including donating land for stations
TransLink is open to discussions, but admits efforts are “directed toward delivering improvements in the 10-Year-Vision
VANCOUVER (NEWS 1130)Ai?? The University of British Columbia (UBC) says it’s willing to consider paying for a portion of the cost of extending Millennium Line SkyTrain all the way out to the Point Grey Campus, so long as it doesn’t interfere with academic funding.
The school is suggesting developers could help pay for it, and also floats the idea of an add-on fare to cut down on the cost similar to the YVR extension of the Canada Line.
The need for improved regional transit connectivity emerged as a key theme during consultations on UBC’s new Strategic Plan and pursuing an accelerated investment in rail rapid transit to campus directly supports the plan’s three themes: collaboration, inclusion and innovation, the university says in a release.
UBC is looking to other cities for ideas on how to contribute, and adds the contribution could take a number of forms.
As York University did out in Ontario, could be in the form of land or as Richmond’s doing in developer charges, explains Vice President of External Relations Philip Steenkamp. Or if it’s a financial contribution, then it would come from transit-enabled revenue, which would be as a result of the increased development we’d be able to do out here as a result of rapid transit.
He admits there’s no word on just how much the university would be willing to contribute.
ai???The current approved extension of the Millennium line to Arbutus is being funded 40 per cent by the federal government, 40 per cent by the provincial government, and 20 per cent by regional partners, he says. So UBC would be looking to contribute toward that regional share.
According to Steenkamp, extending the line all the way to the campus would not only benefit the school. It’s getting increasingly congested in the region, travel times are long, wea’ve got a housing affordability crisis here too, and rapid transit would give people access to more affordable housing options. It would reduce commute times by an average of 20 to 25 minutes each way.
He explains UBC has been consulting extensively with its internal community, which raised these concerns and flagged rapid transit as a priority.
The next step, he says, is to actively make the case that the benefits would extend regionally, and economically. This would connect UBC throughout the region to other knowledge, innovation and health clusters, and it really would help, we believe, the housing affordability crisis and help British Columbia meet its sustainability goals.
Steenkamp adds the university will also be speaking with the key partners; TransLink, all levels of government, and the internal as well as external communities at UBC.
Extending rail rapid transit to UBC is a key component of a regional approach to transit improvement, and directly supports UBC’s Strategic Plan, UBC president Prof. Santa Ono says in a release. Enhanced transit connectivity between UBC and the rest of the region will benefit individuals, businesses and organizations across Metro Vancouver.
Today’s Board approval of the advocacy strategy enables UBC to advance conversations with senior levels of government, regional partners, and with the UBC community about expediting the project, he adds.
TransLink open to discussions
Meantime, TransLink says it’s encouraged to see the Board of Directors openness to contributing to a project like this.
We have had success in the past working with private partners, YVR being one of them with the Canada Line, says the transit authority’s Jill Drews. But at this time, while we see rapid transit to UBC in the future, that timeline is not set. There are no approved plans for a start of construction or even project scoping on something like this.
She says TransLink is open to discussions, but adds efforts are currently directed toward delivering improvements in the 10-Year-Vision.
Phase three does have some early scope work for a UBC extension of rapid transit, she tells NEWS 1130. It doesn’t include any construction, and it’s something that we need to have approved, and approved plan.
Drews says the focus right now is getting the investment plan for Phase Two approved.
Willingness to contribute also poses questions
Andy Yan, director of the City Program at SFU, says UBCai??i??s willingness to contribute makes extending the line all the way to the school a real possibility.
ai???Really, why shouldnai??i??t it go to UBC? And really making that final connection to one of the major job centres in the region.ai???
However, he admits it also poses some challenges.
ai???As you build a line out to UBC, where should the stations be? And what kinds of land uses and development possibilities should occur there,ai??? he says. ai???Of course one of the biggest challenges is how youai??i??re going to pay for it, and what the fare splits might towards the funding of this line.ai???
Yan says building the line all the way through to Point Grey would mean the extension would cut through whatai??i??s already an area with a sizable mid-density type of housing market.
ai???I think the line is looking at from, basically, [VCC] Clark station connecting up down through Broadway to Arbutus, and I think that line has been effectively funded, if memory serves me rightai??i??Ai??I think that this does offer an opportunity now that had previously not been there. But then now comes into, I think, the consultations at the extension of the line from Arbutus to UBC.ai???
Surrey has a big transit and transportation problem, and now with the announcement that the current Mayor, Mayor Hepner, will not to run this fall, now leaves the LRT project in doubt.
The cacophony of the SkyTrain Lobby with their half truths, cherry picked data, and intimidating innuendo are demanding a change from light rail to the proprietary Innovia SkyTrain.
With their campaign of deceit and deception one fact remains for Surrey, either build LRT now or wait twenty or more years for a SkyTrain Line; which will be assuredly out of production and will end up building with LRT in the long term!
Surrey faces a classic Hobson’s Choice: Either build LRT now, or get nothing.
Why?
The problem with SkyTrain, is SkyTrain itself. Extending the Expo Line means a $3 billion refit of the Innovia system must take place. This refit or rebuilding is to increase capacity; increase the electrical supply; a host of track and switch replacements: and expand the station platforms on all stations on the entire Innovia network.
This means a $2.5 billion (current budget for LRT) SkyTrain expansion in Surrey could cost $5.5 billion or more and there is no money budgeted for that!
The region can only afford one rapid transit project every decade ans even with a windfall of federal money, a change from LRT to SkyTrain may prove to be too expensive and the project deferred. This will be a bonus for the now $3 billion and increasing Broadway subway as politicians will divert Surrey’s LRT money to complete the politically prestigious subway project – even to UBC.
This will leave Surrey with no money for SkyTrain unless road pricing and congestion charging is in place and that will not happen any time soon.
So Surrey Mayor and Council and the wannabe mayors and Councillors should take heed. You will have a Hobson’s choice with light rail;
Either build with LRT or build with nothing at all.”
A new player in Vancouver politics,Ai??Vancouver Green Citizensai??i?? Group, is emerging and is taking critical aim atAi?? Metro Vancouver and TransLink.
I have always said that Translink’s ridership numbers are inflated and the recent news releases; re releases and re re releases are indicative of TransLink’s desperate attempt to coax the public to accept Metro Vancouver’s 10 year plan and the implementation of road pricing.
I think TransLink is failing to find anything but a small base to support their two hugely expensive transit projects, both of which are tantamount to be two major fast ferry style fiascos, which will do nothing to reduce auto use and pollution, but will greatly increase Translink’s operational subsidies and property taxes.
The Broadway subway is the biggest threat to public transit in Vancouver as the huge costs involved, the huge annual subsidies will mire TransLink into a muddy quicksand of debt and pollution.
From the KPMG, Pete Marwick, Stevenson & Kellog - 1992 GVRD Cost of transporting people in Greater Vancouver. Source BC Transit. Inflation adjusted $250 million!
Either the housing crisis tied to rapid transit or climate change exacerbated by rapid transit is enough to scuttle the Broadwaysubway.Ai?? When Steer Davies Gleave did its ai???studyai??? in 2012 to award the Broadway subway to the World Bank barred engineering firm ai???selectedai??? to build it, electric vehicles and bikes werenai??i??t ubiquitous.Ai?? This makes the GHG intensity of users whoai??i??d take the Broadway subway untenable in 2018.
In the table, the carbon footprint for the rail lines is based upon the CO2 which Shoshanna (professional engineer) from McGill andAi??MIT (see below) determined for the Sheppard line subway in Toronto (30,545 tonnes of CO2 per km of subway). Carbon footprint is approximate for the above ground portions of the rail lines (horizontal guideways, vertical supports and stations).Ai?? Whatever the carbon footprint turns out to be, TransLink dropped the ball, and the carbon footprint of public transit here is the highest in Canada because the rapid transit lines here really donai??i??t carry many people (small trains) and the GHG emissions from the concrete poured for the lines are incredible.
ai???Shoshanna Saxe, an associate professor at the universityai??i??s department of civil engineering… Building even a relatively small subway like the 5.5-km Sheppard line is a massive, pollution-intensive project. Using data provided by the TTC, Saxe estimated the line required 358,851 cubic metres of concrete and 40,000 tons of rebar to build.
Producing the construction materials generated significant pollution, including at the mineral extraction, mining and processing stages. Emissions were also generated by the energy consumed at the subway construction sites and the movement of people and materials to and from construction locations. In total, Saxe estimated that Lineai??i?? generated almost 168,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalentai??? [30,545 tonnes of CO2 per km of subway].
The average number of people taking public transit for the bus system from 2017 to 2018 and rail lines from 1985 to 2018 is calculated from the annual passenger-trips published by metrovancouver from 1989 to 2015 with the annual passenger-trips for missing years extrapolated.Ai?? TransLink stopped reporting the passenger-trips after 2015 when the passenger-trips went down and the boardings went up for public transit (contradiction whichAi??exposed the spurious method used by TransLink to count riders).Ai?? This indicates that TransLink has used rapid transit to force transfers and inflate ridership.Ai?? When TransLink could no longer expand the U-Pass program further after 2015 to inflate ridership with more double counting, presumably, TransLink stopped giving metrovancouver the data on passenger-trips.
From 2002 to the present, TransLink does not break-out passenger-trips for the Expo Line and combines passenger-trips for the Expo Line and Millennium Line (listed as SkyTrain).Ai?? To arrive at the number of people using the Expo Line from 2002 to 2018, 58% of the passenger-trips for SkyTrain are apportioned to the Expo Line (58% of the SkyTrain length is used as the approximate factor for the passenger-trips on the Expo Line).Ai??Ai??Annual passenger-trips are divided by two (two trips to and from home daily by people using public transit) and 365 days to arrive at the number of people using public transit on any given day for the Expo Line and other rail lines.Ai?? About 882,764 tonnes of CO2 (approximate) were generated when the Expo Line was built.Ai?? On average, roughly 31,000 people (representing about 100,000 boardings or 60,000 passenger trips on average for weekdays and weekends) on any given day have commuted on the Expo Line over the last 32 years (0.9 tonne of CO2 per person per year).
*
Only 28.9 kmAi??with 20 stations was used as the Expo Line length.Ai?? This is fromAi??the hardcopy inAi??the report which was referenced in 2013, TransLink Not in Service.Ai?? Apparently, the length of the Expo Line listed (after the Evergreen Line went into operation) on the internetAi??now hasAi??theAi??greaterAi??length of 36.4 kmAi??with 24 stations.Ai?? Carbon footprint for the Expo Line is greater with the 36.4 km length.
ai??i??Only 10% of the 2.5 million people (250,000 people) on average (weekends and weekdays) in Metro Vancouver use public transit, and the table shows about 300,000 people using all modes of public transit.Ai?? Even though the distribution of people by mode of public transit might be off, the average number of people using public transit in the table canai??i??t be too far off.Ai?? Incidentally,Ai??the maximum number of people using public transit during the peak hour is the average number of people using public transit for the dayAi??multiplied by roughly three.
*
*
ai??i??Another way of looking atAi??the carbon footprint for the Expo LineAi??is that 31,000 people driving cars with the GHG intensity of 0.9 tonne of CO2 per car per year over 32 years produces the same amount of CO2 as the concrete poured for the Expo Line when it was built in 1985 (882,764 tonne of CO2 or whatever it is with the actual amount of concrete used and the number of people carried).Ai?? Carbon emissions by mode are additive in the table for the number of modes used by the public transit commuter.Ai?? It is wrong for TransLink to use passenger trips or boardings by people on public transit to calculate GHG intensity and compare it to the annual GHGAi??intensity by drivers in cars.
*
If UBC could do the research to determine the actual carbon footprint of commuters taking public transit in Metro Vancouver, it could be presented to MLA Andrew Weaver to go to bat for the tram line.Ai?? Also, Steve Brown whoai??i??s the COV engineer for the Broadway subway could be requested to provide his calculations of the carbon footprint of the Broadway subway for peer review whichAi??could be sent to Shoshanna SaxeAi??toAi??vet.
I have included this item because of Raytheons’s involvement of this particular PRT system at a time when they were acting as engineer/consultants for the then Broadway-Lougheed light rail project.
It came closest in the 1990s, when defense giant Raytheon purchased the rights to Taxi 2000ai??i??s technology.
Raytheons negativity towards LRT at the time, encouraged the Glen Clark NDP to make the disastrous decision to build with ART, instead of light rail.
The late Des Turner, noted public transit and LRT advocate and also expert on ICTS/ALRT SkyTrain, wrote a letter to Raytheon Engineers, inquiring as to their knowledge of LRTAi?? planning and construction and in reply received a letter stating that LRT was obsolete and PRT was the way to go, complete with a VHS tape video, which Zwei still has!
VHS tape, like PRT, is obsolete!
Gadgetbahnen, yesterday’s transit for today!
The Twin Cities transit revolution that wasnai??i??t
Personal rapid transit company Taxi 2000 shut down last June after a major investor decided to cut off support. At Taxi 2000ai??i??s Fridley headquarters, visitors could ride a prototype pod on its 60-foot demonstration track. (Submitted photo)
A rendering shows a concept station for Taxi 2000ai??i??s Skyweb Express personal rapid transit system. (Submitted image)
More than three decades after it launched, promising nothing less than to revolutionize urban transportation, Minnesotaai??i??s only homegrown personal rapid transit company is no more.
Last June, Fridley-based Taxi 2000 mothballed its 60-foot demonstration track, first displayed at the 2003 Minnesota State Fair, and laid off CEO Mike Lester, its sole remaining employee. According to filingswith the Minnesota Secretary of Stateai??i??s office, the 34-year-old company was formally dissolved on March 13 of this year.
Taxi 2000ai??i??s demise is, in part, the story of a changing transportation landscape.
Ride-hailing apps like Uber and Lyft are now ubiquitous in Minneapolis and St. Paul, and have pushed deep into suburbs and some smaller cities outside the metro. Fully autonomous vehicles loom, promising even greater disruption. Big cities continue to invest in conventional transit; the Twin Cities will add two new light rail lines and several bus rapid transit lines by 2024.
Meanwhile, personal rapid transit, or PRT, never lived up to its backersai??i?? fervid predictions. The few modest systems that made it to service proved clunky and unreliable. More ambitious projects were stymied by engineering challenges, political resistance, concerns about extensive elevated trackways, and wildly optimistic cost projections that never panned out.
For Taxi 2000, the final blow was the apparent withdrawal of an anonymous, deep-pocketed investor.
ai???Our angel investor decided last year that it was no longer in a position to continue investments,ai??? wrote Taxi 2000 Chairman Morrie Anderson in a terse letter to shareholders posted by a ai???transport-innovatorsai??i?? Google Group member.Ai??ai???We have been unsuccessful in finding other investors, licensees or purchasers of the company assetsAi??and we are now out of funds.ai???
Since the 1950s, PRT proponents have hailed the concept as a catch-all solution to urban transport and land-use woes.
Taxi 2000ai??i??s proprietary system, Skyweb Express, resembled a miniature monorail, with two- or three-person autonomous ai???podsai??? running on narrow, elevated guideways powered by grid electricity. While the company never managed to push the pods past the prototype stage, it claimed they would cost no more than $20 million per mile to implement ai??i?? one-third the cost of light rail transit ai??i?? and dramatically reduce traffic congestion.
Fully built-out PRT systems could theoretically provide door-to-door or corner-to-corner service, obviating the need for traditional stations, funding operations through fare collection alone, and all but replacing private automobiles.
But reality hasnai??i??t caught up. Morgantown, West Virginia, is home to the United Statesai??i?? only operational PRT, a finicky, five-station line opened in 1975. (Purists question whether its 20-person, 8,700-pound cars even qualify as PRT.) A handful of smaller-capacity examples exist overseas.
Taxi 2000ai??i??s mysterious investor had previously promised $30 million to construct and fund a working PRT demonstration system ai???if there is local support,ai??? according to Taxi 2000 founder J. Edward (Ed) Anderson, the former University of Minnesota professor who developed the companyai??i??s technology.
That local support never materialized, and Taxi 2000 closed without constructing a full-scale demonstration system or collecting a single passenger fare.
It came closest in the 1990s, when defense giant Raytheon purchased the rights to Taxi 2000ai??i??s technology. Raytheon modified the technology, rechristened ai???PRT 2000,ai??? and inked a contract with the Chicago Regional Transportation Authority to construct a fare-collecting line near Oai??i??Hare International Airport.
According to a contemporaneous account, Raytheon invested at least $45 million in a 2,000-foot demonstration track at its Massachusetts headquarters. The systemai??i??s eventual per-mile cost ballooned to more than original estimates, threatening its self-sustaining promise. As the Chicago RTA and other prospective customers balked, Raytheon pulled the plug in 1999.
Rendering of a planned Surrey light rail train. (Photo: surrey.ca)
Recent Comments