Kirkland city manager stumps for trail project along old rail line
Interesting news from just South of the border, a city manager actually eying a former disused intact railway for future transit use. Such thinking is so hard to imagine on our side of the 49th, where politicos and bureaucrats, mostly run and hide at the thought of using existing infrastructure.
Here is the difference, in Kirkland the city manager is a man of vision, while in Canada his counterparts are so rooted in the 20th century, they fail to comprehend they are now living in the 21st century, except for raising taxes and user feesAi??that is.
Rail for the Valley handed regional mayors, Metro Vancouver, and TransLink a golden opportunityAi??with anAi??affordable plan to reinstate the Vancouver to Chilliwack interurban with the historic Leewood Study and all RftV has got in return is pathetic excuses that it can’t be done or just silence. TransLink’s excuse sums up the utter stupidity that passes for transit planning in the region; “We are not interested in rail transit, if headways are grater than 10 minutes.” The Leewood study put the maximum headways achieved at 20 minutes between trains.
Instead of building an affordable TramTrain in the region, TransLink squanders tens of millions of dollars on useless metro (SkyTrain) planning for future routes that the taxpayer cannot pay for. This is a sad commentary of the very inept transit and transportation planing being undertaken by career bureaucrats who have absolutely no concept of affordable transit, with the entire ‘ship of fools’ being supported by equally inept regional mayors who just delight in increasing the tax burden on local taxpayers.
A financial iceberg is dead ahead and the unseaworthy TransLink is onAi??a direct collision course.
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Kirkland city manager stumps for trail project along old rail line
Kirkland’s city manager has been instrumental in bringing about what he hopes will one day be a world-class park, paved trail and transit line in Kirkland.
By Keith Ervin
Standing on a railroad tie on a hillside in Kirkland, City Manager Kurt Triplett sees more than tired old tracks and weeds near a sprawling parking lot.
He sees a 100-foot-wide open space that will someday be a linear park, paved trail and a mass-transit line all rolled into one.
And because the Eastside Rail Corridor connects a key Highway 520 park-and-ride with a Google campus and the city’s future economic center, Totem Lake, Triplett also sees it as a tool to grow and attract businesses.
At Triplett’s urging, the Kirkland City Council has authorized the purchase of 5 A? miles of the corridor in a $5 million deal scheduled to close next month with the Port of Seattle.
The council is now considering whether to ask voters to fund a hard-gravel trail to serve walkers and mountain bikers.
For Triplett, Kirkland’s acquisition of the former BNSF Railway line ai??i?? “our equivalent of the Louisiana Purchase” ai??i?? is a chance to expand public use of a 42-mile rail line he spent years as a King County official trying to bring into public ownership.
Triplett recently showed off a section of the trail above Carillon Point with a majestic view of Lake Washington and Seattle. He calls it the trail’s “front porch” and sees it as one of a number of future public gathering places along the rail line.
“That’s our goal here,” he said, “to have something that is truly world class, not just a Burke-Gilman Trail.”
Triplett began working on a regional deal seven years ago and helped broker the Port’s purchase of the corridor, backed by King County’s promise to buy most of the southern portion.
The deal envisioned continuing freight operations between Woodinville and Snohomish, and eventually both a trail and light-rail line connecting Redmond, Woodinville, Kirkland, Bellevue and Renton.
But “eventually” seemed too long to Triplett and a Kirkland park-funding advisory committee, which is urging the City Council to ask voters in November to make a gravel trail the centerpiece of a parks-levy package next fall.
Whether Kirkland funds trail construction through a levy, Triplett believes the city can find a way to begin moving hikers, bikers and commuters along the route, and to encourage trail and transit uses outside Kirkland.
Job interview
When Triplett was interviewed by Kirkland City Council members two years ago for the city manager post, he said, “Whether you guys hire me or not, you should talk to the Port about buying the corridor.”
It was a message that resonated with council members, who had talked for years ai??i?? but come up with no real plan ai??i?? about someday building a “BNSF Trail” or “Cross-Kirkland Trail.”
Triplett’s suggestion excited Councilmember Amy Walen, who said she shared the same goal but had been discouraged by more veteran members. “Nobody was energized or had the connections or skills that it takes to make a deal like this happen. Kurt had these skills,” she said. …
“He went to work and made it happen.”
Few people knew as much about the politics and economics of the corridor as Triplett, who as chief of staff to then-King County Executive Ron Sims was immersed in a four-year effort to acquire the land from BNSF Railway and build “the granddaddy of trails.”
Under one scheme that ultimately died, the Port would have bought the corridor, swapped it for county-owned Boeing Field, and paid for a paved trail from Renton to Snohomish.
After Sims resigned in 2009 to take a job in the Obama administration, Triplett succeeded him and helped engineer the Port’s $81 million purchase of the corridor.
King County agreed to buy most of the land south of Woodinville from the Port, but hasn’t yet completed the deal. Redmond has bought a 3 A?-mile segment
Sung Yang, County Executive Dow Constantine’s chief of staff, said the county and the Port are making good progress toward a land sale.
Strategic location
The south end of Kirkland’s purchase is adjacent to a planned parking garage at the South Kirkland Park and Ride, where a transit-oriented development will bring 250 multistory homes and shops.
The tracks go right past Google’s growing campus south of downtown and end up at Totem Lake, which has been designated as a future high-density urban center.
Google urged the City Council in December to buy the rail corridor, and Triplett believes its interest shows it would also encourage high-tech employers to locate and stay in Kirkland.
He believes it would be used by future University of Washington students, Google and Evergreen Hospital employees and others seeking to avoid traffic congestion and freeway tolls.
Triplett is hopeful major employers will contribute to development of the corridor, but for now the only funding proposals on the table involve tax dollars.
The city is buying the property with $1 million of surface-water utility reserves and a $4 million loan from city utilities. The loan could be repaid through deferral of other capital projects, a voter-approved levy or councilmanic bonds.
A 50-member Park Funding Exploratory Committee has proposed installing a $3 million hard-gravel trail as part of a broader capital levy, but not to include loan repayment in the ballot measure.
Dissenting committee member Santos Contreras called the corridor “a jewel” but said citizens should be asked to pay for its purchase before a trail is built.
Member Bonnie McLeod doesn’t think a case has been made for buying the rail corridor. “Do I want a cool trail going through our community? Absolutely,” she said. “I was adamant that it remain available for public transit and not just turn into recreation, but why does no other city along the route feel the need to own it? Why do we?”
Seattle Times staff reporter
How the TTC sullied the reputation of LRT (Part II)
How the TTC sullied the reputation of LRT (PartAi?? II)
Ai??March 16,Ai?? 2012
In Part I of my look at howAi?? the TTC has sullied the reputation of LRT, I focused on the TTC’s communicationsAi?? on surface rail, where “LRT” somehow meant “Streetcar Rapid Transit” but “SRT”Ai?? meant “Scarborough… RT”? Plus, while there were 75 km of streetcars and 6 kmAi?? of RT, only the latter could be found on a map. In confusing light rail with streetcars, and streetcarsAi?? with buses, the TTC soiled the very sound of the letters L-R-T before the cityAi?? even built any “real” Light Rail Transit lines.
But maps and words only matter so much. WhatAi?? about the experiences of actually riding the streetcars and the RT as a transitAi?? user? And as a tourist? How do those factor into the anti-surface rail venomAi?? found in letters to the editor, online forumsAi?? and public meetings? In Toronto of allAi?? places? In an era when dozens of cities are racing to buildnewstreetcar lines and LRTroutes?
Going to Party Like ItsAi?? 1949
One cannot drive around downtown Toronto withoutAi?? at some point staring out the windshield at the back of a streetcar. Similarly, no one can ride a streetcar without soonerAi?? or later fuming at a stuffed transit vehicle being held up by a single-occupantAi?? car double parking or waiting to make a left turn. Mixed-traffic operations areAi?? by their nature infuriating for all. While the planned Transit City lines wouldAi?? have featured separate Right of Way (ROW), the continuing experience along theAi?? traditional mixed-traffic streetcar lines downtown remains a major motivationAi?? for the underground-at-any-cost crowd.
Even so, the TTC has managed to make mattersAi?? worse. While many problems such as traffic enforcement or the narrow width of Toronto’s colonial streets have been beyond theirAi?? control, streetcar operations have remained far too anchored in the 1940s. SomeAi?? examples:
- There are too many stops. The 501 Queen, theAi??Ai?? busiest streetcar, stops three times between Yonge and Church ai??i?? a distance of 300Ai??Ai?? meters. Spadina, a new line, is littleAi??Ai?? better with three stops in 375 m between Queen and King, or 160 m between theAi??Ai?? stops at Harbord and Sussex. This incredibly close spacing cements the imageAi??Ai?? of even an improved streetcar as slow and lumbering.
- Too much time is lost at boarding because ofAi??Ai?? the failure to adopt modern payment systems. While POP has been used on someAi??Ai?? lines, the lack of a smartcard or off-vehicleAi??Ai?? payment has greatly slowed boardingAi??Ai?? times, making streetcars much slower downtown than they might be.
- The TTC has stuck to a single-zone fareAi??Ai?? pricing model that essentially uses short trips (often downtown, often onAi??Ai?? streetcars) to subsidize long distance commuting on the subway, at the highest fares in North America. It costs less to ride the Portland streetcar for a year than it costs to ride a TTC streetcar for aAi??Ai?? month. The TTC should have long ago instituted a free fare zone, timedAi??Ai?? transfers or other differentiated costs for the downtown streetcar network toAi??Ai?? better reflect their optimal hop-on, hop off short-distance nature.
- The TTC simply waited too long to replace theAi??Ai?? fleet. While the CLRV’s were the darling of the ball when they first came outAi??Ai?? in the 1970s, even auditioning for service in other cities, they today lack modern features such as low-floor boarding, airAi??Ai?? conditioning, wide aisles and sliding doors. And when it did finally get around to buying a newAi??Ai?? vehicle, the TTC botched theAi??Ai?? bid ai??i?? resulting in further delay. ItAi??Ai?? is doubtful there would be so much negativity towards streetcars if thoseAi??Ai?? shiny new Bombardier FlexityAi??Ai?? LRVs had been in service BF (BeforeAi??Ai?? Ford).
Bottom line: riding streetcars in Toronto isAi?? more or less the same experience for a financial services worker today as it wasAi?? for that person’s grandmother headed to the munitions plant inAi?? 1940. There is really no excuse forAi?? that.
The Sad, Sorry Tale of theAi?? RT
Where to begin with the Scarborough RT? This was the original storyAi?? of modern light rail to the suburbs, gone horribly wrong. Extensive histories have been written elsewhere, but the important detail isAi?? that the TTC had a chance to build a “high-speed streetcar” line that wouldAi?? finally demonstrate the true LRT-based potential of the new Canadian Light RailAi?? Vehicles. And they blew it.
Old marketingAi?? materials reveal the original streetcarAi?? intentions of what later became the RT. Had the province not interfered and pressured the TTCAi?? to convert the system toAi?? ITCS, who knows what ScarboroughAi?? residents would think of “streetcars” and LRT today? The elevated trackway toAi?? McCowan could have served as the trunk line that then descended to grade and ledAi?? to extensions in all directions. Instead of a small blue stubway at the end ofAi?? the Bloor-Danforth line, the TTC map could have looked like the western end ofAi?? the Philly SEPTA map where lengthy light rail feeds into 69th St Terminal.Ai?? And it would have all happened years ago, with unlimited future expansionAi?? potential.
But that did not occur, and as a resultAi?? Scarborough transit users today despise the RT as insufficient, unreliableAi?? second-class transportation that only shuttles them from bus to subway ai??i?? furtherAi?? evidence in their minds of why even fully-grade-separated light rail is just aAi?? cheap excuse for “real” rapid transit. Few are aware of the lost streetcar/LRTAi?? potential of the original concept, and still fewer care. Trust in suburbanAi?? surface rail was lost, never to be regained.
Tourism Derailed
Torontonians are oddly unaware of the symbolism theAi?? streetcars command as an image of the city internationally. Try a google imageAi?? search on “Toronto,” and after you wade through pages of the CN Tower andAi?? skyline, streetcars start to pop up constantly. However, the TTC is famouslyAi?? tone-deaf to tourists, with no official merchandiseAi?? store and no dedicated tourist websiteAi?? (as opposed to those found in, say, New York or Chicago).
This attitude from the city’s own transit agencyAi?? has long extended to the streetcar network. Instead of being treated like the tourist icons theyAi?? are, and despite being one of theAi?? largest such networks in the world, streetcars here are officially considered noAi?? more special than buses. Besides the aforementioned problem with maps, the practical operation of streetcars ignores tourists.Ai?? Compare this lack of attention to New Orleans, where the streetcars are alsoAi?? regular workhorses for commuters but extremely tourist-friendly, or San Francisco, where heritage streetcars have beenAi?? placed on a special surface line downtown with high visibility to tourists.
Yet somehow those rather clear success storiesAi?? were lost on TTC HQ. Instead of, say, creating a tourist-friendly loop aroundAi?? the downtown (as was done inAi?? Melbourne), or just keeping heritageAi?? vehicles in regular service, the TTC sold off its fully functional andAi?? beautifully restored PCC fleet in 1995, just five years after refurbishing themAi?? for the opening of the Harbourfront line (two remain in special charter service only). So while aAi?? tourist today can ride an old Toronto streetcar in San Francisco or Kenosha, Wisconsin, he or she cannot do it in Toronto. Oops.
Although not directly related to LRT expansionsAi?? in the suburbs, the lost goodwill of the TTC’s inactions on tourism stillAi?? matters. Without idolized status, left exposed to political whims, theAi?? streetcars have become easy targets for those who argue against surface rail.Ai?? That it could even be suggested that they be eliminated by a mayoralAi?? candidate was a stunningAi?? revelation.
Summary: A Streetcar NamedAi?? Aspire
Although the above list of miscues isAi?? substantial, to be fair none of the current LRT vs subway vitriol would be getting such a prominent hearing were it notAi?? for the deliberate actions of a certain former councillor from Etobicoke whoAi?? drives an SUV and has stated on multipleAi?? occasions that streetcars “cause pollution“Ai?? and “drive me nuts.” Yet the TTC must still bear responsibility for theAi?? decades it has spent de-valuing the existing streetcars, not following bestAi?? practices as their operation evolved, undermining the very definition of “lightAi?? rail” and missing past opportunities to build new downtown tourist or suburbanAi?? high-speed routes.
With a new chief executive looking for a fresh start, the TTC now has a chance to own up to past mistakes andAi?? take corrective action. An omnibus strategy of restoring lustre to existingAi?? lines by fixing the problems stated in this article would pay long-termAi?? dividends, reduce the chance of ugly PR incidents, and begin to restore the reputation of surface rail inAi?? the GTA. Only then might Toronto be able to move forward into its multi-modalAi?? future in peace.
Writing by LarryAi?? Green
Photos from the City of Toronto Archives, Transit Toronto,Ai?? and KennethAi?? Lai
How the TTC sullied the reputation of LRT (Part I)
Larry Green, a contributor to the “blog TO” site says Toronto Transit Commission [TTC] tarnished the reputation of light rail, possibly explaining why subways have drawn interest. Below is two parts of this feature story:
http://www.blogto.com/city/\
2012/03/how_the_ttc_sullied_the_reputation_of_lrt_part_i/
“How the TTC sullied the reputation of LRT (Part I)
March 15, 2012
Will Toronto’s transit imbroglio never end? With the Prime Minister now being squeezed for a soundbite, Mayor Ford’s war on streetcars has now spread from town hall meetings to Queens Park to
Ottawa. Not since a certain other suburban-oriented Mayor called in the feds to clear a snowdrift has a Toronto issue garnered so much local, regional and national attention.
That said, there is a puzzling and nasty undertone to much of the discussion. It might be one thing for there to be debate over appropriate levels of national or provincial funding for a single city (albeit a city that in turn is an engine for the national and provincial economy). Or perhaps it could be expected to see people argue at length if there were some significant legal or environmental issue involved such as condemnation-property rights or accessibility. But these factors aren’t even on the table ai??i?? instead it’s about subways vs light rail transit, and how much the people who love subways hate LRT. Regardless of how staged and silly it was for a room full of people to boo and jeer the very mention of LRT, the fact that such an event could even occur in Toronto was remarkable.
What happened? How did the very city that is internationally known for its streetcars end up being full of Randall O’Toole clones? Rob Ford could not have singlehandedly created such sentiment in a mere two years; something cleary went horribly wrong over a long period of time to build the kindling that Ford simply put a match to. Here’s Part One of how the TTC itself sullied the reputation of surface rail in Toronto:
Bad Semantics
Public transit terminology could be a thesis topic for linguists. Many “subways” are not entirely underground. Nearly a third of the huge New York subway system, for example, is elevated above the roadway. Some LRT systems like Boston and Newark have historically been called “subways” because of a central tunnel, even though the vehicles later emerge to run on the surface in the medians of streets. Others such as Houston and Minneapolis use the word “metro” even though their LRT systems are nothing of the sort.
Further muddying the waters, some LRT systems have names derived from streetcars, and some streetcar systems have names that sound more like subways. Confused yet?
Canadian cities make the situation even worse. Vancouver has a medium capacity light-metro “Skytrain” that is not a subway, nor a traditional train, nor even necessarily found in the sky (there are extensive underground sections). Calgary and Ottawa call their Light Rail Vehicles “trains.” Montreal has a metro that runs entirely underground, but on rubber wheels . And then there is Toronto.
“Streetcar” is a very old and clearly defined word in Toronto ai??i?? this was never a “trolley” or “tram” town ai??i?? and most of the streetcar lines in the city run very much as they did a century ago, in mixed traffic, in vehicles directly descended from the first streetcars. But as streetcar lines were rebuilt or added in recent decades, the TTC got too clever by half and tried to slap the LRT tag onto lines that were very much still traditional streetcar routes.
Remember the “Harbourfront LRT,” a line so symbolically traditional that it used restored PCC cars? The 510 Spadina has also been called “LRT” at times. The recent rebuilding of St. Clair did not improve matters, being widely branded as LRT at the time despite the fact that the TTC now swears it is not an LRT.
And what do those letters stand for, anyway? The TTC calls its elevated medium-capacity light metro in Scarborough an “RT,” or “Rapid Transit” But this is not the same “RT” as found in “LRT,” which in Toronto has sometimes meant “light rail transit” and sometimes “light rapid transit” and sometimes, pardoxically, “streetcar rapid transit.”
On the rest of the continent, where a city has both LRT and streetcars the linguistic distinction is clear. You have your Portland Light Rail, and your Portland Streetcar. Same goes for the Seattle Light Rail and the Seattle Streetcar. But in Toronto it’s just a jumbled mash-up. Nothing sums this up more than this reference in a tourist guide to the “Spadina LRT Streetcar”. No wonder Transit City’s LRT lines had such a tough time finding acceptance in this tongue-tied town.
Worse Maps
All rails are not created equal, at least in the minds of TTC mapmakers. While subways and the RT have their own simplified map and are clearly highlighted on the overall “System Map”, good luck finding the 75 km of streetcar tracks on any TTC cartographic product. A visitor looking at the TTC’s own Downtown Map blowup would certainly have no idea which thin red line was a bus and which depicted the ten streetcar routes 250,000 people each day ai??i?? they are all the same color and most are the same linetype. The tiny legend should not normally be necessary for someone simply searching for major routes but even this is of little help ai??i?? it only mentions “streetcar rapid transit” (for Spadina/Queen’s Quay and St. Clair) and ignores all other streetcars completely. One would literally have to have prior knowledge to find any surface rail line when traveling on the TTC ai??i?? it simply does not exist on paper, anywhere.
The topographic inertia has been hard to escape. In the early 1990s, the new “Harbourfront LRT” briefly appears on maps as a higher-order transit line, only to disappear a few years later once the line was expanded to include Spadina. Nothing changed in the service itself ai??i?? it just went back into hiding on the map.
This is patently bizarre. No other public transit system in North America with any kind of rail line fails to highlight it as such on a system guide or subway map, even when the rails fall under different modes and agencies. Here are examples from Seattle, Portland, Philadelphia and New Orleans. The suburban streetcar section of the Boston T’s Red Line is lithographically shown as equivalent to the subway it connects to. Clearly the steel wheels in these towns are higher-order transit, even when running in mixed transit.
Which is entirely the point. Besides higher carrying capacity, rails on the ground represent certainty for residents, businesses and property investors. This is why many academic papers have been written on the use of streetcars as an urban development tool. They also are easy to understand for visitors, who can board a vehicle feeling confident about the destination. Pop quiz: have you ever visited a big city as a tourist and hopped on trains or trams but not once boarded a bus? Even though transfers are free and the buses go everywhere, often at comparable speed to a subway for short distances? Think about it for a moment.
If you want a logical, practical, easy-to-understand higher-order Toronto transit map you have to look to hobbyists rather than the TTC. The internet is full of the kind of map that puts all rails on their rightful pedestal. The concept is hardly radical.
Part I Summary
Toronto is blessed with the continent’s largest streetcar system yet can’t figure out how to describe it. Cartographically misrepresented and badged with a lexicon of misleading labels, it’s no wonder light rail had a bad name in Hogtown before the first modern LRT line could even be built. Riders of the steel ribbons may know better, but you can hardly blame a car-commuting citizen of the former boroughs for thinking that any kind of surface rail is nothing better than a bus since every representation from the TTC has equated the two modes. This deeply toxic association has proven very difficult to undo in the minds of those who are less than obsessive about their transit maps and terminology. No matter how many times someone points out that the planned LRT routes on Finch or Sheppard would, say, have more distant station stops or not take up auto lanes, a number of people will nonetheless think of the downtown streetcars. It’s enough to make one want to cry out.
Coming Up in Part Two – Operations, tourism and the sad, sorry tale of the RT
Bogota’s Vaunted Bus Rapid Transit System ai??i?? in Distress
This comes as no surprise as the shine of bus rapid transit is beginning to wane.
In South America, the rise of BRT was mainly due to the World Bank’s aversion to fund any type of rail project, but would shovel piles of money off the back of a truck to fund new highway construction. BRT also echoed an era of major highway expansion and everyone knows, new highways can accommodate a lot more cars and in a very short while congestion reigns.
Today, those who champion BRT, are also championing new highway construction andAi?? TransLink, whichAi?? puppet strings reach as farAi??as the provincial government in Victoria, whichAi??puppet stringsAi??are directly linked toAi??the BC Road builders Association, will promote anything the provincial government and its political friends want.
In simple terms, BRT = new highway construction.
BRT, in North America has been abysmalAi??in revenue operation, failing to meet its promoters expectations and where BRT is built, LRT is soon to follow, only at a far grater cost than if modern LRT had been built in the first place.
Bogota’s Vaunted Transit System ai??i?? Model for Transjakarta ai??i?? in Distress
March 14, 2012
Bogota, Colombia. Bogota’s eco-friendly mass transit system has been widely emulated around the globe, so urban planners were dismayed when a protest by frustrated commuters turned into a free-for-all that nearly paralyzed Colombia’s capital.
Anger over the TransMilenio system’s overcrowded, deteriorated state was behind last week’s protest, which began at five of the bus rapid transit system’s 114 stations before spinning out of control and devolving into battles between protesters and riot police.
Vandals in ski masks looted and broke windows. Bus drivers abandoned their shiny, double-length vehicles and fled. Earlier protests over the system’s decline had been isolated. This one seemed coordinated.
“The stations are like rivers of people and there’s no control,” complained German Augusto Guarumo, a 52-year-old lawyer and commuter who says the system has become unmanageable during peak travel hours.
Friday’s rioting was a shock to an 11-year-old system that urban planners have lauded, along with a similar network in Curitiba, Brazil, as a promising alternative to rail systems. Its low-emission buses briskly ply dedicated lanes that typically border traffic-choked avenues.
Prized for their efficiency, low cost and smog- and congestion-fighting prowess, such systems have sprung up in cities from Jakarta, Indonesia to Mexico City to Los Angeles and Cleveland, Ohio.
But the TransMilenio has become a victim both of its own success and of official neglect. It became overloaded as the capital’s motor pool grew by about 100,000 automobiles annually over a decade and two consecutive city administrations did almost nothing to expand it. It was built to handle half of the 1.7 million passengers it now carries daily.
And it’s not as if Bogota residents have an alternative. There are rickety old belching buses on some avenues. But most main thoroughfares belong to TransMilenio alone.
Other Latin American cities with bus rapid transit systems tend to have alternatives. Santiago, Chile, has an underground metro. So do Mexico City and Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the variety of options include a bus rapid transit system launched last year.
The success of bus rapid transit is not measured in easing vehicular traffic alone. Economists like it for its affordability. Environmentalists like it for its climate- and public-health friendliness.
The TransMilenio has reduced particulate emissions by 1,000 metric tons a year, saved Bogota $60-70 million in health care costs from decreased respiratory and other ailments and reduced carbon emissions by more than 1.7 million tons between 2006-2009 alone, according to a 2010 study by Manuel Olivera, Colombia’s director for the Clinton Climate Initiative. It has also already earned Bogota $3 million in direct carbon reduction payments under the Kyoto Protocol.
For commuters, the benefit has come primarily in relief from the congestion caused by the 1.4 million automobiles that bloat Bogota’s roads, sometimes producing near-gridlock conditions.
That congestion worsened during the previous administration of Samuel Moreno. The former mayor is on trial for allegedly soliciting and receiving payoffs in granting major construction contracts including one to expand the TransMilenio.
Enrique Penalosa, who as Bogota’s mayor from 1998-2001 launched the TransMilenio, says at least 18 percent of the TransMilenio’s users have cars but leave them at home at least two days a week to comply with vehicle restrictions based on license plate numbers.
One complaint of riders is that the fare is expensive at $1 per trip because the overcrowding makes their commute longer.
Police say they don’t yet know who organized Friday’s protest. About 60 participants were arrested but later released. Authorities put the damage at a half million dollars and 11 injuries were reported.
The violence came as Bogota’s new mayor, former M-19 leftist rebel Gustavo Petro, seeks to renegotiate contracts with some of the system’s 26 concessionaires that expire in 2014.
He claims the city, which does not subsidize the system, deserves more than 5 percent of the TransMilenio’s profits because it provides the infrastructure and security. The concessionaires have not yet agreed to open negotiations.
Petro contends his political opponents were behind Friday’s protest. But Penalosa blamed Petro, claiming the mayor promoted the protests as part of his campaign to renegotiate contracts.
System users, meanwhile, say they’re tired of finger-pointing. “It’s going to take a tragedy until these people realize that we are human beings and not merchandise,” said Carmenza Contreras, a 38-year-old architect.
Associated Press
April 15 Friends of Rail For the Valley AGM
Mark your calendars,
Announcing…
Annual General Meeting of
Friends of Rail For the Valley, inc
Sunday April 15, 2PM
University of the Fraser Valley, Abbotsford
Room B 121
Details are To Be Announced. We hope to have a guest speaker and/or a video presentation.
YouAi??can help speed up the coming of light rail
Share your ideas. Get involved!
(membership fee of $10)
Austin LRT plan criticized … by rail advocates
Light rail advocates not only promote light rail, they also promote good public transport and if a light rail project does not meet the criteria for good public transit, light-rail advocates must criticize the project.
What is happening in Austin has happened elsewhere. In Seattle, the light-rail group supporting the then proposed Seattle LRT projects withdrew their support when bureaucrats morphed the project into an expensive hybrid light-rail/metro line and in Vancouver, those supporting LRT for the Broadway-Lougheed rapid transit project (latter known as the Millennium SkyTrain Line) abandoned the NDP government who forced a SkyTrain solution onto the taxpayer.
There is no shame for light rail advocates criticizing a transit project, if it is a bad transit project, it just increases their credibility.
Austin LRT plan criticized … by rail advocates
Written by Lyndon Henry
Customarily, in almost any urban area, you’d expect your strongest rail transit advocates to be rallying around an official rail plan as it heads toward a possible ballot initiative. But in Austin, Tex., today, that’s definitely not the case.
A group of avid transit activists has been questioning the official City of Austin plan for 16.5 miles of “Urban Rail” (actually, a full-performance light rail transit, or LRT, plan that has mutated from an original streetcar plan). They argue that it’s literally off the track, ignoring where the biggest need is, and investing about 1.4 billion bucks to go where it isn’t.
This group of pro-rail nitpickers is currently small, but it comprises some of the most venerable and influential transit advocates in the city ai??i?? including yours truly and a longtime colleague, Dave Dobbs, publisher of the well-respected Light Rail Now website. I’m the guy that originally proposed LRT for Austin, way back in the 1970s (whew), and, following the ballot failure of that plan in 2000 (by a very narrow margin of less than 2,000 votes), Dave and I concocted the scheme for running DMUs on the railway owned by Capital Metro, the transit authority. You know … the scheme that today runs as the MetroRail Red Line.
Basically, the city’s neediest travel corridor runs along a couple of major central-city thoroughfares called Lamar and Guadalupe, which channel a huge travel flow from the north and northwest down southward through the heart of the city and into the Core Areaai??i??including the University of Texas (plus the fourth-densest residential neighborhood in the state), the Capitol Complex (state Capitol plus a cluster of state offices), and Austin’s downtown. (A depiction of the proposed service, envisioned as LRT, is at left.)
MetroRail, originally envisioned as a “demonstration” starter line, and built at very low cost (about $4 million a mile), has gained public respect for attracting just under 2,000 rider-trips a day out of cars, SUVs, and pickup trucks. Why such relatively low ridership for a rail transit line? By following a former Southern Pacific branch line, MetroRail bypasses the central corridor and the Core Area in a leisurely dogleg through the east side of the city, ending up in the lower southeastern corner of downtown. Now the new Urban Rail plan (promoted by the City, not Capital Metro) also fails to serve this crucial travel corridor, thus likewise missing the target.
For about the past six years, we’ve been raising concerns about these route weaknesses. The official response has consistently been that the route plan isn’t “set in stone” … but, well, it’s set in stone. There’s talk of a possible bond election next November to fund the first phase.
All this should become clearer in an article I’ve just published, with more details, maps, and other graphics, on the Light Rail Now website: Austin, Texas: City’s Urban Rail Plan Needs Major Overhaul
The official Urban Rail site, with full information on the plan, is here:
You’d think that, in today’s contentious political atmosphere (with some GOP politicians trying to scuttle dedicated fuel-tax funding for transit), local planners would realize a major rail project like this needs all the help it can get. But instead, the attitude seems to be, “Damn the critics’ torpedoes ai??i?? full speed ahead!”
But if some of the most knowledgeable and enthusiastic rail supporters in the city think it’s flawed, what about voters at large? Doesn’t seem to bode so well.
Lyndon Henry
Lyndon Henry is a writer, editor, investigative journalist, and transportation consultant currently based in Central Texas. He holds a Master of Science in Community & Regional Planning, with a focus in Transportation, from the University of Texas at Austin, 1981. From 1973 to 1989 he was executive director of the Texas Association for Public Transportation, and presented the original proposals and feasibility studies for light rail that led to the inclusion of rail transit in the Austin-area planning process.. From 1981 to 1985 he served as a transportation consultant to the Hajj Research Centre at
King Abdul Aziz University, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He has also served as a transportation planning consultant on several other transit projects in the USA. In 1983-84 he was a member of the Austin-Travis County Transit Task Force which recommended a transit authority for the Austin area. That agency, eventually named Capital Metro, was created in 1985. From 1989 to 1993, Mr. Henry served as a board member and vice-chairman of Capital Metro. From 1990 to 1992 he was an Adjunct Faculty member at St. Edwards University, teaching a course in public policy. Since 2000 he has served as a technical consultant to the Light Rail Now Project, and from 2002 to late 2011 he served as a Data Analyst for Capital Metro in Austin. He is also a member of APTAai??i??s Streetcar and Heritage Trolley Subcommittee and Light Rail Transit Technical Subcommittee.
Cleaning a subway – Does TransLink get it?
A London Underground Vacuum train
Subways are an expensive proposition, not only are they expensive to build and operate, they are expensive to maintain.
A little known fact is that subways needAi??regular cleaning as the dust and debris from daily operation is very corrosive to important signaling installations. The constant piston like action of trains in the tube, propel the debris of operation like a miniature sandblaster and over time, great and expensive damage occurs. This debris must be cleaned and a subway vacuum, many custom made, is used to clean the subway tubes.
Subway cleaning is just another subway expense that has been quietly ignored by TransLink and the subway lobby in Vancouver, especially when they expect the valley taxpayer to ante up to pay for Vancouver’s expensive transit demands.
From the Railway Gazzette
London Underground vacuum train to cut tunnel cleaning time
12 March 2012
Much fine dust in the tunnels is metal from wheel-rail contact or braking, which LU says can ’cause signal failures and interfere with other electrical systems’. At present a contractor is employed to clean tunnels manually overnight, but it takes two years for six gangs of six workers to cover all the tunnels which at 181 km form 45% of the 402 km LU network.
The new train will consist of seven cars. At each end will be a pair of driving motor cars built for the Victoria Line in 1967 and recently withdrawn. These are being remodelled to provide traction and to supply the power for the vacuum and dust disposal plant, which is being supplied by Hannover-based metro cleaning vehicles specialist SchAi??rling Kommunal. A hydraulic drive will allow low-speed running at 1 km/h during cleaning, while the motor cars will enable the train to reach work sites at line speed.
Dust and litter will be sucked in by a 360Ai?? ring of nozzles on the central vacuum car. On each side of the vacuum car will be vehicles with containers to store the fine dust or larger items of litter. It is estimated that manual cleaning removes about 150 kg of dust per km of tunnel. The vacuum train is expected to quadruple this to 600 kg/km.
The train is suitable for use on the small-profile single-bore deep level tube tunnels, and also the mainly double-track sub-surface tunnels on the older parts of the LU network.
A New York subway vacuum train
Surrey’s mayor renews call for light rail
Surrey mayor, Dianne Watts is renewing her call for LRT and well she should as the province is now leaning towards a SkyTrain subway under Broadway. Surrey and the south Fraser region is grossly shortchanged by TransLink and public transit is just a few steps up the ladder from dismal.
The real problem is TransLink’s fetish with SkyTrain, light-metro and subways and all transit planning is based on the outdated bus/light-metro philosophy, where all bus routes feed a light-metro spine. Inflexible and mostly customer unfriendly, TransLink persists with this nonsense to the detriment of prospective transit customers.
The SkyTrain, anti-LRTAi??lobbies areAi??very strong and very vocal and they no shrinking violets at spreading untruths, questionable studies, and pure invention to discredit modern LRT. The ongoing debate with “rico” shows that utter lack of knowledge of modern LRT and the ability to carry large numbers of passengers, yet at the same time, absolutely no scrutiny isAi??done at all with the spurious claims aboutAi??SkyTrain ridership.
Mayor Watts should step up the calls for LRT and at the same time demand an independent consultant for proposed light rail in Surrey as TransLink is just not up to the task. Rail for the ValleyAi??would like to suggest Leewood Projects of the UK to undertake an independent study for LRT in Surrey, just like the historic study Leewood Projects didAi??in conjunction withAi??Rail for the Valley for the return of the Valley interurban.
TransLink is far to anti-LRT to have any credibility with any transit study, either with LRT or SkyTrain light-metro, as the Broadway transit studies have shown. Surrey needs a fresh approach to “rail” transit and surrey mayor, Dianne Watts, renewed call for light rail is on the right track!
Surrey’s mayor renews call for light rail
Ai??Dianne Watts delivers her annual state of addressBy Kelly Sinoski, Vancouver SunMarch 13, 2012
METRO VANCOUVER — Surrey Mayor Dianne Watts is once again renewing her call for light rail transit south of the Fraser, arguing rapid buses or a costly SkyTrain line to Langley won’t reduce the increasing gridlock on city streets.
Watts noted her city pays $160 million every year to TransLink but is not getting the transit service it needs to meet a growing population that is set to reach 750,000 people by 2040. The city’s population has grown 18.5 per cent in the past five years ai??i?? more than three times the national average of 5.9 per cent growth. About one-third of the population is under the age of 19.
“Do we want to become Los Angeles?” she asked the attendees at her annual state of address of the Sheraton Guildford Hotel.
Using the same stage backdrop of an LRT as last year, Watts said light rail is not a “request of the month” and she won’t give up, noting three light rail trains could be built for less than the cost of a $2 billion SkyTrain to Langley. More buses aren’t efficient enough, she argued, while rapid buses are “not 21st century” and do not meet the city’s goal to have 80 per cent of trips within Surrey on transit by providing denser town centres.
The city is in line for a B-Line bus service along King George Highway from White Rock to Guildford, buses from White Rock to Langley and a rapid bus along Highway 1 over the new Port Mann Bridge. A new Pattullo Bridge is also included in the TransLink plan, while a study on a rapid transit line linking to the King George station is underway.
But Watts said light rail will help shape and connect communities across Surrey’s vast land base, while increasing economic development. Watts noted Portland, Oregon has seen $8 billion in new development around its rail stations.
The city is already exploring three routes: 104th Avenue between the City Centre and 152nd Street; Fraser Highway between City Centre and Langley; and King George Boulevard, between City Centre and South Surrey.
She also called for a regional tolling strategy to help defray the costs of a new Pattullo Bridge, noting residents south of the Fraser are being unfairly taxed with tolls on the new Port Mann Bridge.
Transportation was just one prong of Watts’ speech, which noted Surrey has a strategic advantage in becoming the economic powerhouse for the region because it holds 46 per cent of the region’s available industrial land, and has the second largest border crossing in Canada, the Fraser Surrey Docks and is the gateway to Asia Pacific.
But the city is feeling a financial pinch related to growth. The city’s major source of revenue is property taxes yet cities only get eight cents of every one tax dollar, are consistently facing downloading costs from the provincial and federal governments for expanded services such as sewer and water and are trying to address the growing issues of affordable housing and homelessness.
The city has already instituted new zoning bylaws to allow for more multi-family dwelling and smaller lots as well as mixed-used ton centres with higher density around transit, fee simple row houses and manor houses. The plan to move forward, she said, includes improving social infrastructure, generating social economic activity and creating thriving communities.
The Karlsruhe model of a dual-mode railway system
Karlsruhe:
|
| Country: | Germany |
| Type: | Policies |
| Area: | Entire City, Region |
| Actors: | Local Gov. |
| Funding: | Local Gov., Regional Gov., National Gov., Private |
| Topics: | Built environment |
| Consultancy | |
| Mobility | |
| Objectives: | Increase non-motorised mobility |
| Increase use of public transport | |
| Reduce car mobility | |
| Reduce energy consumption | |
| Instruments: |
A coupled set of GT-8’s in Karlsruhe operatin on the main tramway
Abstract:
The dual-mode railway system of Karlsruhe is widely regarded as the model of a high-quality and well patronised local public transport system. The successful track-sharing experience of the Karlsruhe Stadtbahn, the Citynew tram system, revolutionise the urban and regional public transport system as this Karlsruhe tram is running on the urban light rail system and on the heavy rail tracks of the German Railways. The Karlsruhe model of a dual-mode railway system is an outstanding example of best practice in urban development for the following reasons:
- continuous extension of an environmentally compatible transport system from
the urban area to the region; - introduction of innovative technology;
- dissemination of know-how;
- facilitation of commuter movement between railway and tramway by through
connection; - revitalisation of urban life in the city centre by serving pedestrian
precincts.
Concept and aims
Transferability is the key to the creation of an effective public transport system that can serve the urban area as well as the conurbation as a whole. The linking of different modes is essential in the public transport sector in order to attract new passengers by offering travelling standards that can compete with the car. In Karlsruhe the peripheral location of the railway station initially required that a large number of commuters have to change from the railway to the tramway connection. This has two major disadvantages. Firstly, the trips become lengthy and, secondly, the passengers have to pay an extra ticket due to non-integrated fares. It is obvious that the philosophy of the Karlsruhe public transport system started with the target of establishing intermodality between
tramway and railway.
The concept of track-sharing between light rail and heavy rail vehicles had been investigated in an initial study by the Federal German Ministry for Research in 1984/85. The results triggered off the development of the so-called Karlsruhe Model. Three fundamental preconditions characterise the new approach:
- The transport system has to use vehicles which can use the light rail tracks
of the city area as well as the heavy rail tracks of the German Rail (Deutsche
Bundesbahn AG) on the regional level. - The different railway networks have to be connected;
- The new network has to incorporate the building of new stops along the
existing heavy railway lines in order to cut the travelling time.
The origins of the Karlsruhe model of a dual-mode transport system can be traced back to the 1950s. In 1957 the metre gauge Albtalbahn merged with the city tramway. The Albtalbahn is running south from its own station near the German Rail main station to the spa of Bad Herrenalb and Ittersbach in the Black Forest. At the time the railway was converted to a standard gauge and could be
operated by city trams providing a through service to the city centre. The experience was exploited again in the period of 1979 to 1989 when the Albtalbahn
service was progressively extended to the north of Karlsruhe by using the German Rail branch line. With the new connection to Neureut the basic innovation has been introduced. On the new line the railway leaves the separate railway line at special points and runs through village streets.
This development laid the foundation for a new concept of far-reaching operations on a mixed light rail and heavy rail network. So far it had been possible to install tramway overhead electrification at 750 V DC on the shared track sections but extensions should need to operate with the 15 KV AC electrification of DB lines. Experiments were undertaken with prototype battery and dual system tram. The dual system was found more efficient as the equipment allows voltage change with the tram in motion. The dual system vehicle type is supplied by the Duewag rail vehicle company which is part of the Siemens rail vehicle group. An important factor of the new type of vehicle is that it uses the safety standards of ordinary heavy rail vehicles (low passive safety) and, thus, allows travel at higher speeds in the region.
Implementation
The area served by the integrated transport system has 1,200,000 inhabitants, including 270,000 from the Greater Karlsruhe area. Most of the served suburbs have between 25,000 and 30,000 inhabitants.
The practice of intermodality started in 1992 when the Karlsruhe Model, the so-called Stadtbahn (the city tram system), started its service between Karlsruhe and Bretten (30.2 km). This was the first route which is run on the heavy rail tracks (21 km) and which also includes a twin ack section of 2.8 km due to the busy schedule on the German Rail line. This service has provided some
significant changes:
- shorter timetable intervals (every hour during off-peak hours and every 30
minutes during peak hours) - more stops,
- single fare structure,
- integration of the local bus network (at Bretten),
- provision of park and ride facilities for bicycles and cars.
In the meantime the Stadtbahn is running on its own network of approximately 400 km. In 1996 the total network of the new corporate structure serves approximately 600 km as some of the routes are rented from the German Rail. The service has been continuously extended in all directions. Since 1994 the region on the other side of the river Rhine is served to the City of Worth in the Land
of Rhineland Palatinate. To the north the Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe und Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft (VBK/AVG) has added the line to Eppingen to its corporate network as they bought the line from German Rail. In the south the famous spa of Baden-Baden can be reached by Stadtbahn since May 1994. However, the link to the Baden-Baden centre still has to be completed as the once
existing railway network had been removed. The northern part of the Black Forest has also become part of the co-operative structure of Karlsruhe in June 1996.
However, the route to Baden-Baden and to Forbach in the Black Forest are both rented from the German Rail. In contrast the VBK/AVGown track to Eppingen will be extended to the City of Heilbronn within the next two years.
Results and Impacts
The first dual-mode line between Karlsruhe and Bretten proved to be highly successful. Since the opening in September 1992, there has been a 479% increase in passengers. 40% of the customers have previously used their private car. The number of passenger has also gone up at weekends. The number of public transport passengers before the opening of the Stadtbahn was 533,660 in total (488,400 on workdays, 39,000 on Saturdays, and 6,200 on Sundays) where
as the figures after six months of operation of the Stadtbahn have increased to a total of 2,554,976 (2,064,378 on workdays, 263,120 on Saturdays, and 227,478 on Sundays). The percentage increase is 423% on workdays, 675% on Saturdays, and 3,660% on Sundays!
32% of the passengers used monthy environmental tickets, 21% use city or regional cards, 20% use apprentice or student tickets, 12% use tickets of the German Rail, 6% use four-trips tickets, 4% use single tickets and the remaining 5% have some other special ticket. Since the setting up of a co-operative structure for the travelling area in 1994 the former German Rail tickets are sold by the VBK/AKB. Surveys into the purpose of travelling with the Stadtbahn showed that 38% of the passengers travel to work, 23% are on their way to training, 15% of the travel share is during leisure time, 12% of the travel is for shopping, and the remaining 12% are related to various reasons.
The success of the Stadtbahn is mainly due to the shorter travelling intervals, the increase in number of stops and the higher comfort of the light rail. Thanks to faster acceleration and braking the VBK/AKB only requires three light rail vehicles for a comparable service previously operated by the German Rail with four diesel trains. The ecological benefit is an extra bonus. The difference in energy costs is about 18,000 DM per year / per train.
In 1994 the total number of passenger of the Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe und Albtal-Verkehrs- Gesellschaft amounted 93.9 million.
The Karlsruhe Model can be regarded as an optimal solution of a public transport system that should serve medium-sized cities and regions with a population of 200,000 to 500,000. At times of financial pressure the revitalisation of existing and under-used tracks is preferable to the construction of new and often parallel lines. In this context the Karlsruhe experience is a valuable asset in order to generate transferability of a successful system. Currently, the Verkehrs-Consult Karlsruhe GmbH (VCK), the consultancy subsidiary of the VBK/AKB, is helping to build several follow-up
projects:
- The City of SaarbrA?cken (190,000 inhabitants in the city and 280,000 in the
region) is the most advanced scheme. The implementation started in 1995, and the
operation of the first route will start in 1997. The project includes 15 km of
newly constructed inner city tracks and the total investment is 540 million DM. - In Heilbronn (122,000 inhabitants in the city and 415,000 in the region)
there will be only 9 km of new tracks but the light rail system will gain access
to approximately 220 km of regional heavy rail tracks. As the city is only 80 km
from Karlsruhe the plan is to connect both networks in order to set up a direct
connection from Karlsruhe to Heilbronn via Bretten by 1998. - The City of Aachen (280,000 inhabitants in the city and 630,000 in the
region) decided in July 1995 to build a system which is re-using the tracks that
had been closed in the 1970s. Parallel planning incorporates a linkage with the
lines to Herzogenrath (MAi??nchengladbach) and Stolberg (KAi??ln-DA?ren) as well as a
line across the border to the Dutch city of Heerlen. The electrification in the
City of Aachen will be 1500 V DC which is the Dutch voltage standard. Priority
is given to the connection to the DA?ren area as the upgrading of this network is
making fast progress. In 1995 the investment for the modernisation and
standardisation of access points, the building of additional stops, and the
purchase of 16 new rail vehicles totalled approximately 53 million DM. - The City of Kassel (195,000 inhabitants in the city and 550,000 in the
region) has started to operate a 3.5 km light rail track in the district of
Baunatal which is also using the heavy rail track of the regional rail, the
Kassel-Naumburger Eisenbahn. In Kassel a special solution is the use of
four-rail tracks at stops to allow low-floor platforms outside heavy rail
clearances. - The City of Chemnitz (270,000 inhabitants and 600,000 in the region) will
also use low-floor light rail vehicles with a power-pack for use on five
non-electrified regional German Rail lines. The power pack system is a test case
which could become a model for cities with a non- electrified regional rail
network.
Other German cities like Dresden, Kiel, Ulm, OsnabrA?ck, Paderborn, and Rostock are currently investigating the possibilities of an adoption of the Karlsruhe Model. In most cases these cities already had a light rail system which had been abandoned in the 1960s or 1970s.
In addition, the Karlsruhe Model has also had some impact in other European cities. In Austria the cities of Graz and St. PAi??lten are in the process of assessment with the Austria Rail (Ai??BB). Feasibility studies should be completed in 1996. In Great Britain there is growing interest. Nottingham, Karlsruhetwin town, has completed the first planning phase of a new track-sharing system, the
so- called Robin Hood line. Newcastle upon Tyne, the towns in the Medway valley in Kent, and Cardiff are further candidates for a system. The introduction depends on a change in financing on the local level. In Great Britain private funding of public transport is the normal case whereas in Germany the financing is via Land and municipality funding. Currently, the thinking is mainly directed
towards the possible use of existing infrastructure. In France the Karlsruhe Model has been discussed for the region of Ile de France (8,120,000 inhabitants) and the cities of Marseille and Valenciennes. In the Netherlands studies are being carried out in the Rijn and Bolenstreek region which includes the cities of Alphen aan Rjin, Gouda, Leiden, and Nordwijk. Similar planning has been
initiated in Maastricht, Heerelen, and Kerkade. The City and Region of Luxembourg is also interested and the City of Ljubljana in Slovenia (260,000 inhabitants in the city and 360,000 in the region) is the first East European municipality which has commissioned a feasibility study for 1995/96.
Actors and Structures
The co-operative structure of Karlsruhepublic transport (Verkehrsverbund) was
founded in 1994 by five public transport companies which operate different
networks. The Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe und Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft
(VBK/AVG) are the main operators. The company has a total staff of 1,400 (722
drivers).
Finance
The total investment in the basic infrastructure and the first generation of
vehicles amounted to 80 million DM. The new route to Bretten alone cost some 45
million DM in 1989 (excluding the ten dual-voltage vehicles). Other technical
infrastructure investment is directed to the building of connection points, the
building of depots, and the purchase of new rolling stock. The price of a dual-
voltage light rail vehicle of the first generation was 4.5 million DM. 15% of
the costs are taken by the dual-voltage equipment. The second generation of
vehicles is expected to be less expensive.
Due to the German financing method of co-funding
(Gemeinde-Verkehrs-Finanzierungsgesetz) the financing of vehicles is split
between the national government (50%), the City of Karlsruhe (25%) and the
municipalities and districts (Landkreise) in the region cover the remaining
quarter.
The investment costs for infrastructure (e.g. electrification, twin tracks,
park & ride facilities) are shared between the national government (60%),
regional government of the Land of Baden- WA?rttemberg (20 to 25%), and the local
communities (10 to 15%).
It is interesting that Karlsruhe, like other cities with a well patronised
public transport system, has one of the highest percentage of costs covered.
Revenue from fares covers 66% of the costs in the area of Karlsruhe and 85% of
the costs within the region.
In June 1996 the new zone network has been introduced. Prices for a monthly
environmental ticket are 54 DM (two zones), 72.50 DM (three zones), 90.50 DM
(four zones), 109 DM (five zones), 127.50 DM (six zones), and 165 DM for the
network as a whole. Special prices for apprentices are 45 DM for the Karlsruhe
or Baden-Baden area, 55 DM for three zones, or 85 DM for the complete network.
Students also have special tariffs as the term tickets for five months cost 180
DM inside Karlsruhe, 220 DM for three zones, or 340 DM for the complete network.
A single ticket costs 2 DM (one zone), 3 DM (two zones), 4 DM (three zones), 5
DM (four zones), 6 DM (five zones), 7 DM (six zones), or 8 DM (network as a
whole). Special offers are a city card or the three-zones ticket for 8 DM each
or the regional card for the complete network. These ticket are valid for two
persons and 24 hours. Other services include the so-called combination tickets
for special events (e.g. fairs and exhibitions, concerts and music festivals,
sport events in Karlsruhe or a special 150 km one-day trip to the Bundesliga
football game in Freiburg) and the school childrens ticket for the six-weeks
summer holiday (30 DM). Company tickets are also available with a 5% reduction
for over 50 cards or 10% reduction for over 300 cards. In 1994 5,000 company
tickets have been sold and another 4,000 company tickets for five big employers
have special price arrangements. All tickets are valid on the Stadtbahn, the
light rail transit, and the buses.
Evaluation and Statements
At the time of the opening of the Stadtbahn between Karlsruhe and Bretten in
September the VBK/AKB commissioned an evaluation study on the change in mobility
pattern. The researchers selected the districts of GrAi??tzingen (9,500
inhabitants) and JAi??hlingen (4,500 inhabitants) as case studies. The two surveys
have been completed as a pre-survey in April 1992 before the service went into
operation and a second round questionnaire a year later. Approximately 2,000
people participated by filling out of the questionnaires or by giving
interactive interviews.
The results underline that the new Stadtbahn has made an impact:
- mobility as a whole remained on the same level;
- use of the Stadtbahn led to an increase of the total public transport from
20% to 25% in GrAi??tzingen; - use of the Stadtbahn led to an increase of the total public transport to 75%
in JAi??hlingen; - change from private car to the Stadtbahn does not result in a secondary use
of the car by other members of the household; - total increase of trips by Stadtbahn is due to an increase in first-time
travellers; - there are still potentials of increase which can be scooped out by soft
policies like information campaign and special events.
Source of Information
Drechsler, Georg 1987: Beispiel Karlsruhe: Aufbau des Strassenbahn- /
Stadtbahnnetzes in der Stadt und Region Karlsruhe, in: Reinhardt KAi??stlin /
Hellmut Wollmann, (Hg.), Die Renaissance der Strassenbahn, S. 297-334
Ludwig, Dieter / Emmerich, Horst / in der Beek, Martin, 1994: Erfahrungen mit
der ersten Stadtbahn auf Bundesgleisen. Ein Jahr Gemeinschaftsbetrieb Karlsruhe
Bretten, in: Der Nahverkehr, Nr. 1-2, S. 42-50
Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe und Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft mbh 1994:
Potentiale fA?r den Ai??ffentlichen Personennahverkehr, Karlsruhe
Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe und Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft mbh 1995: report
Karlsruhe
Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe und Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft mbh 1995:
Stadtbahn Karlsruhe- Bretten. Untersuchung A?ber das MobilitAi??tsverhalten,
Karlsruhe
Ludwig, Dieter / KA?hn, Axel 1995: Das Karlsruher Modell und seine
A?bertragbarkeit, in: Der Nahverkehr, 13. Jg., Nr. 10, S. 12-22
Griffin, Trevor 1995: Trams on heavy rail tracks: The Karlsruhe experience,
in: European Railway Review, November, pp. 55-57
Ludwig, Dieter 1995: Der regionale Schienenverkehr – am Beispiel des
Karlsruher Modells, in: Hartmut H. Topp, (Hg.), Verkehr aktuell: Renaissance der
StraAYenbahn, Kaiserslautern, S. 61-67
Contact:
| Name | : | Ludwig |
| Firstname | : | Dieter |
| Telefon | : | ++49 / 721 / 599 59 02 |
| Telefax | : | ++49 / 721 / 599 59 09 |
| Address | : | Managing Director |
| Verkehrsbetriebe Karlsruhe | ||
| Albtal-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft | ||
| mbH | ||
| Tullastr. 71 | ||
| D – 76131 Karlsruhe | ||
Cities:
Karlsruhe :
The City of Karlsruhe has a population of approximately 270,000 and the
region accounts for some 1.2 million people. The region covers an area of 2,700
square kilometres. The City of Karlsruhe is a centre of administrative
authorities as well as the Federal Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). Karlsruhe
has a Technical University and a nuclear test laboratory
(Kernforschungszentrum). The City is near the River Rhine and it has an
important port in the Karlsruhe-Rheinhafen district.
Population:
270000
Project was added at 27.06.96
Project was changed at
27.06.96
Extract from the database ‘SURBAN – Good
practice in urban development’, sponsored by: European Commission, DG XI and
Land of Berlin
European Academy of the Urban Environment Ai?? Bismarckallee
46-48 Ai?? D-14193 Berlin Ai?? fax: ++49-30-8959 9919 Ai?? e-mail:
husch@eaue.de
The 1986 LRTA Study: Bus ai??i?? LRT ai??i?? Metro Comparison – Reprinted
I thought I would reprint this post from May 20, 2010 as it may clear up some major misconceptions about LRT capacity.
There is an ongoing debate today that LRTAi??can only carry a limited number of riders and that the magic number for a subway is about 100,000 riders a day on a transit line. This may have been true in the 1970’s, but not the 21st century, where modern multi-articulated low-floor light rail vehicles (tram is much easier to say!) are able to easily carry three or four times this number, thus negating the need for expensive subway construction, except on the most heavily used routes. If the LRTA found that modern LRT could carry over 20,000 pphpd in 1986, it is no stretch of the imagination that LRT can carry 30,000 to 40,000 pphpd if demands warrant, such as Karlsruhe Germany, where 45 second headways with coupled sets of trams are doing just that.
The 1986 LRTA Study: Bus ai??i?? LRT ai??i?? Metro Comparison
Posted by zweisystem on Thursday, May 20, 2010 Ai??
The following is from the Light Rail Transit Associations hand book Light Rail Transit Today, comparing the operating parameters of bus, light rail, and metro on an unimpeded 8 kilometre route with stations every 450 metres. Using real data based on acceleration, deceleration, dwell time, etc., the study gives real time information for the three transit modes.
Please note: This study has been abridged for brevity and clarity.
The study assumes a vehicle capacity for a bus at 90 persons; LRT 240 persons (running in multiple unit doubles capacity); and metro at 1000 persons.
The time to over the 8 km. route would be:
- Bus ai??i?? 22.4 minutes
- LRT ai??i?? 18 .6 minutes
- Metro ai??i?? 16.3 minutes
The Round trip time, including a 5 minute layover:
- Bus ai??i?? 54.8 minutes
- LRT – 47.2 minutes
- Metro ai??i?? 42.6 minutes
The comparative frequency of service in relation to passenger flows would be:
At 2,000 persons per hour per direction:
- Bus ai??i?? 2.7 minute headways, with 22 trips.
- LRT – 7.5Ai?? minute headways, with 8 trips.
- LRT (2-car) ai??i?? 15 minute headways, with 4 trips.
- Metro ai??i?? 30 minute headways, with 2 trips.
At 6,000 pphpd:
- 1 Bus ai??i?? 0.9 minute headways, with 67 trips.
- LRT ai??i?? 2.4 minute headways, with 17 trips.
- LRT (2-car) ai??i?? 4.8 minutes, with 13 trips.
- Metro ai??i?? 10 minute headways with 6 trips.
At 10,000 pphpd:
- Bus ai??i?? 30 second headways, with 111 trips (traffic flows above 10,000 pphpd impractical).
- LRT ai??i?? 1.4 minute headways, with 42 trips.
- LRT (2 car) ai??i?? 2.8 minute headways, 21 trips
- Metro ai??i?? 6 minute headways, 10 trips.
At 20,000 pphpd:
- LRT ai??i?? 0.7 minute headways, with 83 trips.
- LRT (2 car) ai??i?? 1.4 minute headways, with 42 trips.
- Metro ai??i?? 3 minute headways, with 20 trips.
Comparative Staff Requirements on vehicles in relation to passenger flows. Station staff in brackets ().
At 2,000 pphpd:
- Bus ai??i?? 21 (0)
- LRT ai??i?? 7 (0)
- LRT (2 car) ai??i?? 4 (0)
- metro ai??i?? 2 (up to 38)
At 6,000 pphpd:
- Bus ai??i?? 61 (0)
- LRT ai??i?? 20 (0)
- LRT (2 car) ai??i?? 10 (0)
- Metro ai??i?? 5 (up to 38)
At 10,000 pphpd:
- Bus ai??i?? 110 (traffic flows above 10,000 pphpd impractical) (0).
- LRT ai??i?? 34 (0)
- LRT (2 car) ai??i?? 17 (0)
- Metro ai??i?? 8 (up to 38)
At 20,000 pphpd:
- LRT ai??i?? 69 (0)
- LRT (2 car) ai??i?? 34 (0)
- Metro ai??i?? 15 (up to 38)
Though the study is 24 years old and completed before the advent of low-floor trams (which decreased dwell times), it still give a good comparison of employee needs for each mode. Metroai??i??s, especially automatic metro systems do require a much larger maintenance staff than for bus or LRT and when one factors in the added high cost of subway or viaduct construction plus higher operational costs, Metro only become a viable proposition when traffic flows exceed 16,000 pphpd to 20,000 pphpd on a transit route.
Claims from other blogs that automatic metros can operate more frequent headways than LRT are untrue; automatic metros can not operate at higher frequencies than LRT, but if Metro is operated at close headways in times of low traffic flows, they do so with a penalty in higher maintenance costs and operational costs.
Taking into account the almost universal use of low-floor trams, operating in reserved rights-of-ways, combined with advances in safe signal priority at intersections; given an identical transit route with equal stations or stops, LRT operating on the surface (on-street) would be just as fast as a metro operating either elevated or in a subway at a fraction of the overall cost grade separated RoWai??i??s. Also, automatic (driverless) metros, though not having drivers have attendants and station staff, which negate any claim that automatic metros use less staff than light rail.
The LRTA study does give good evidence why LRT has made light-metros such a as SkyTrain and VAL obsolete.
http://www.railforthevalley.com/latest-news/zweisystem/the-1986-lrta-study-bus-lrt-metro-comparison/

















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