How other countries see light rail and appraise light rail investments? From the Light Rail Transit Association

Article from the March 1999 edition of Tramways & Urban Transit

As anyone involved in a British light rail scheme knows, the appraisal system is rigorous and, many feel, fatally flawed, oriented as it is to short term and financial criteria rather than a properly broad social cost-benefit analysis. It is now also heavily influenced to favouring projects which are attractive to private companies under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and public-private partnership requirements which though they may well be the Nineties version of the EmperorA?ai??i??ai???s new clothes, are certainly the the flavour of the decade in the U.K.

Tramways & Urban Transit is pleased to publish a summary of the report prepared by Prof. Carmen Hass-Klau and Dr. Graham Crampton of consultants ETP (Environmental and Transport Planning). This article is a for a DETR Project on the examination of the appraisal methods and financial support mechanism used for light rail outside Britain. The full report studied the appraisal methods in France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the United States.

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Advantages and disadvantages of Light Rail

Among the aspects discussed were the advantages and disadvantages of light rail in comparison to other public transport modes. The main disadvantage of light rail is that investment in light rail is more expensive than running buses along the same corridor because for buses the basic infrastructure – the roads – are already there. However there is quite a wide variation in the cost per km of light rail.

One of the advantages of light rail versus buses is that a typical light rail vehicle carries between 144-188 people (units with two or three carriages could carry 288-465 people) whereas an articulated or double-decker bus is only able to carry 80-160 people.

On the Continent, public transport experts believe that modern trams are perceived by the public to be a superior transport mode to buses. This appears to be in contrast to Britain where the run down trams of the 1950s and 60s left negative memories in the minds of many people.

Buses may have to use bus bays and make other sharp manoeuvres, as well as suffering engine vibration and road surface unevenness. Modern trams in contrast normally have a smoother and more comfortable ride.

As many trams have their own right of way, often established a long time ago, they are more protected from congestion and are normally faster than buses. Furthermore the same tram corridor can often also be used by buses. Even if bus lanes are available buses have problems with parked cars, which is not the case for trams as tram corridors are mostly in the middle of the carriageway. However at junctions delays can occur if cars are allowed to use the same right of way as trams.

Normally trams blend in better with the built environment of a city centre and other historic parts of the urban area. In practice the construction of a tram line can be used to redesign large parts of the city centre into a more pedestrian-friendly environment. With modern on-street running, there is no separation between the tram track and the rest of the carriageway. Pedestrians and trams mingle especially well together. Streets with trams can be designed much more attractively than streets with bus lanes. In Britain, the ugliness of overhead cabling is often an issue, whereas on the Continent, firstly people are used to it, and secondly it is normally designed to a high standard. Some tram routes have trees on both sides and/or lawn track beds. In the city centre similar pavement as in pedestrianised streets is used. Increasingly the traditional design of having tram beds looking like railway tracks has been abandoned.

Whereas underground rail is not visible to the public, surface trams have a strong marketing effect in favour of public transport. Zurich or Strasbourg trams have become a tourist attraction and are featured on public relations material for the cities, like the red buses in London. In contrast, elevated systems such as the VAL or the Docklands Light Rail are difficult to integrate into the urban environment; they are mostly too intrusive.

Environmentally, trams are much cleaner than normal diesel buses but increasingly local authorities are switching to earth-gas buses which have very low emission values. Trams are quieter than buses but this is not always the case.

Trams can be attractively designed, representing a futuristic image of a public transport mode as in Strasbourg. Buses have so far not been able to change their design significantly.

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Conditions for successful running of light rail

The success of light rail is dependent on many factors, of which population and the employment density of the light rail corridors and the frequency of service seem to be the most important aspects. Trams which run at low headways (high frequency) can gain a significant number of passengers. The higher the frequency of a public transport mode the more passengers will use it (or the more additional passengers can be won). However, the operators have to weigh the higher operational cost against the advantages of a high frequency. In many cases there is not even a choice, because the capacity to increase the frequency is not available.

In the past transport experts believed that the speed of the public transport mode was one of the major features to attract passengers. Again, there is little established evidence of this. Today we know from surveys carried out that speed itself is not the crucial factor. Passengers prefer ‘seamless’ journeys or short interchange times with immediate connections.

Even so, speed is still important. Many light rail lines in Europe have priority at traffic lights which can increase average speed and therefore give trams an advantage over cars.

We know little about how other factors like design and the comfort of the vehicle generate passenger growth.

The success of light rail is also dependent on the administrative and operational structure of which light rail forms a part. Competition between public transport modes is not particularly helpful in creating a successful public transport infrastructure.

An overview of the operational structure of public transport in some of the European countries shows great differences in the ways in which public transport is organised, with the Netherlands having the most centralised approach and Britain having in most cases no transport authority at all.

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The financing of light rail

Light rail investments have been funded by German governments since 1971. A specified percentage from national petrol tax revenues is awarded to urban public transport systems.

In previous years, up to 60% of the cost of urban rail investment has been paid by the Federal Government, up to 25% by the LA?Ai??nder and the rest by the local authorities. Since 1992, the Federal Government maximum funding percentage has been increased to 75% in West Germany and up to 90% in East Germany.

With the constitutional changes which introduced a new regional rail transport law in 1994 an amendment permits the LA?Ai??nder to receive even more petrol tax for those parts of the railway network which are defined as `regional’ rail transport (in practice the local rail network). This will also affect those light rail modes which run on traditional rail track like the ones in SaarbrA?A?cken and Karlsruhe.

Since 1992 all French transport regions with more than 20,000 inhabitants have the right to demand a public transport tax which can only be used for public transport investment but also helps to pay operational costs. Every employer with more than 9 employees who is located inside a transport authority may be asked to pay between 0.55 – 1.05% of its total payroll as Versement Transport to the authority.

The local transport authority can decide, following agreement within the Communes, how they want to spend the money, as long it is on public transport. However the upper limit can be increased if new public transport investment is built, and since 1990 this upper limit in provincial France can be 1.75%. In the Paris region the variation lies between 1.3 – 2.2%. However, there the employers also pay half of the cost of travel cards for their employees. This is in addition to the Versement Transport.

At the beginning of 1995, of 190 transport regions about 90%, which had the right to collect this tax, actually used this opportunity.

The Federal Government of the United States spent about $18.5 billion over 1980-95 on discretionary grants for new rail starts and extensions, contributing between 50-80% of the construction costs for these projects. This funding made it easier to initiate projects, and often made up funding shortfalls when projects ran over budget. Critics have argued that the whole capital grants program is discredited and the Federal Government has no business in funding new rail public transit systems at the local level at all. Others conclude that the main focus of any reform of the process should be to remove discretionary control of the funding, which has proved to be an easy target of misuse. The 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) launched the first major re-structuring of the US’s surface transportation programs since Interstate Highway construction began in 1956. It embodied a Surface Transportation Fund, which includes roads amounting to $120.8 billion over 6 years. Within this was included a Mass Transportation Fund amounting to a $31.5 billion mass transit program over 6 years, with its 80% Federal share for capital programs and 50% for operating expenses.

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The evaluation of light rail investments

When studying the financing and evaluation methods in the various European countries and the United States, the political dimension of any method to justify light rail investment becomes apparent. Generally speaking, investing in light rail is seen by most politicians as being a good cause.

In Germany a traditional cost benefit analysis is used to justify the funds which come from the Federal Government. (This method is also applied in Switzerland, Austria and parts of Italy). One of the most important factors is the time savings to the public transport customer if a new line is installed. It is normally assumed that with each 1% time saving, additional demand of 0.75% for light rail service is created. It is further assumed that the transfer is made by the car users and not from any other mode. In reality, there is little evidence on how many people actually switch from car to public transport. Neither the public transport operators nor the Federal Government seemed to be interested in this question.

Although comprehensive traffic studies are normally carried out by the French transport authorities, no cost benefit analysis is demanded by the Central State. The British reader may find this surprising but this was also the case in Germany until 1982. Most major investment decisions regarding German light rail and underground were all made before this date. One of the reasons why the French may not require such an evaluation method may lie in the relatively low financial participation of the State in providing funds for light rail (only a maximum of 30% is funded). Funding of the rolling stock is not included in France but is in Germany. But the Versement Transport provides a significant proportion of the funds needed for light rail investment.

A very different approach is carried out in the Netherlands. Here the integration between land use and transport appears to be a very important factor. A traditional cost benefit analysis is combined with a multi-criteria approach, consisting of 20 different criteria. They include hard and soft measures and each of them is valued and weighted. This creates a balance sheet where the cost side is financial and the benefit side non-monetary. The results are provided as a benefit-cost ratio. Yet, independent of these calculations a high quality factor seemed to be decisive.

The Swedish studies allowed relatively little insight into their procedures but in the past a more traditional cost benefit analysis has been applied. This approach is questioned and new methods are being discussed that are similar to the Dutch appraisals.

The Federal U.S. Government does not seem to work with a cost benefit analysis as a decision device for the funding of light rail projects. But this does not imply that for an individual State that wants to obtain funding, cost benefit analysis is not carried out. In the past the decision making was highly political and more based on an equal distribution between the States than on a strict evaluation method. This may have been a deliberate choice because if such a method had been used the eastern States with their higher population and employment densities might have got most of the funding.

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Complementary measures

Apart from the operational and technical aspects and the location of the lines the role of complementary measures may be decisive for the degree of success of light rail investment. Whether a system is characterised as successful or not depends on the indicators used. If the success of light rail is measured in passenger growth since the start of operations then most newly built light rail lines are thriving. There are only very few exceptions known among experts, though unfortunately Sheffield’s tram is one of them. However, if success is measured by the extent to which car drivers are lured out of their cars, then most light rail lines are not as successful as they could be, possibly because there is a lack of policy measures that could be used to strengthen the role of light rail.

Complementary measures are defined as all those measures which are not connected directly to the operation of light rail for instance restraint policies (pedestrianisation, closure of town centres to through traffic), ticketing and marketing. Complementary measures can be divided into hard and soft. Measures which support light rail in order to ‘force’ a transfer from car to tram are called hard measures. Some authors prefer the word ‘stick’ instead of hard. In contrast, all those methods which primarily try to persuade car drivers to use light rail are soft measures such as marketing or comfort improvements. Ideally a combination of soft and hard measures should be used. Hard measures have to be sold well politically, otherwise people may not be willing to accept them.

The full report can be purchased from ETP, 9 South Road, Brighton BN1 6SB, Tel. 1273-540955, Fax 1273-508791, E-mail: etp@mistral.co.uk

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Mini-biographies:

Prof. Carmen Hass-Klau has a Professorship in Engineering and European Public Transport at the University of Wuppertal, Germany, and has also set up and directed Environmental and Transport Planning, a consultancy based in Brighton, England. She was also a member of the DETR Expert Committee advising on the preparation of the 1998 Transport White Paper.

Dr. Graham Crampton is a Lecturer in Economics at Reading University, England, and works for Environmental and Transport Planning on transport policy research projects.

NEWS FLASH – Province launches review of BC Ferries and TransLink – From News 1130

Of course the province and Transportation Minister, Shirley Bond will not look at the real reasons of Translink’s financial problems: building light-metro (RAV & SkyTrain) on routes that do not have the ridership to sustain them. It seems the newly announced combined GST/PST (now known as HST) and potential massive new TransLink taxes and auto levies has raised the publics ire. But, unless the province employs BC’s Auditor General or engage an accredited organization such asAi??Ai??the UK’sAi??Ai??National Audit Office or NAO to look at TransLink, the review will be nothing more than self serving bumf, justifying Gordon Campbell’s inept and extremely expensive transit initiatives forced upon Translink.

Review will be completed by September 30th

Connie Thiessen / Mike Hanafin VICTORIA (NEWS1130) | Tuesday, July 28th, 2009

VICTORIA (NEWS1130) – The provincial government is launching a reviewAi??Ai??of BC Ferries and TransLink, the publicly funded, independently regulated transportation authorities.Ai??Ai?? The Finance Ministry and Transportation Ministry say it is to ensure customers and taxpayers are receiving maximum value for services.

Finance Minister Colin Hansen says that during challenging economic times, they must ensure that services are provided in a way that is financially sustainable and provides maximum value for people in B.C.Ai??Ai?? “Both BC Ferries and TransLink have been mandated to provide vital transportation services for millions of people, and we must ensure the governance arrangements are operating as efficiently as possible and the authorities are meeting their service objectives.”

The review was requested by transportation Minister Shirley Bond and are to be completed by September 30th.Ai??Ai?? The province says they’ll look at all aspects of the operations, from regulatory environment to
corporate structure to financial performance. A final report containing recommendations will be made public.

Bond says, “It has been six years since BC Ferries became a private operation, and two years since TransLink’s governance model was revised. It is important we ensure both organizations are
meeting their financial and service expectations that came about with the new models.”

The review will specifically look at:
* The division of responsibility between the Province and the respective
entities.
* The size, composition, appointment process and compensation for the
board of directors.
* The regulatory environment, including responsibilities, authorities and
powers of the Ferry Commission as well as the regional transportation
commissioner and Mayors’ Council on Regional Transportation.
* The operating costs and service delivery models, including the
company’s efforts to reduce costs using Alternate Service Providers, and
actions to increase productivity and quality customer service.
* A review of options available to the Province that are consistent with
the entities’ independence under generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) and which would ensure that existing and future independent,
regulated, publicly created authorities such as BC Ferries and the South
Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority are effectively
structured to:
o Protect ratepayers’ interests with minimal administration costs,
including hard caps on compensation levels for senior executives and
board members.
o Protect clearly mandated customer service levels.
o Improve transparency and public accountability for decisions and
performance levels.

What is guided bus? Is it B-Line BRT?

Guided buses are buses steered for part or all of their route by external means, usually on a dedicated rights-of-ways, thoughAi??Ai??not to be confused with a busway. This track, which often parallels existing roads or railways, excludes all other traffic, permitting theAi??Ai??operation of reliable schedules on heavily used corridors even duringAi??Ai??peak hours.

Guidance systems can be either physical, such as kerbs;

or remote, such as optical or radio guidance;

or by rail, making the guided bus a hybrid rail/monorail vehicle, retaining the ability to operate independently of the ‘rail’.

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On kerb-guided buses (KGB) small guide wheels are attached to the bus, and these engage vertical kerbs on either side of the track-way. The bus is steered in the normal way away from the guide-way. The start of the guide-way is funneled from a wide track to the normal width. The track-way allows for high-speed operation on a narrow guide-way.

Only a few examples currently exist, but more are proposed in various countries. The longest guided busway in the world is the O-Bahn Busway route in Adelaide, South Australia, which has been operating reasonably successfully since the mid 1980s.Ai??Ai?? Sadly, operating performance of the Adelaide KGB has not met expectations and no more KGB is to be built and modern LRT is now the preferred choice to provide urban transit to the city.

As reported earlier…….

http://railforthevalley.wordpress.com/2009/07/12/bus-raid-transit-a-transit-panacea-or-a-money-pit/

…….. Ai??Ai??the wire guided Dutch Phileas guided bus has also had operating problems in Turkey and the ‘rail-guided’ guided busesAi??Ai??operating in Caen has had severe teething problems. The real problem for guided bus is that its installationAi??Ai??costs are only slightly less (about 20% less)Ai??Ai??than light rail, which has much more operating benefits. Due to higher construction costs and operational problems, guided bus has become a niche transit mode, which does not compete with light rail, but with more conventional trolley buses!

From the BBC – Wales Southwest: The Swansea and Mumbles Railway, the first public railway that ended as LRT!

A little history lesson today: The Swansea and Mumbles Railway, the first public railway which operated fromAi??Ai??1807 to 1960.Ai??Ai??Starting fromAi??Ai??horse drawnAi??Ai??converted rail carriages, the Swansea and Mumbles Railway ended up as a light rail/interurban line, using rather large double-deck electric trams.

 

Early Days of Mumbles Railway

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From a four-wheeled dandy attracting international visitors for a “novelty” ride, to scenes when its passengers narrowly escaped being bombed – the history of the railway is intriguing and varied.

Even today the Mumbles Railway is held in remarkable affection by local people as historian Carol Powell now recounts in a series of features about its history and development.

Ai??Ai??Steam trains and bank holiday daytrippers

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B.C. Rail, C.N. Rail & Gordon Campbell – Why it is important for ‘Rail for the Valley’ to understand the current situation.

The following item on David Berner’s blog……

http://thebernermonologues.blogspot.com/2009/07/really-big-smell.html

……is well worth a read, to understand the politics of TRIANGULATION, including Mr. Campbell, his family and the hierarchy of CN Rail.

It seems that the Premier regards ‘rail’ transit issues as a political plum, for his own amusement, phony environmental claims and multi billion dollar reelection metro construction. Rail for the Valley doesn’t want to get involved with “legal mattersAi??Ai??before the court”, but when CN Rail operates trains on part of the interurban route, one must worry that the Gordon Campbell Liberal government will forever drag its feet in allowing a Vancouver to Chilliwack service to operate.

One final question: Has the consulting firm, doing the Fraser Valley Rail Study, included diesel light rail? If not, then the study is not worth the paper its printed on.

TransLink mired in political standoff – Francis Bula, Globe and Mail

Ten years on, and TransLink remains stuck on the road to nowhere

Frances Bula

Vancouver

A?ai??i??Ai??Premier Gordon Campbell and Transportation Minister Kevin Falcon unveiled a $14-billion public transit plan to be completed by 2020 today. It is a key measure in the province’s greenhouse gas reduction plan, touching every region of the province.A?ai??i??A?

Those were the opening lines in a government news release distributed to reporters on Jan. 14, 2008, while the Premier stood amid charts and displays demonstrating the utopian future of transit in Metro Vancouver. With maps covered in a web of coloured transit lines, the plan included the Evergreen Line in the northeast sector, a 12-kilometre extension of the Millennium Line to the University of British Columbia, a six-kilometre extension of the Expo Line in Surrey, and herds of new clean-energy buses and SkyTrain cars.

That was then. Eighteen months later, the plan is mired in what has become a familiar standoff in British Columbia: the perpetual tussle between the province and a regional transportation agency.

In the latest chapter, TransLink says it can’t possibly pay for its part of the Premier’s ambitious plan without getting money from some new taps besides beleaguered transit riders, now paying as much as $5 for a single trip, and residential ratepayers, now paying an average of $235 a year for transportation.

The province, channelling its message through rookie Transportation Minister Shirley Bond, is insisting that the agency fulfill the promises the Premier made while balking at TransLink’s suggestions for new revenue sources. They include a vehicle levy of up to $200 a year, a share of the carbon-tax revenue, and road-pricing mechanisms such as tolls, distance charges and fees that would allow single drivers to use high-occupancy vehicle lanes.

What’s perplexing to almost everyone is why the province and TransLink, which is responsible for transit and roads in the Lower Mainland, have been locked in conflict almost from the day the agency was created by an NDP government in April of 1999. Today it’s the 10-year plan. A couple of years ago it was the province’s dissatisfaction over how TransLink handled approving the Canada Line, which led to a restructuring that took most decision-making power away from local politicians. And back when TransLink first got started, it was the vehicle levy that they parted ways over.

A?ai??i??Ai??The problem for TransLink is that while it is an innovative structure and it got the revenue tools, it never got the revenue streams,A?ai??i??A? says Pat Jacobsen, the former Ontario deputy transportation minister who was TransLink’s CEO for seven of its 10 years. A?ai??i??Ai??It’s the only authority I know of that has to fund 100 per cent of its bus capital, 50 to 70 per cent of its rapid-transit capital and all of its operating costs from local sources.A?ai??i??A?

The bill ends up being paid disproportionately by property taxes. According to a 2007 City of Edmonton study, transit costs account for 7.4 per cent of a Metro Vancouver resident’s tax bill, while just 4.5 per cent of the average Torontonian’s taxes go to fund that city’s system, which serves more than twice as many riders. The numbers are likely even farther apart now, since TransLink pushed through the maximum allowable property-tax increase last year.

That comes partly because provincial politicians of all stripes have been fearful of paying the price for introducing any new taxes.

During this year’s election campaign both the Liberals and the NDP refused to consider letting carbon-tax revenue go to TransLink.

A?ai??i??Ai??I get that you cannot ask a politician to go out and commit political suicide,A?ai??i??A? says former TransLink director Gordon Price, a passionate transit advocate. But with local mayors saying they are willing to take the heat for a vehicle levy, with the public saying it’s willing to pay more for transit, and with the need to do something to stop environmental degradation, Mr. Price says it’s time for the Premier to stand behind his plan.

But that leads to a second political dynamic at work A?ai??i??ai??? the fact that TransLink has always been a bit of an unloved child for the B.C. Liberals. They opposed its creation, and even though they essentially took it over two years ago by creating an appointed board, still don’t see the agency as truly theirs.

A?ai??i??Ai??I just don’t think Gordon Campbell ever wanted TransLink. And they’re always afraid of Vancouver getting too much,A?ai??i??A? says George Puil, a veteran former Vancouver city councillor and TransLink’s first chairman.

Mr. Puil has never been known as an NDP supporter or a green freak, but he can’t understand how the province thinks TransLink can come up with the $450-million a year A?ai??i??ai??? a 50-per-cent increase over its current budget A?ai??i??ai??? needed to fund the Premier’s dream plan if it isn’t given new revenue sources.

From the BBC – "Drivers ‘distrust’ road tax spend". Will regional mayors ‘here’ impose the auto levy?

And TransLink wants to add more taxes on cars. Local politicians take note.

A note added re comment, as the title states, this article comes from the BBC.

Motoring taxes have been handled so badly that drivers no longer trust what ministers say the charges pay for, an MPs’ report says.

Inconsistency over justification for green taxes “tarnished their image”, according to the transport committee.

Ministers should also abandon the link between unpopular congestion charge schemes and transport funding, it adds.

The government said billions had been spent on public transport and it was committed to improving travel options.

The cross-party committee concluded that road users remained “an important source of revenue” but needed to be treated “fairly and with openness”.

Voluntary road pricing schemes – such as allowing drivers to pay charges related to distance, time or congestion instead of car tax or fuel duty – could be an option, its members suggested.

They said drivers needed “clearer signals” about how their taxes were being spent to reduce congestion and pollution.

The report said: “Fuel duty has been presented, at different times, as a tool to reduce carbon emissions, a source of general revenue, and a means to fund transport investment.

“We are concerned that motorists are mistrustful of the government regarding taxes.”

Chairman Louise Ellman added: “The government handled a phased set of increases to Vehicle Excise Duty (car tax) so badly they tarnished the image of environmental taxes.”

Taxing drivers according to how much they use their cars remained the fairest method but the amount raised could be limited by the economic climate, she said.

Instead, the committee recommended the government develop other measures to address congestion.

‘Unacceptable’

The committee said proposed city-centre congestion charge plans had proved “unacceptable” in many areas.

Manchester and Edinburgh have rejected congestion schemes in recent years while plans to further expand the scheme in London were dropped last year.

Ms Ellman said distribution of money from the government’s Transport Innovation Fund should no longer be tied to such schemes.

But she believes individual drivers might be willing to pay road charges if they could offset them against road and fuel duties or get other incentives.

She said a scheme in Oregon, in the US, which linked charges to duty rebates and the offer of insurance and entertainment services, had proved successful.

Other suggestions the committee makes are for locally-funded transport improvements and tolls for foreign-registered lorries.

It also says car parking charges must be “proportional” and local authorities should not be charging excessive prices to pay for non-related services.

Although it said it had no evidence this was happening, the public was concerned about the issue.

Similarly, it says penalty fines must not be used as a “blatant” tool to raise money from motorists and councils must spend more of the revenue raised on creating more parking spaces and improving signs.

The Department of Transport said it had no plans to change the Transport Innovation Fund but stressed councils would still continue to receive funding if they did not pursue congestion schemes.

As well as increased investment in buses, trains and cycle routes, it said widening roads, extending hard shoulders and improving junctions would help tackle congestion.

“We are committed to implementing innovative and far-reaching measures to improve the transport options available,” it said.

RAC Foundation director Professor Stephen Glaister said drivers were given “no clear explanation” of what they got in return for around Ai??A?45bn paid in taxes each year.

AA president Edmund King added that the public had lost trust in all political parties on motoring issues.

Debunking the SkyTrain myth part 5. Thirty years of SkyTrain planning – the years that the Locusts hath eaten!

In the late 1970’s, after much study and with regional consensus, Greater Vancouver’s Regional Authority, the GVRD,Ai??Ai??was on the verge of approving three light rail lines; Vancouver to Whalley (via New Westminster); New Westminster to Lougheed Mall and Vancouver to Richmond. Costing $350 million to $460 million. It wasn’t to be. The then Social Credit provincial government forced the construction of the newly renamed Advanced Light Rail Transit (ALRT) System onto the GVRD and built a $850 million light-metro just to new Westminster.

A history lesson:

In the late 1970’s, the UTDC or Urban Transit Development Corporation, a Ontario crown corporation designed a new elevated light-metro called ICTS or Intermediate Capacity Transit System, for a public transit niche between the maximum ridership Toronto’s streetcars could carry and the ridership needed to justify a subway. The cost of ICTS was roughly half of a that of aAi??Ai??subway to build, though, according to the Toronto Transit Commission, “up to ten times more to install than light rail.”. Only two such systems were sold, Detroit (known locally as the mugger mover) and the Toronto, soon to be torn down, Scarborough Line.

Unfortunately for ICTS, it came after the Renaissance of modern LRT, which filled this niche and according to the TTC’s own studies, ICTS, despite the much higher costs, had about the same potential capacity of light rail!

To try to reinvent their proprietary light metro system and compete with light rail, the UTDC renamed ICTS’s to ALRT or Advanced Light Rail Transit in the late 1970’s. Then in a crass political deal with the then BC Social Credit Party, they agreed to purchase ALRT in exchangeAi??Ai??to obtain the then famous, Ontario Premier William Davis’s ‘Blue Machine’, which pioneered computer tracking of voters during elections, to desperately try to win the next BC provincial election.

The die was cast and the GVRD got SkyTrain “whether you like it or not.” Instead of originally planned LRT from Vancouver to Lougheed Mall, Whalley and Richmond, the region got SkyTrain only to New Westminster and as a bonus, the famed UTDC/BC TransitAi??Ai??‘SkyTrain speak’, which would even put George Orwell to shame.

The rest of the world came and saw SkyTrain at Expo 86, but the rest of the world built with LRT instead. No one else built with ALRT. The UTDC was sold to Lavalin which went bankrupt trying to sell the, again renamed ALM or Automated Light Metro, to Bangkok. Bombardier Inc. bought the shattered remains of Lavalin and ALM, redesigned the light-metro and renamed it ART or Advanced Light Metro.

In the mid 1990’s in other crass political deal, this timeAi??Ai??with Bombardier Inc., to get a (nowAi??Ai??abandoned) SkyTrain fabrication plant in Burnaby, the Glen Clark NDP government forced ART to be built on the Millennium Line. To date Bombardier as only soldAi??Ai??four ART systems, the Port Authority in New York, connecting the JFK airport to the subway system, Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, and Korea. It should be noted that ART was not allowed to compete against LRT forAi??Ai??all installations, strange as LRT has outsoldAi??Ai??ART by well overAi??Ai??70 to 1!

With SkyTrain came the ALRT/ART technocrats and bureaucrats who so perverted transit planning in the region, that we only plan for light-metro. After Vancouver had a well publicized temper tantrum, not wanting elevated SkyTrain, they got a much more expensive subway instead for the RAV/Canada Line. What Vancouver wants, Vancouver gets. As subway construction is about twice as much as elevated construction, RAVCo. and Intransit BC cut construction costs by building the somewhat cheaper cut-and-cover method, with the cost savings coming from not paying compensation to affected businesses.

The SkyTrain or light-metro trap

Regional planners have fallen into the SkyTrain trap, where all transit planning in the region is based on light-metroAi??Ai??including theAi??Ai??predicted ‘flip-flop’ on the Evergreen Line, whereAi??Ai??proposed LRT was planned as light-metroAi??Ai??andAi??Ai??then dutifully replaced withAi??Ai??SkyTrain. The SkyTrain trap is when one builds aAi??Ai??light-metro and then hires none but shills, who only plan for SkyTrain, which is a light-metro. Building much cheaper LRT would only show how inept previous transit planning has been and career bureaucrats and politicians, ever mindful of their reputations until the pension cheques roll in, will do everything in their power to prevent honest transit planning in the region.

SkyTrain trap:

Build small but very expensive proprietaryAi??Ai??light-metro line >> densify metro route by rezoning industrial & commercial lands to residentialAi??Ai??along the metro line to increase ridership >> increasing land values >> exodus of families and businesses, searching for cheaper homes and industrial landAi??Ai??>> new highways and bridgesAi??Ai??to cater to increasing suburban populationAi??Ai??>> increasedAi??Ai??traffic congestion as it too expensive to build with light metro in lightly populated areas >> build another light-metro line, thoughAi??Ai??not catering to suburban populations >> increased densification along the route to increase ridership >> further increasing land values >> a greater and further exodus of families and businesses to the suburbs, searching for cheaper homes and industrial landAi??Ai?? >> more new highways and bridgesAi??Ai??to cater to increasing suburban populationAi??Ai??>> increased traffic congestion >> more light-metro is planned, but not enough to cater to suburban populations >> increased densification >> and so on.

Most cities understand the SkyTrain trap is, with the first light-metro line built and subsequentlyAi??Ai??future transit construction isAi??Ai??with light rail; but no, not in Vancouver, where planners and politicians continue to plan for pie in the sky light metro lines.

SkyTrain, wins the battle but looses the war: Highways forever!

PortlandA?ai??i??ai???s Regional Planning Agency Highlights Two New Corridors for Light Rail – From the Transport Politic

Interesting news from Portland Oregon, where their light rail system keeps on growing at a steady pace, with taxpayer’s approving construction onAi??Ai??every new line. It must be remembered that Portland’s original light railAi??Ai??line cost one quarter of that to build than Vancouver’s SkyTrain and the regional taxpayer has never been allowed to vote on any ‘rail’ transit project.

13 July 2009

Second line to Gresham and new path to Sherwood would extend cityA?ai??i??ai???s high-capacity network.

PortlandA?ai??i??ai???s Metro regional planning authority has picked two corridors for future major transit investments, plotting the regionA?ai??i??ai???s path towards better public transportation. The new routes would extend east and southwest from downtown and will be developed consecutively after the completion of projects already in the engineering stage today. Metro also selected a number of other corridors for long-term consideration.

Along with the I-205 Green Line light rail scheduled for opening on September 12, the Portland region is currently planning a new light rail line south to Milwaukie, another north to Vancouver (WA), and a streetcar extension south to Lake Oswego. These projects, already being readied for the New Start funding process, will be the first completed.

MetroA?ai??i??ai???s new plans confirm that new routes between downtown and Gresham along Powell Boulevard and another between downtown and Sherwood via Tigard along Barbur Boulevard and Highway 99 will be the next to enter engineering. These routes were chosen after a close analysis of 18 possible corridors in the region and were determined to be the most cost-effective in terms of attracting ridership. Unlike the routes mentioned above, however, these lines have yet to be guaranteed funding. They also could theoretically be built as bus rapid transit, but PortlandA?ai??i??ai???s success thus far with light rail indicates that the city will continue investing in the latter mode.

The plan also argues for future consideration of other corridors in the southern and western parts of the region, though those projects are a long ways off.

PortlandA?ai??i??ai???s pursuit of advanced planning for its light rail program fits well with the cityA?ai??i??ai???s strict adherence to the Oregon-mandated urban growth boundary, which ensures that the countryside remains rural, rather than becoming exurban. Strong transportation investments in the right areas can allow for future growth in dense, infill neighborhoods and prevent suburban sprawl. The cityA?ai??i??ai???s streetcar expansion project follows a similar vein of thought.

The city and region could be doing a better job making that infill happen, however, and one hopes that the new lines will be the setting for a significant densification of the existing urban fabric. Though light rail has brought intense development to downtown and a few isolated spots along the routes, it hasnA?ai??i??ai???t been enough of a game-changer to reorient the auto-centered lifestyle thatA?ai??i??ai???s still present in much of the area. Part of the problem is that many of the light rail routes A?ai??i??ai??? including the soon-to-open Green Line A?ai??i??ai??? are located adjacent to or in the median of grade-separated highways. This makes them less than ideal places for transit-oriented, walkable neighborhoods.

But Powell Boulevard and much of Route 99, by virtue of their tighter girth, are connected to the neighborhoods around them, unlike I-205, for instance. ItA?ai??i??ai???s easy to imagine them transformed into urban boulevards, with four and five-story buildings facing the street and commercial districts situated around light rail stations. As downtown reaches its developmental limits, these corridors could become extensions of that core, adding a bit of mixed-use urbanity to neighborhood around the whole region.

http://thetransportpolitic.com/<!–Yonah Freemark–>

The demise of the Evergreen Line – How does this affect the valley interurban?

It seems that TransLink, which is in deep financial trouble, is on the verge of dumping the Evergreen SkyTrain Line. No surprise here as the proposed Evergreen line follows a route with little ridership potential.

Despite claims and opinions to the contrary, there is little demand for a SkyTrain metro extension to the Tri-Cities as peak hour bus ridership is still less that would sustain a bare bones tram system. Why then TransLink’s penchant for SkyTrain and light-metro?

It’s all about land development and not providing an attractive transit alternative, nor building a customer friendly transit system. Land valuesAi??Ai??near SkyTrain, especially at stations rises considerably as municipal politicians relax zoning and allow much higher densities. This in turn creates large windfall profits for the landowners. The lands adjacent to the Evergreen line have already been rezoned for higher residential and commercial densities and there was little scope for large profits. The $450 million shortfall in funding, poor ridership, and little scope for property rezoning and redevelopment, means the Evergreen Line will remain a vague political promise, with little chance of fruition.

What does this mean for the valley interurban?

The deferral of the Evergreen Line could be good news and I stress ‘could be’ good news for the valley interurban. Why so? TransLink is ‘tapped out’ and taking on another short metro line will only add to their current financial woes. There is an ever increasing demandAi??Ai??from Fraser Valley politicians and residents that they too want to see ‘rail’ transit.

Including RAV, total spending on SkyTrain light-metro networkAi??Ai??is past $8 billion dollars (those huge annual debt servicing charges do add up), yet there is little to show for it south of the Fraser. If RAV/Canada Line doesn’t meet projected ridership numbers by August 2010, there possibly could be a demand by politicians (mindful of 2011 municipal elections) in the Fraser Valley for a more affordable and quicker ‘rail’ transit solution than a $3 billion or more ‘pixie dust’ SkyTrain line to Langley by 2040!

A hourly Vancouver to Chilliwack diesel LRT service could be put in place for about the same cost of two or three km. of SkyTrain and completed in under two years!

The collapse of the Evergreen SkyTrain metro will not herald a new era of light rail in the lower mainland, but may compel transit plannersAi??Ai??to build a cheap ‘rail‘ showcase light railway project fueled by political demands of the taxpayers south of the Fraser River, tired of funding ‘other people’s’ rapid transit lines!