Another suicide, another death and TransLink washes it hands of the problem.
The SkyTrain light-metro system doesn’t have an attendant on board to monitor the tracks.
This is the darker side of driverless trains.
Unlike other automatic metros, there are no sliding glass gates at stations to prevent egress onto the tracks.
This costs money and the politicians do not think it a wise investment. Not cost effective.
It is cheaper in the long term to let the disturb die by SkyTrain, rather to do what other transit authorities have been forced to do, put gates at stations to prevent people from accessing the tracks.
The TransLink, SkyTrain lobby and the Mayor’s Council on Transit seem happy with the status quo, preventing suicides is not cost effective.
Medical emergency stops service between some Vancouver SkyTrain stations
Expo Line service between some Vancouver SkyTrains has been disrupted due to a medical emergency
TransLink has set up bus bridges while service is stopped
VANCOUVER (NEWS 1130) – Expo Line service between the Stadium-Chinatown and Waterfront SkyTrain stations is currently stopped due to a medical emergency.
The shutdown started around 7 a.m. Monday morning.
Commuters needing to get to those stations will have to get off at the Main Street-Science World station for a bus bridge.
Trains are operating from Main Street Station to King George, and customers heading to or from Production Station must transfer at Columbia.
There’s no indication on when service will resume.
Despite the ongoing charade by regional mayors pretending that the now called Movia Automatic Light Metro is not a proprietary railway, the singular fact remains, it is. This Linear Induction Motor (LIM) powered bit of history has always been a proprietary railway, unable to operate with any railway, except its own family of seven such transit systems.
Even Vancouver’s versions of MALM cannot operate coupled sets of MK.1 and MK.2/3 trains.
As there is no “off the shelf” and as one overseas expert told me:
“You just cannot slap a pair of LIM’s on any bogie and expect it to work”
Thus vehicles that can operate on the MALM lines, the Expo and Millennium Lines, operate a proprietary railway and by doing so, creates many problems.
We must return to Gerald Fox’s 1991 study “A Comparison Between Light Rail And Automated Guided Transit” (AGT) to see his conclusions have proven extremely accurate. Please also remember that the two of the AGT systems used in the study, ALRT and VAL, were proprietary transit systems.
Requiring fully grade separated R-O-W and stations and higher car and equipment costs, total construction costs is higher for AGT than LRT. A city selecting AGT will tend to have a smaller rapid transit network than a city selecting LRT.
There is no evidence that automatic operation saves operating and maintenance costs compared to modern LRT operating on a comparable quality of alignment.
The rigidity imposed on operations by a centralized control system and lack of localized response options have resulted in poor levels of reliability on AGT compared to the more versatile LRT systems.
LRT and AGT have similar capacities capabilities if used on the same quality of alignment. LRT also has the option to branch out on less costly R-O-W.
Being a product of contemporary technology, AGT systems carry with them the seeds of obsolescence.
Transit agencies that buy into proprietary systems should consider their future procurement options, particularly if the original equipment manufacturer were to cease operations.
Despite boasting by TransLink and echoed by ill informed civic, provincial and federal politicians, only seven such systems have been sold and not one of the systems sold was ever allowed to compete against light rail. No one has copied Vancouver’s exclusive use of automatic light metro, no one has copied Vancouver’s use of the proprietary and now called MALM.
Toronto’s Scarborough Line was so designed not use light rail vehicles and even cannot use MK 2/3 cars is telling! Very soon there will be only six MALM systems in operation and Detroit’s wee MALM system will soon follow, being life expired.
Then there will be five.
GOLDSTEIN: Why Scarborough RT is dying and Presto’s on life-support
Author of the article:
Lorrie Goldstein
Publishing date:
Feb 12, 2021
Passengers wait for a TTC Scarborough RT Line 3 train at Scarborough Centre Station in Toronto, Ont. on Friday, March 8, 2019. Photo by Bryan Passifiume /Toronto Sun/Postmedia Network
Two City Hall stories covered in the Toronto Sun this week by reporter Bryan Passifiume illustrate perfectly why public transit in this city has been a train wreck for decades.
They are the official and long-predicted death of the ancient and creaking Scarborough RT (rapid transit) line in 2023, and the potential replacement of the Presto fare system post-2027.
Both sagas would be a comedy of errors if they weren’t costing taxpayers and transit users billions of dollars and thousands of hours in wasted travel time.
They demonstrate two enduring truths about public transit in Toronto.
First, our municipal and provincial politicians love to debate building public transit as opposed to building public transit.
Second, when they finally do something, they screw it up.
As a result, beleaguered Scarborough commuters post-2023 will be going back to the future — on buses — hoping for the completion of the three-stop Scarborough subway, supposedly to be ready by 2030, but don’t hold your breath.
We got here because of a decade-plus political battle at City Council and Queen’s Park about whether it would be better to build a seven-stop Scarborough LRT (light rail transit) or a one-stop, three-stop or four-stop Scarborough subway.
The predictable and inevitable result is that Scarborough residents will be getting neither an LRT nor a subway in time to replace the Scarborough RT, which opened in 1985 and should have been mothballed a decade ago.
Replete with cynical political grandstanding and opportunism on all sides of the debate and breathtaking and hilarious flip-flops in hopes of winning municipal and provincial elections, here are the various and sundry positions City Council has taken on an LRT versus a subway for Scarborough since 2007.
We got here because of a decade-plus political battle at City Council and Queen’s Park about whether it would be better to build a seven-stop Scarborough LRT (light rail transit) or a one-stop, three-stop or four-stop Scarborough subway.The predictable and inevitable result is that Scarborough residents will be getting neither an LRT nor a subway in time to replace the Scarborough RT, which opened in 1985 and should have been mothballed a decade ago.Replete with cynical political grandstanding and opportunism on all sides of the debate and breathtaking and hilarious flip-flops in hopes of winning municipal and provincial elections, here are the various and sundry positions City Council has taken on an LRT versus a subway for Scarborough since 2007.
Ready?
(1) We should build the LRT. (2) No, wait, we should build the subway. (3) No wait, we should build the LRT. (4) No wait, we should build the subway.
For the provincial government it’s been (1) We want you to build the LRT. (2) No wait, we want you to build the subway.
It’s like a never-ending Mad Hatter’s tea party.
Which brings us to Presto, the regional electronic fare card that was the brainchild of the provincial government starting in 2002. This should not have been the expensive fiasco it has turned into.
Presto cards at kiosks and in use at and around the Queen St. W. area and subway station on Wednesday October 23, 2019. Photo by Jack Boland /Toronto Sun/Postmedia Network
This wasn’t new technology when it was being developed.
Honk Kong has had its Octopus card and New York the MetroCard (now the OMNY card) since 1997.
London, England has had the Oyster Card since 2003, Chicago the Chicago Card, now replaced by the Ventra Card, since 2004.
Presto, has the distinction of being criticized by three — count ’em three — auditors general, two provincial and one city, going back to 2012.
That’s when then Ontario auditor general Jim McCarter described its rapidly escalating costs — more than $1 billion at the time — as “among the most expensive fare-card systems in the world.”
Its introduction into the Toronto public transit system has been a comedy of costly errors.
That includes everything from malfunctioning vending machines and fare gates, to frozen card readers, charging customers twice for the same fare, charging students and seniors adult fares, and fares being declined because of delays between the time a commuter pre-loads the card and the time it registers in the system.
As Casey Stengel famously said of the hapless 1962 New York Mets, “Can’t anybody here play this game?”
REM is a clone of the Canada Line, a faux P-3 project designed to benifit land speculators, land developers and of course the financiers, which in this case is the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, or CDPQ .
The local rail advocates are now fully understanding at how REM will not provide better public transport and are desperately trying to change what the politicians, with very little public input, have agreed to do.
Like Vancouver, REM has tied Montreal transit planners to a very expensive light metro system and will stop any sort of rational transit planning in the Montreal region for decades to come. As in Vancouver with the Canada Line, the plans were scaled back, stations omitted and will offer a more limited service.
As Vancouver passes the point of no return for user friendly and affordable public transit with the current SkyTrain expansion, only benefiting the Caisse de dépôt, SNC Lavalin who lead the faux P-3 consortium and receive over $110 million annually to run it and politcal friendly land developers and land speculators, drooling at the prospect of another Vancouver land rush.
There is little real evidence that the Canada line has actually taken cars off the road or attracted people to transit, despite what TransLink and the Mayor’s Council on Transit claims.
Will REM be successful?
Only for the Caisse de dépôt and land developers and speculators but, with those wanting better public transit, they will be left waiting at the station as the money train passes them by.
“Just like the construction of the Olympic Stadium, Montrealers can do little but watch billions in public money wasted on a glamour project of dubious necessity.”
Every time there’s an announcement about the Réseau express métropolitain (REM), the pundits, politicians and PR hacks frame it like a late-night infomercial advertising some product you never knew existed but was now available to solve your and all the world’s problems. Finally, they exclaim, Montreal is getting the REM.
Ever since the government of Quebec awarded a no-bid, sole-sourced contract to the provincial pension fund (the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, or CDPQ) to build a new mass transit system, I’ve been concerned this might not be the best idea. I support public transit because I believe it’s the best way to control carbon-dioxide emissions and to make cities far more liveable. Congestion, pollution and emissions all work together in depreciating our quality of life, and I often find myself wondering how we might use our public spaces differently if we only had to contend with a quarter, third or half as many cars.
That aside, the REM is behind schedule, over-budget and bits and pieces of it are being scaled back. It will open later than originally stated, have fewer stations and may not go to all the places we were told it would. Perhaps more disturbingly, both the CDPQ and the political class are now talking about extending it all over the metropolitan region, as though more of this overhyped panacea to all our transit and traffic woes will distract us from the fact that it hasn’t even gotten off the ground yet.
Much like a runaway freight train, there’s little hope of stopping the REM. Indeed, our future REM trains are supposed to be fully automated — no need for pesky unionized transit employees dipping into the profit margin — and so likely won’t have anyone aboard to hit the brakes in case of an emergency. The REM — and this cannot be forgotten — was a decision of the Quebec government in collaboration with the provincial institutional investor, the CDPQ. Neither Denis Coderre nor Valérie Plante had anything to do with it, despite what they may tell you. This was never Montreal’s decision to make, as our transit agency was never initially consulted.
The main reason why the REM won’t be stopped, no matter how many problems it produces, is because there will be incredible financial penalties to pay. Moreover, the work that’s already been done has been so expensive that no government would risk pumping the brakes to re-evaluate just what exactly it is we’re doing, or ask the question whether this is really worth it.
All we can do at this point is complete the project and try to wrestle back some control into the hands of the people who need and use public transit, rather than those who seek to profit off it.
So with all this mind, let’s consider some of the most recent developments.
Anyone who’s not too stoned to recall 2015-16 (when the REM was first announced) will doubtless remember the centrality of the airport connection. Finally — we were told so many times — Montreal would have a quick and efficient connection to the airport. Now it seems that Aeroports de Montréal is unable to come up with the estimated $600-million to build the connection. It’s a neat idea to have direct public transit connections between airports and city centres, but in Montreal’s case the passenger estimate for the new airport stop isn’t terribly impressive. One estimate prepared for the CDPQ back in 2016-2017, and based on data from 2015, put the daily average number of airport REM station boardings between 4,600 in 2021 (what was supposed to be the first year of operation) and 5,600 in 2031 (after a decade-long “ramp-up” in use). This would put the airport REM station in the same range as some of the lesser used metro stations. Some of the more optimistic pre-pandemic projections indicated 10,000 passengers will use the station per day. While it’s true the number of passengers using Trudeau airport has been steadily increasing over the years, it was still just 20 million passengers per annum, and that was before the pandemic. It may not be until the end of this decade that we get back to that level of passengers, and of course, the major reductions in flights also means major reductions in airport workers too, further sapping the number of people who may use a new REM airport station.
The airport station reveals other shortcomings of the REM. The way the system was designed, the only trains that will run directly to the airport are those leaving the McGill/Central Station nexus downtown. If your starting point is on the South Shore, in Deux Montagnes or in the West Island, you’ll have to switch trains, as none of those branches will run trains going directly to the airport.
While the estimated travel time between downtown Montreal and the airport will probably clock-in at 20-25 minutes, passengers coming from other areas can expect much longer commutes. For the majority of West Islanders, Lavalois and people living on the western side of the off-island suburbs, taking a cab or driving will unfortunately still be the most efficient way to get to the airport. And at 20-25 minutes, the REM isn’t that much more competitive on the downtown-airport run than the existing bus service.
Worse, it’s not like Montreal can take the $600-million earmarked for the airport station and use it somewhere else — like buying 600 brand-new electric buses from a local bus manufacturer (NovaBus’s fanciest, fully electric buses cost $1-million apiece). For comparison’s sake, 600 new buses, each carrying 80 passengers, just increased Montreal’s public transit capacity by 48,000 people per minute. This would be a considerable improvement over the few thousand additional passengers handled by the airport stop, but more significantly, the buses, unlike the REM, can go anywhere.
Why are we so caught up with the idea of riding the REM to the airport? It probably stems from the same minds that think a REM monorail over René-Lévesque is also a good idea. In sum, Montreal’s getting transit solutions to problems that don’t really exist, dreamt up by people who may not live here and likely haven’t used public transit in decades.
The people who are calling the shots consistently pitch the REM as a solution both to congestion as well as something that will encourage people to abandon their cars and hop on board the sustainability train. They pitch the REM as something “cool” that people will look forward to trying, and I can’t help but wonder how many of these people marvelled at the various new fangled transit technologies demoed at Expo 67, like hovercrafts (no longer will your boat be confined to water!) or gondolas (they’re not just for Switzerland anymore!).
Yes, people do need to be encouraged to take public transit, but this won’t happen if you spend several years ripping up the existing transit infrastructure. The STM’s ridership numbers were increasing steadily year over year until the Coderre administration made serious service cutbacks in 2014. Consequently, use declined, something REM construction exacerbated.
When it was originally proposed, the REM was supposed to use existing infrastructure. The public was assured that the construction of the REM would have a minimal impact on extant infrastructure. But rather than buying trains to fit extant infrastructure, the CDPQ instead decided to build everything anew, from the trains to the track to the power systems. In so doing, the most-used commuter train line in Greater Montreal was shut down, and the excessively expensive Mascouche Line was cut off from downtown Montreal, rendering it essentially useless. New double-decker trains bought less than a decade ago are no longer needed. It goes on and on like this. Just like the construction of the Olympic Stadium, Montrealers can do little but watch a white elephant get built, billions in public money wasted on glamour projects of dubious necessity.
There’s a common denominator to this mess: Montreal’s transit isn’t planned by Montreal. The REM was always a Quebec government and CDPQ project, and it’s worth pointing out that the CDPQ had no prior experience in the construction or management of mass transit systems, let alone public transit.
Montreal is actually legally prohibited from developing its own public transit systems (see item #151 here). That is to say, if Montreal had $10-billion lying around, it would still not be allowed to expand the metro.
We have no choice but to involve middlemen in our own transit planning decisions. With regards to the REM, the Quebec government handed incredible power over to the CDPQ. They were given exclusive rights to public infrastructure (like the new Champlain Bridge and the Mount Royal Tunnel) and further granted non-compete agreements with other modes and services of public transit. Looping back to the issue of the airport station, the CDPQ actually managed to get the government to agree to force the STM to cancel the 747 airport shuttle to give the REM exclusive airport access (see pp. 10-11 here).
No public transit planner would ever plan transit like this.
Once the REM becomes operational, all other transit modes and systems will be reoriented to serve it. Eliminating duplication may seem like a good idea to the number crunchers, but users and planners understand that operational redundancy is vital. A healthy transit system offers multiple ways to get between points A and B — not only does this offer users choice, it helps spread people out and offers alternatives in case of service disruptions.
What concerns me most of all about the REM — aside from the fact that we’re essentially subsidizing the CDPQ’s real-estate development plans and being used as guinea-pigs for their infrastructure development business — is that we’ve been forced to hand over control of public transit to a for-profit organization. The CDPQ included a clause stating their annual return on investment would be set at 10% irrespective of the REM’s actual revenues. If the REM doesn’t produce this return, taxpayers foot the difference.
There’s nothing really novel about the REM. It’s just another imposition on the city of Montreal by people who claim to have our best interests at heart, but are truly only interested in sucking as much money out of the public purse as they possibly can. The REM is shiny and new, and may or may not reach the airport, but it isn’t the boring old solutions that would likely have the best overall impact. There are experts, but they weren’t consulted. There were consultations, but the people were ignored. There was an environmental assessment that was highly critical of the project, and Coderre decided it had exceeded its mandate. We were given the bare minimum opportunity to speak, but no one was really listening.
So what do we do now?
It’s an election year, there’s a good chance Coderre will run, and he’ll likely position himself as the REM king. Mayor Plante, not wanting to be upstaged, will likely match or exceed whatever Coderre’s position is on transit development. Expect a lot of talk about a Blue Line extension to Anjou (finally!), more talk about a Train de l’Est and/or some kind of Pink Line/ Train de l’Est amalgam (finally!!) and monorails over René-Lévesque (finally!!!). They’ll likely each have a position on the airport connection as well, and here Montrealers may have a chance at regaining a degree of control over public transit. We can say no, we can demand the REM be subsumed into the STM and we can insist the citizens and government of Montreal be given the control they deserve over their own transit systems.
A Bonn tram on a simple, yet effective reserved rights-of-way, giving metro service at a fraction of the cost.
In the 1970’s, German trams were on the decline. Two decades of subway mania fragmented tram lines and tram routes and on the whole, ridership on German public transport was declining.
Despite eager promises from planners and politicians of futuristic rapid transit, the new subways were not attracting predicted ridership and car use increased dramatically, further putting pressure on transport authorities.
As the 1980’s approached it was common knowledge that all but a few of German tramways would not survive into the 21st century.
Then the mid life subway rehab time bomb went off, further stressing transit managers to find new monies to subsidize huge subway rehab costs and under performing bus routes.
A Berlin tram is a very user-friendly park like setting.
As the mid life rehab costs for subways began to beggar transit operators, transit managers struggled to maintain a consumer friendly transit system. Subways were not attracting the expected ridership and ongoing maintenance costs were limiting expansion. The buses that replaced the trams were far from popular and with forced transfers from bus to metro, many customers started to drive instead.
Politicians, like politicians elsewhere they thought they were grand transit experts. In Germany right wing politicians favoured metros or subways and left wing politicians favoured trams.
Sound familiar?
A modern articulated tram in mixed traffic in Heidelberg.
The 1980’s brought the low-floor articulated tram; the concept of the urban reserved or dedicated rights-of-ways; and simpler ways of ticketing.
By the early 80’s, German public transport was on the decline and in trouble.
Desperate to retain ridership, tranait managers listened directly to the transit customer and tried to provide a transit service that best fitted the needs of customers and not politicians. Transit customers did not want buses, nor subways, rather they wanted their trams because of their convenience and speed to get to their destinations. Add in new cars and new ways of operating and once was a declining transit mode, saw a massive resurgence.
The now famous Karlsruhe Zweisystem or TramTrain came from a direct result of customer input and managers thinking out of the box. Transit customers did not like the transfer from commuter train to tram at the main station and TramTrain provided a direct service to the city centre. So popular was this new concept of operating trams that ridership exploded, with a 479% increase in ridership in just a few months!
Customer first planning, quality vehicles and thinking out of the box has brought major changes on how transit is provided, including TramTrain, cargo trams, lawned rights-of-ways and much more.
The successful Car-Go-Tram in Dresden.
Today Germany operates ten light rail lines (most are Stadtbahn with extensive subway sections) and fifty-six tram/LRT lines, which is extremely positive of a transit mode that just over forty years ago was deemed obsolete.
The German tram resurgence gives many positive lessons about public transit, including giving the customer a product he wants to use, quality service to cater to destinations where the customer wants to go and not burdening the taxpayer with transit “glam”.
Lessons that have yet to be learned in metro Vancouver.
Alstom is now the owner of the proprietary Movia Automatic Light Metro (MALM) system and the big question is, will Alstom continue to produce the MK.2/3 cars or even honour Bombardier’s contracts with TransLink.
Will Alstom treat TransLink and regional politicians as rubes for the taking?
The early resignation of TransLink CEO Kevin Desmond, and the puff stories in the mainstream media about his tenure and TransLink, pure spin by all accounts, may provide an answer.
As noted here for the past several years, the Expo and Millennium lines need up to $3 billion in rehab, especially the aging Expo Line and this money has not been funded.
As the start of construction of the Broadway subway, chill financial winds are circling around TransLink as former customers are not returning to transit, which means former customers are not returning the very expensive light metro system.
Operating empty buses on empty routes can go on only for so long and politicians, as all levels of government will worry that the politically prestigious Broadway subway will slowly turn into a financial tar pit.
Another ill wind has now arisen, depite the hype and hoopla and well orchestrated news releases by TransLink about record ridership, mode share by transit has been declining.
I do not think the 2020’s will be kind to TransLink or the politicians who supported their grand schemes.
Alstom completes Bombardier Transportation acquisition to create ‘a global mobility leader’
29 January 2021
INTERNATIONAL: ‘Today is a unique moment for Alstom and the mobility sector worldwide, with the creation of a new global leader centred on smart and sustainable mobility’, said Alstom Chairman & CEO Henri Poupart-Lafarge when the acquisition of Bombardier Transportation was completed on January 29.
Valencia was the first Spanish city to reintroduce the tram, in 1994. The success of the modern tramway network in Valencia led to the extension of its lines on three occasions.
After Valencia came Bilbao (2002), Alicante (2003), Barcelona (2004) and, in October 2006, the inauguration of the 4.7 km long Vélez-Málaga Tram (which linked Vélez-Málaga with the coastal part of Torre del Mar).
These lines were followed by the Metro Ligero de Madrid (2007), in the Madrid districts of Sanchinarro and las Tablas (ML-1), and linking the capital with Boadilla del Monte and Pozuelo de Alarcón (ML2, ML3).
Then came Seville, where a tramway network named MetroCentro has been running since spring 2007, Tenerife (2007), Murcia (2007), the Madrid suburb of Parla (2007) and Vitoria (2008).
In Tenerife, the tramway is operated by the company Metropolitano de Tenerife. It runs through and connects the cities of Santa Cruz de Tenerife and San Cristóbal de La Laguna, and has a fleet of 26 Alstom Citadis trams. Line 1 (Santa Cruz interchange)–Avda. Trinidad (La Laguna) opened on 2 June 2007. The line connecting the two neighborhoods of Tincer (Santa Cruz) and La Cuesta (La Laguna) followed on 30 May 2009.
Valencia
Projects, from Wikipedia:
In Spain, 13 tram networks are currently planned to be added to the nine already operating.
There have also been plans to install a tramway in Oviedo (a project to implement this mode of transport, by the PSOE, was discarded after the PP defeated it at an election). In addition, Madrid is expanding its LRT (light rail) network on its outskirts.
Cadiz TramTrain
From Zweisystem:
Spain has shown that their politicians and transit planners understand the importance of the modern tram, especially for large cities, is alleviating gridlock, congestion and pollution.
While our politicians dither with dated transportation concepts and an almost vitriolic hate of the the modern tram, valuable monies are being wasted on politically prestigious transit projects that in the end will not achieve the success that they have been promised to be.
In Metro Vancouver, the result of this current transit planning is all too predictable,: gridlock, congestion and pollution.
A single line in Montpellier, line T1, carriess over 130,000 weekday riders! And thatai??i??s with no tunnels, mostly street running.
Systems in Nantes, Bordeaux and Montpellier have ridership at or near 260,000 riders a day! That exceeds Boston.
The French do it right! What you get is: Simple OCS systems; grassy trackways; frequent headways (7A?>10 minutes or less); most of the important urban trip-generating venues served; most systems connect with the railway stations; much peripheral development along tram lines; tram/pedestrian-only zones; and clean, attractive trams.
Compared to metro Vancouver’s poor planning, it is impressive.
Hello everyone. In this video I talk about the tramway revival in France. What are the strengths of the tram? What it can promote in terms of use of means of transport and the attractiveness of urban centers. Since the 1980s, new tram networks have flourished throughout Europe, over fifty of them. The trend was initially shy, then it has undergone a much faster pace since the 2000s, to the point that it is no exaggeration to speak of real fashion.
It was in France that this phenomenon was born and tram networks have been developed the most over the past two decades, as the graph shows you on the screen. In 1983, there was in France only three tram networks left, or rather three tram lines, one in Lille, one in Marseille and one in Saint-Etienne. There was in 2012, 24 operated networks. The first network to have been achieved is the Nantes network, which was commissioned in 1985. It was followed by the Grenoble network in 1987, and the modern tramway, which was developed in AZle-de-France in 1992, then in 1994, the Strasbourg network was born. It was the first tram networks that have been made in France again.
Why such enthusiasm for the tramway? The modern tram, as rebuilt in many European cities, is part of a double movement. The one that first aims to promote the use of other means of transport that the car as part of everyday life, but also on the other hand, the desire to reclassify urban centers to make them more attractive to frequent, as well as live in. Thus in most urban areas where it was reintroduced, the tram was accompanied by an important urban requalification in the city center and a sharing of the road favorable to other modes of transport than the car.
Research on the introduction of a tram in a public transport network, show that it allows a growing number of users. Tram Assets are indeed many for the user: a much higher speed than the bus, high frequency shift during the day, evening and weekend, a smooth ride that allows to use one’s travel time to deploy activities, provided that we have a seat, usually quality foot paths to go to stops because of efforts to improve the ergonomics of the public space, and finally, easier memorizing the path of the lines due to the materialization of the tramway in the public space via the rails.
In France, in many cities that have reintroduced trams, there is also an increase in the number of inhabitants in the city centers. On the one hand, it appears that the tram favors real estate investments in the city, through the redevelopment of public spaces that accompanies it, on the other hand, there is also that the tram contributes to make more desirable to live in the city because the tram limits the dependence on cars by the quality of transport service it offers to residents. The effect of the introduction of the tram on the use of public transport is however very variable.
Statistics on the use of public transport update consequent differences according to the considered cities, and in particular, these figures show that the increase of the number of users five years after commissioning of a tram overall a network varies for France between + 18% and + 50%. This is what you see for example for a number of cities in the table you have before you. This suggests that the use of the tram is not mechanical. That is to say it is not enough to introduce a tram that it is used, even if in all agglomerations in which it was introduced in France, there is an increase in the use of public transport.
How can we explain these differences in the use of public transport following the commissioning of a tram? There are a number of factors related to the offer and the interaction of the offer with the context and the provisions of the resident population in a city that explains these differences. In the offer, there is first of all the commercial speed, following that it is low, 14 to 16 km / h or higher, more than 20km / h, there are differences in the use of the tram network, and more generally of public transport. There are also differences depending on the frequency if the frequencies are quite low, from 8 to 10 minutes, or high, from 3 to 5 minutes. This is also a factor which has an influence on the use.
The fact that the network is unified in its quality, that is to say, we offer almost the same frequencies, the same amplitude sideboards the evenings and weekends throughout the network, or only on the tram network, and that therefore there would be a public transport offer of two speeds, a high-quality service on tram lines, and a lower quality of service on the bus network, it also has an impact on the use of public transport. Another effect that has an impact on the use of trams: is that the lines are saturated or do they offer the comfort of a seat, This allows using one’s time. This is particularly the case when using public transport during off-peak hours. Finally, the link with urban planning and urban development, the question is also to know if the tram lines that have been developed, serve the agglomeration in which the offer was extended, completely or only partially.
Or in other words: how is made the joint between the public transport system and urbanization, Can we go anywhere with public transport, or otherwise, are only some parts of the metropolitan area available? That is also a factor that plays a central role in the greater or lesser use of public transport, especially when there is introduction of a tram. And of course, last factor that plays a role: the issue of reliability. Does generaly, schedules are respected. You understood through the examples I’ve shown you, tram networks in France were often allowed to revalue cities and it is even often their main function. This is the case for example in Bordeaux, a city that is often considered as exemplary of this view. A high quality in the fields which have been cited in this video makes it possible for people to deploy its lifestyle using public transport and it makes attractive the attendance of urban spaces, whether recreational or for habitat.
In this sense, the redeployment of tramway networks in France as much about the planning issues that of transportation issues, although of course and as I noted in this video, there is also an interest in the field of transport to develop these infrastructures since in all the cities where these networks have been redeployed, there is an increase in the use of public transport.
Given by Vincent Kaufmann est professeur de sociologie urbaine et d’analyse des mobilits laEcole Polytechnique rale de Lausanne (EPFL).
It seems there is much confusion with TransLink and metro cities regarding transit mode. It is the old shell game, practiced by BC Transit, TransLink, both the provincial Liberal Party and the NDP, regional Mayors and very sadly, both University of BC and Simon Fraser University.
Rapid transit refers to metro and not light rail, which is a stand alone transit mode and far more adaptable than rapid transit and very successful in application. LRT can be built as rapid transit, as we see in Ottawa and Seattle but it can also operate as true LRT or even a streetcar if need be.
Unlike rapid transit, LRT is extremely flexible in operation and not restricted by automatic train control, which demands a grade separated rights-of-way, either on a viaduct (very expensive) or in a subway (hugely expensive).
So why does the old shell game continue? Why to bureaucrats confuse both the public and politicians with non existent transit modes?
It is time for clarity in planning, which make many bureaucrats and politicians very, very nervous.
The first letter sent, Janurary 5, 2021 to Richmond mayor and council.
Mayor and council;
*
A recent article in the Richmond News makes me wonder if city staff understand the nuances of rail transit.
*
We currently operate light metro in the region, with Richmond being served with a pygmy heavy rail metro, operated as a light metro and lacks both capacity and affordability.
*
Rapid transit is a bureaucratic term that can mean anything, but the transit industry refers to rapid transit as a heavy rail metro.
Light Rail Transit or LRT is just a modern tram operating on a dedicated rights of way, which the former interurban route is a good example of.
*
Modern light rail can affordably cater to traffic flows from 2,000 persons per hour per direction to over 20,000 (pphpd), which is currently more than the maximum capacity of 15,000 pphpd for the Expo and Millennium Lines and around 9,000 pphpd with the Canada Line.
*
There is no need to densify the route for modern light rail, in fact the density issue is strictly a SkyTrain issue because there is no other credible reason for building the light metro in the Metro Vancouver region. The density issue was created to support the development of towers and high rise condos, which benefit land speculators and land developers, who tend to support politicians at election time.
*
What is needed for LRT to succeed is building a user-friendly service that takes customers from where they live to where they want to go; something most transit planners in Metro Vancouver tend to forget.
The cost of the SkyTrain light-metro is now over $200 mil/km to build. Richmond does not have the population to support such an investment.
The reply from a City of Richmond Engineer;
As you note, there certainly exists a range of rapid transit technologies available today. Although costs and infrastructure requirements vary by type, each feature high-capacity vehicles and provide priority over general traffic that goes beyond what is achieved with conventional transit.
*
Metro Vancouver’s rapid transit system currently includes the Rail Rapid Transit (RTT) Expo, Millennium and Canada Lines. TransLIink, the authority responsible for providing public transit in the region, have also considered two other forms of rapid transit: Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and Light Rail Transit (LRT). There are five BRT lines currently in operation and a future BRT linking Richmond City Centre to the Expo Line is planned by TransLink.Given the higher cost of rail rapid transit relative to conventional bus service, ridership is a key consideration to ensure effective and productive service.
*
Transit Service Guidelines established by TransLink provide general thresholds to determine the type and provision of transit services. Typically, the type of transit service depends on a variety of factors including trip type, number of destinations and travel demand based on current and future land use on a corridor. For rapid transit service, TransLink relies on comprehensive and specialized studies to consider eligibility for investment in consideration of other regional priorities. Studies focus primarily on high performing frequent transit routes that already have significant established ridership that is anticipated to increase with densification in the future.
I have forwarded your comments to TransLink for consideration, given they are the authority that provides regional public transportation.
Regards
The Wuppertal Schwebebahn could be considered Rail Rapid Transit, simply because it is a true monorail and uses one rail, unlike straddle-beam monorails.
The reply, Janurary 12, 2021
Thank you for your email.
*
There is really no such thing as Rail Rapid Transit and generally it is a bureaucratic term to encompass all rail systems, which in the end does not really describe any mode.
*
Today we have metro, light-metro and light rail and their sub variants. Light-metro is largely obsolete, superseded by light rail and metro.
*
The Metro Vancouver region operates light metro, with the Expo and Millennium Lines operating a proprietary light metro system and the Canada Line which is a heavy-rail metro built as a light metro.
*
Light rail is a transit mode unto itself and comes in sub variants, such as streetcar or tram, light rail, which is a tram operating on a dedicated rights-of-way, tramtrain which is a tram that can operate on both tram or streetcar lines or on a mainline railway and now ultra light tram, which is said to be cheaper than BRT.
*
We do not have BRT in the lower mainland, rather we have express buses tarted up as BRT. To be called BRT a bus must operate on a dedicated rights-away and with greater land take and lower unit capacities, have costs approaching modern light rail!
*
BRT is not more efficient than LRT, especially as the number of passengers increases. Operationally, BRT becomes very inefficient compared to LRT at only moderate levels of passenger flows. The operating costs of having to operate greater and greater numbers of buses compared to the number of (Light Rail Vehicle), to move the same number of passengers, is why Ottawa started transforming the continent’s largest BRT network into an LRT network.
*
The problem in Richmond is that at over $200 million/km, it is impractical to extend the Canada Line and the best course of action is to build a stand alone LRT line and maybe convert the Canada Line to LRT at a later date. I have been advised that it would be the cheaper option to increase capacity.
*
TransLink, unfortunately, is decades behind the times and their studies reflect this. No one builds with light-metro and proprietary railways are losing favour due to their high costs, especially as they age.
*
I have been advised by both Canadian, American and European engineers about our local transit issues and their answers are blunt and to the point, Metro Vancouver operates a dated light-metro system that does not conform to modern public transport philosophy and by doing so is costing the taxpayer far more money that it should. A great disservice has been done to the transit customer, by providing an inferior service, decades out of date.
*
The letter is a warning of financial ills to come and indeed financial ills will come.
The modern tram, can obtain much higher capacities than our light-metro system, but can be built at a fraction of the cost.
Zwei has been copied a letter that has been sent out to Metro politicians. I also have been informed that the provincial NDP have blocked receiving said letter.
It is of great importance that the media should ask pointed questions about regional transit, but they don’t and have given largely given regional transit a free pass.
Making transit issues a ‘mom and apple pie’ approach is leading to a financial quagmire, which I am afraid will start giving the taxpayer sticker shock very soon.
The 50 year costs for SkyTrain are never mentioned and for good reason, they are huge.
My name is Malcolm Johnston and I have been involved with transit issues in the lower mainland for over 35 years. I am advised by transit experts, both in Canada and abroad and I am the person responsible for the Leewood Study, an independent study by Leewood Projects UK, about the viability of reinstating the former Vancouver to Chilliwack interurban service with modern TramTrain or light diesel multiple units, on behalf of the Rail for the Valley group.
The Lower mainland has a very expensive transit problem; Metro Vancouver mayors, the province and TransLink have approved $4.6 billion dollars, extending the Expo and Millennium lines 12.8 km.
This massive expenditure, extending the Millennium and Expo Lines a mere 12.8 km will not attract much new ridership because there will be little improvement for the transit customer.
Premier Horgan’s recent political promise to extend the Expo Line to Langley, has grave financial implications, akin to the FastFerry fiasco, which has followed the NDP as an Albatross around its political neck for two and half decades.
This $4.6 billion investment confirms Bent Flyvberg’s Iron Law of Mega-projects specifically addresses why politicians are obsessed with infrastructure at any cost.
…the “political sublime,” which here is understood as the rapture politicians get from building monuments to themselves and their causes. Mega-projects are manifest, garner attention, and lend an air of proactiveness to their promoters. Moreover, they are media magnets, which appeals to politicians who seem to enjoy few things better than the visibility they get from starting mega-projects. Except maybe cutting the ribbon of one in the company of royals or presidents, who are likely to be present lured by the unique monumental and historical import of many mega-projects. This is the type of public exposure that helps get politicians re-elected. They therefore actively seek it out.
It is time TransLink stops its deliberate game of confusion with Metro Vancouver’s rapid transit system, which has lead to decades of dubious transit projects.
Metro Vancouver’s rapid transit system is a light-metro system, which is called SkyTrain. The SkyTrain system is made up of two distinct railways:
The Canada Line, a conventional railway, built as a light metro and uses ‘off the shelf’ Electrical Multiple Units (EMU’s) currently supplied by ROTEM of Korea.
The Expo and Millennium Lines operate an unconventional, proprietary and often renamed light-metro system, now called Movia Automatic Light Metro (MALM), which cars are only built by Bombardier Inc.
The MALM system uses linear induction motors (LIM’s) and is not compatible in operation with any other railway except its small family of seven systems. Vancouver is now the sole customer for MALM.
A technology bias exists at TransLink. Internationally the MALM system is considered obsolete as it costs more to build, operate and maintain than conventional light rail. Cities that built light-metro, such as Ottawa and Seattle, use light rail vehicles, as they are much cheaper to operate and far more flexible in operation.
TransLink continues to use this cunning method of manipulating analysis to justify SkyTrain in corridor after corridor, and thus succeeds in keeping its proprietary rail system expanding.
Gerald Fox, Noted American engineer, retired.
TransLink’s well oiled propaganda machine, churning out ”fake news” and “alternative facts” has created the local SkyTrain myth. The SkyTrain myth has fuelled the SkyTrain Lobby, which repeats TransLink’s fake news so much, that politicians and the public have come to believe the SkyTrain myth.
The Broadway subway is testament to the power of the SkyTrain myth. Funding for the $2.83 billion Broadway subway has been approved, yet its foundation is one of half truths and questionable planning.
The North American Standard for building a subway is a transit route with traffic flows in excess of 15,000 persons per hour per direction (pphpd), yet peak traffic flows on the 99B Line is about 2,000 pphpd, based on 3 minute peak hour headway’s.
TransLink’s two top planners were fired for their opposition to the subway, by publicly stating the obvious; that there wasn’t the ridership on Broadway to justify an almost $3 billion subway.
TransLink quite happily lets people believe that Broadway is the “most heavily used transit route in Canada“, but claims “This is our region’s most overcrowded bus route.”, instead when there is a threat of professional or legal accountability.
“The problem with TransLink is that you can never believe what it says; TransLink never produces a report based on the same set of assumptions.”
Former West Vancouver Clr. Victor Durman, Chair of the GVRD (now METRO) Finance Committee.
The Mayor of Surrey’s flip flop from LRT to SkyTrain was also predictable, as the bureaucrats at TransLink did their best to ensure this would happen.
The well oiled SkyTrain Lobby was in full force with every bit of classic fake news and alternative facts they could muster, yet ignored the fact that MALM is now considered obsolete internationally and only seven such systems have been built in over forty years.
The present mayor of Surrey’s election claim that a SkyTrain extension from King George station to Langley City could be completed for $1.65 billion, was later exposed to be false.
The figure was $1.25 billion lower than the $2.9 billion estimate by engineering firm Steer Davies Gleave & Hatch, yet TransLink, the provincial and federal governments stayed mute.
Now, with the NDP promising to complete the proprietary MALM railway to Langley at a further cost of $1.6 billion, a very costly issue arises.
The aging Expo line is desperately in need of a major rehab. This rehab includes a major overhaul and expanded electrical supply; a new automatic train control system, all the switches being replaced on both the Expo and Millennium Lines to permit faster operation and all stations must be rebuilt to deal with the higher customer flows which come with a higher capacity. The rehab is said to cost between $2 billion to $3 billion and must be done before any extension to Langley is built.
The real cost of the Langley extension will be $3.6 billion to $4.6 billion!
How is this to be funded?
The combined annual operating costs for the Broadway subway and the full Expo Line to Langley will exceed $70 million annually.
How is this to be funded?
Is a $4.6 billion expanding MALM 12.8 km a good investment?
By comparison, 2020 cost for The Rail for the Valley’s Leewood Study, for a 130 km, Vancouver to Chilliwack passenger service, using the BC Electric rail line, servicing North Delta, Cloverdale, Langley, Abbotsford, Sardis and Chilliwack and connecting the many business parks, universities and colleges along the route, will cost $1.5 billion.
TransLink does not support the Leewood Study’s Vancouver to Chilliwack rail service because it would outperform their $4.6 billion, pygmy 12.8 km extension to the Expo and Millennium Lines.
“But, eventually, Vancouver will need to adopt lower-cost LRT in its lesser corridors, or else limit the extent of its rail system. And that seems to make some TransLink people very nervous.”
Gerald Fox
With the Covid-19 emergency, a major rethink must be done on how we provide an affordable regional rail system. Metro Vancouver’s light-metro system has been well studied, yet those cities who have done so, have invested in light rail instead!
Why, in an era of unprecedented investment in regional rail transit, has no one copied Vancouver’s light metro system, including the exclusive use of the proprietary MALM system?
Of the seven systems built in the past forty years, Toronto is soon tearing down their version of SkyTrain and Detroit’s version will follow, as both systems infrastructure are near being “life expired”.
Two of the later versions of SkyTrain built in Malaysia and Korea have embroiled both the patent holders, SNC Lavalin and Bombardier in legal proceedings, including charges of bribery.
It is time to put an end to MALM expansion or the provincial government and current mayors, will become like Marley’s ghost, dragging an ever longer chain made of empty cash-boxes, IOU’s, red ink, bare pursesand increased taxes wrought in union made steel, election, after election for decades to come.
Remember the FastFerries?
Today, TransLink continues to be toxic with taxpayers and extending MALM to Langley will make TransLink and all who supported the gold-plated extensions radioactive politically, on a Chernobyl scale.
THE CAPACITIES of different modes of transport are generally quoted as 0-10 000 passengers per hour for bus, 2000-20 000 for light rail, and 15 000 upwards for heavy rail.
* Maximum capacity is only likely to be required for a few hours during peak hours, and even here there are likely to be variations both day by day and within each hour. The capacity required originates from the route’s social characteristics.
* As for the vehicles, buses have a comfort capacity equal to the number of seats, and a maximum capacity equal to seats plus standing load.
* In the case of trams, it is more complicated. The nominal maximum capacity is calculated at four passengers per square metre of available floor space (a reasonably comfortable level), plus the number of seats.
* As trams are designed to carry a large standing load, the ratio of standees to seats is quite high. The standing area is also important for the carrying of wheelchairs, pushchairs, shopping and sometimes bicycles. Some manufacturers quote maximum capacity using 6p/m2 while a figure of 8p/m 2 is used as a measure of crush capacity. This last figure is also employed to determine the motor rating of the vehicle.
* A further complication is that even when there are seats available, some passengers prefer to stand. This may be because they are only traveling for a few stops, that they want to stretch their legs, or may just prefer to stand.
* A tram’s comfort capacity can therefore be considered as the number of seats, plus the voluntary standees who may amount to up to 10-15% of the nominal maximum number of standing passengers.
ELASTICITY
* It is the difference between the average passenger load for any particular time and the crush load which gives light rail its Elasticity Factor, allowing it to cope with variations in conditions such as sudden surges or emergency conditions.
* Standing is made more acceptable by the design of track and vehicle, reducing the forces acting on the passenger to a minimum. This makes for a smooth ride, as well as ensuring ease of access, good support and the ability to see out without having to stoop.
* Where a route is mainly urban with short journey times, the number of vehicles required should be calculated on the nominal maximum. On longer journeys outside the central area, a lower level may be more appropriate, dependent on the route’s characteristics. Even on rural sections, there are likely to be a a number of short distance riders, and the loading factor will increase nearer to the urban area.
COMPRESSIBILITY
* While it might be thought desirable to offer every passenger a seat, it is in fact the ability to carry high loadings in a confined area (the Compressibility Factor) which enables light rail to achieve many environmental benefits, allowing large numbers of people to be carried without harming, and often improving, the features of a city.
* It is city centres where several routes combine that the most capacity is required. A typical situation could be a pedestrian street with six routes operating at 10-minute headway giving 36 double coupled trams per hour each with a capacity of 225. This gives a nominal capacity of16 200 passengers per hour which can be increased to 25 200 pph in extremis without extra vehicles.
Light rail is unique in this ability to operate on the surface with its capacity without detracting from the amenities which it serves. A further factor in setting the resources required is the need to lure motorists out of cars. The more difficult the traffic conditions, the higher the loading’s will be acceptable. It is however important that crush loads are not allowed for more than the shortest of periods on an infrequent basis, both to maintain customer satisfaction and prevent elasticity of the system being compromised.
* It is vital that public transport can cope with sudden changes in demand, such as extreme inclement weather or air quality violations which can cause private traffic to be halted. This is where the elasticity inherent in light rail is so beneficial in enabling an instant response in an economical fashion. A tram may be crowded, but its infinitely better than having to wait in the snow of smog until extra vehicles are brought into service.
* It is this unique combination of Capacity, Compressibility and Elasticity rather than capacity alone which makes light rail so successful as an urban transport mode.
* Note Statistics are based on Karlsruhe, using GT/8 cars
Recent Comments